^{Page 356 note 1} Mazrui, Ali A., Towards a Pax Africana: a study of ideology and ambition (Chicago and London, 1967), p. 14.Google Scholar

^{Page 356 note 2} Ibid.

^{Page 356 note 3} Ibid. pp. 33–4.

^{Page 357 note 1} For example, Kwame Nkrumah, the foremost pan-Africanist, once wrote: ‘We feel a special sympathy with those who are kin to us in race. But equally we have special relations with other African states, such as Tunisia, which are not bound to us by any racial ties.’ ‘African Prospect’, in Foreign Affairs (New York), 37, 10 1958, p. 46.Google Scholar In a similar vein another noted pan-Africanist, Nnamdi Azikiwe, writes: ‘The inhabitants of the African continent are not racially homogeneous. In North Africa, the majority of the population belongs to the mediterranean group of the Caucasoid race. In Africa South of the Sahara, the majority are Negroid.’ ‘Pan-Africanism’, in Emerson, Rupert and Kilson, Martin (eds.), The Political Awakening of Africa (Englewood Cliffs, 1965), p. 150.Google Scholar

^{Page 357 note 2} Cobban, Alfred, The Nation-State and National Self-Determination (1945, New York edn. 1970), p. 107.Google Scholar

^{Page 358 note 1} In independent African countries South of the Sahara, perhaps more Africans have lost their lives in the past ten years fighting against tribal or ethnic domination than against European domination during the previous half century. A basic fact of life in Africa is that those outside one's cultural group are regarded as foreigners, and there have been instances, as among the Hausa-Fulanis of Nigeria, where early independence has been opposed: the extended rule of a European power has been preferred to the possibility of political domination by another African cultural group.

^{Page 358 note 2} Nkrumah, loc. cit. p. 46.

^{Page 359 note 1} Higgins, Rosalyn, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations (Oxford, 1963), p. 104.Google Scholar

^{Page 359 note 2} Ibid. p. 105.

^{Page 359 note 3} Cobban, op. cit. p. 106.

^{Page 360 note 1} Duchacek, Ivo D., Comparative Federalism: the territorial dimension of politics (New York, 1970), p. 69.Google Scholar

^{Page 360 note 2} For example, see Forbes, Jack, ‘Do Tribes have Rights? The Question of Self-Determination for Small Nations’, in Journal of Human Relations (Wilberforce), 18, 1, 1970, pp. 670–9.Google Scholar

^{Page 360 note 3} This represents the view of the O.A.U. and most African political leaders, and is well articulated by Panter-Brick, S. K., ‘The Right to Self-Determination: its application to Nigeria’, in International Affairs (London), 44, 2, 04 1968, pp. 254–66.Google Scholar

^{Page 361 note 1} Bassiouni, M. C., ‘“Self-Determination” and the Palestinians’, in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 65th Annual Meeting (Washington, 1971), p. 36.Google Scholar

^{Page 361 note 2} Case for Recognition of Biafra: statement by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam), 13 04 1968, p. 2.Google Scholar

^{Page 361 note 3} The Aburi agreement had, in effect, envisaged a loose federation bordering on a confederation as an interim arrangement for Nigeria. The military Government later backed away from this, apparently on second thoughts.

^{Page 362 note 1} Case for Recognition of Biafra, p. 5.

^{Page 362 note 2} Welch, Claude E. Jr, Dream of Unity: pan-Africanism and political unification in West Africa (Ithaca, 1966), p. 4.Google Scholar

^{Page 362 note 3} Julius Nyerere's address at the second meeting of the O.A.U. in Cairo, 20 July 1964; Freedom and Unity (New York and London, 1966), p. 302.Google Scholar

^{Page 362 note 4} Touré's, Sékou broadcast of 30 November 1958, published in République de Guinée, L'Action politique du P.D.G.-R.D.A. Guinée pour l'émancipation et l'unité africaine dans l'indépendence (Conakry, 1959), pp. 149–50.Google Scholar

^{Page 363 note 1} For similar views of African unity expressed by Modibo Keita, the former President of Mali, see ‘The Foreign Policy of Mali’, in International Affairs, 37, 4, 10 1961, pp. 435–36.Google Scholar

^{Page 363 note 2} Nyerere, op. cit. p. 338.

^{Page 363 note 3} President Tubman's press conference of 27 November 1958, reported in the Liberian Age (Monrovia), 28 11 1958,Google Scholar and quoted by Liebenow, J. Gus, ‘Which Road to Pan-African Unity? The Sanniquellie Conference, 1959’, in Carter, Gwendolen M. (ed.), Politics in Africa, 7 Cases (New York, 1966), p. 10.Google Scholar

^{Page 363 note 4} Senghor, Léopold Sédar, ‘West Africa in Evolution’, in Foreign Affairs, 39, 2, 01 1961, p. 242.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{Page 364 note 1} For example, in the immediate post-independence period in Nigeria, Chief Awolowo's flirtation with Nkrumah's brand of pan-Africanism and African socialism was viewed as subversive by the Balewa Government.

^{Page 364 note 2} Léopold Senghor once raised the spectre of Nigerian domination as one of the factors that make the reconstruction of the old French West African Federation a compelling necessity for the francophone states; Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism (New York, 1962), pp. 22–26.Google Scholar

^{Page 364 note 3} Haas, Ernst B. and Schmitter, Philippe C., ‘Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: projections about unity in Latin America’, in International Political Communities: an anthology (Garden City, 1966), pp. 226–67.Google Scholar

^{Page 364 note 4} Nye, Joseph S., ‘Comparing Common Markets: a revised neo-functionalist model’, in International Organization (Boston), 24, 1970, p. 816.Google Scholar

^{Page 364 note 5} Hansen, Roger D., ‘Regional Integration: reflections on a decade of theoretical efforts’, in World Politics (Princeton), 22, 2, 01 1969, p. 268.Google Scholar

^{Page 365 note 1} For an illustration, see the speech of the late Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, on ‘African Unity’ delivered at the African Summit Conference in Addis Ababa, 24 May 1963. Vital Speeches of the Day (New York), 29, 2, 1 08 1963, pp. 620–2.Google Scholar

^{Page 365 note 2} The secession of Katanga was divisive because of the intrusion of foreign powers and ideologies into the conflict. In the case of Biafra, whatever little strain it caused on interAfrican relations could have been avoided if the O.A.U. and its members had adopted a common and more flexible policy towards secession. More on this later.

^{Page 366 note 1} Azikiwe, Nnamdi, ‘May Allah Save Our Republic’, an address broadcast over the Nigerian Television Service, 10 12 1964.Google Scholar

^{Page 366 note 2} Kenya, , National Assembly Debates (Nairobi), XIV, 6th Session, 28 02 1968, col. 110.Google Scholar

^{Page 366 note 3} Ibid. 29 March 1968, cols. 1305 and 1310.

^{Page 367 note 1} This would be an interesting subject for a simulation exercise.

^{Page 367 note 2} For examples of some of these events, see Hodgkin, Thomas, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York, 1957), pp. 12–14.Google Scholar

^{Page 367 note 3} See Legum, Colin, Pan-Africanism: a short political guide (New York, 1965 edn.), pp. 31–2.Google Scholar

^{Page 368 note 1} Gutteridge, William, ‘Military Elites in Ghana and Nigeria’, in African Forum (New York), 11, 1, Summer 1966, p. 32.Google Scholar

^{Page 368 note 2} Welch, Claude E. Jr, ‘The Roots and Implications of Military Intervention’, in Welch, (ed.), Soldier and State in Africa: a comparative analysis of military intervention and political change (Evanston, 1970), p. 27.Google Scholar

^{Page 369 note 1} Panter-Brick, loc. cit. pp. 260–1.

^{Page 370 note 1} Ibid. p. 258.

^{Page 370 note 2} The Resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the O.A.U. at its 4th Ordinary Session at Kinshasa, 11–14 September 1967; Brownlie, Ian (ed.), Basic Documents on African Affairs (London, 1971), p. 364.Google Scholar

^{Page 371 note 1} For example, some provisions of the U.N. Charter begin with the phrase: ‘All Members shall’ (e.g. Article 2, sections 2, 3, 4, and 5), while others begin with the phrase: ‘The Organisation shall’ (e.g. Article 2, sections 1 and 6) or ‘The United Nations shall’ (e.g. Article 8).

^{Page 371 note 2} For example, Article 2, section 2, reads in part: ‘the Member States shall’; Article 3 begins with: ‘The Member States… solemnly affirm’, and Article 6 with: ‘The Member States pledge’; while Article 2, section 1, and Article 7 begin with: ‘The Organisation shall’.

^{Page 371 note 3} The Resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the O.A.U. at its 4th Ordinary Session, Brownlie, op. cit. p. 364.

^{Page 372 note 1} Cf. Article 2(7) and Chapter VII.

^{Page 373 note 1} Brownlie, op. cit. p. 364.

^{Page 374 note 1} O.A.U. Council Resolution 5 (III), September 1964, reported in Africa Digest (London), 10 1964, p. 38.Google Scholar

^{Page 374 note 2} The Economist (London), 12 09 1964, pp. 1003–4.Google Scholar

^{Page 375 note l} For example, Article 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter does not apply to such situations.

^{Page 375 note 2} Emerson, Rupert, ‘Self-Determination’, in American Journal of International Law (Washington), 65, 07 1971, p. 467.Google Scholar

^{Page 375 note 3} Rosalyn Higgins, op. cit. pp. 79–81.

^{Page 375 note 4} Ibid. p. 80.