¹ See, for example, Franck, Thomas M. and Carey, John, The Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo (Dobbs Ferry, 1963);Google ScholarLefever, Ernest W., Crisis in the Congo: a U.N. force in action (Washington, DC, 1965);Google ScholarGendebien, P. H., L'Intervention des Nations Unies au Congo, 1960–1964 (Paris, 1967);Google Scholar and United Nation, The Blue Helmets (New York, 1985), pt. 5.Google Scholar

² Cf.Collins, Carole, ‘Fatally Flawed Mediation: Cordier and the Congo crisis of 1960’, in Africa Today (Denver), 39, 3, 1992, pp. 5–22.Google Scholar

³ U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (New York, 1975), ch. 3.Google Scholar

⁴ Colby, William, and Stockwell, John, panel discussion, ‘Should the U.S. Fight Secret Wars?’, in Harper's (New York), 09 1984.Google Scholar

⁵ Smith, George Ivan and O'Brien, Conor Cruise, The Guradian (London), 11 09 1992, letter to the editor.Google Scholar

⁶ The New York Times 10 February 1962.

⁷ O'Brien, Conor Cruise, To Katanga and Back: a UN case history (London, 1962).Google Scholar

⁸ ‘Mercenaries “killed UN chief in air crash”’, in The Guardian, 11 September 1992.Google Scholar

⁹ Whatever the merits of the argument that the colonies were more of a liability than an asset in most cases, the Congo had an exceptionally high economic value. For a generally critical view of the thesis of ‘economic imperialism’, see Fieldhouse, D.K., Economics and Empire 1830–1914, (Ithaca, 1973).Google Scholar

¹⁰ O'Brien, op. cit. p. 173.

¹¹ ‘Belgian Giant Maps New Areas for Profit’, in Business Week (New York), 26 05 1962.Google Scholar

¹² ‘The Congo is in Business’, in Fortune (New York), 11 1952.Google ScholarPubMed

¹³ See statements by a Belgian journalist in O'Brien, op. cit. pp. 84 and 239.

¹⁴ Quoted from U.N. document, ‘Report on Mercenaries and Other Forms of Foreign Intervention in Katanga’, dated (probably) 23 October 1961; DAG-1/2.2.1, Box 47, United Nations Archives, New York.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Department of State Airgram, A-701, 9 June 1966, Washington, DC, released under the Freedom of Information Act.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Hemstone, Smith, Rebels, Mercenaries, and Dividends: the Katanga story (New York, 1962), p. 46. The author, then a journalist, is currently U.S. ambassador to Kenya.Google Scholar

¹⁷ O'Brien, op. cit. p. 164.

¹⁸ Smith, and O'Brien, , loc. cit.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Roger Trinquier's activities in both Indochina and Katanga are discussed by McCoy, Alfred Jr., The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York, 1972), ch. 4.Google Scholar

²⁰ O'Brien, op. cit. p. 197.

²¹ Department of State, ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’, 27 January 1961, p. 72; National Security File, Countries Series, Box 86, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.Google Scholar

²² The U.N. force adopted a ‘hands off’ attitude with regard to Katanga from July until mid- September 1960, when Rejeshwar Dayal, an Indian national, arrived in the Congo as Hammarskjöld's personal representative. This anti-Katanga stance continued until the termination of the secession in January 1963.Google Scholar

²³ The New York Times, 5 November 1960.

²⁴ Memorandum from Ralph Bunche to Secretary-General, 6 August 1960; DAF-13/1.6.1.1, Box 1, U.N. Archives, New York.Google Scholar

²⁵ Hoskyns, Catherine, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960–December 1961 (Oxford, 1965), p. 329.Google Scholar

²⁶ Although Brussels gradually distanced itself from Tshombe's régime, according to Gérard-Libois, Jules, Katanga Secession (Madison, 1966), p. 158, Belgian policy changed especially quickly after a new left-leaning government was elected and assumed office in April 1961Google Scholar. However, Belgian mining interests continued to support Tshombe long after the termination of the Katanga secession. See Gibbs, op. cit. chs. 4–6.

The finding that it was the mining companies, not the Belgian Government, which played the dominant rôle in the Katanga secession contradicts the notion of the ‘autonomous’ state, insulated from business pressures, which has been popularised by, for example, Skocpol, Theda, ‘Bringing the State Back In: strategies of analysis in current research’, in Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 3–43.Google Scholar

²⁷ On these events, see Dayal, Rejeshwar, Mission for Hammarskjöld (Delhi, 1976), ch. 16.Google Scholar

²⁸ According to Wheatcroft, Geoffrey, ‘The Center Holds I’, in The New Republic (Washington, DC), 12–1909 1988.Google Scholar

²⁹ O'Brien, op. cit. p. 158.

³⁰ For competing views of operation ‘Morthor’, see Dayal, op. cit. pp. 268–9.

³¹ Translated and quoted by Representative Bruce, Donald, ‘Is Katanga on the Auction Bloc?’, in Congressional Record (Washington, DC), 12 09 1962, p. 19247.Google Scholar

³² La Libre Belgique quoted in L'Echo de la bourse (Brussels), 1–201 1963, and translated by author.Google Scholar

³³ SirTeeling, William, M.P., in Hansard Parliamentary Debates (London), 7 02 1963, pp. 706–7.Google Scholar

³⁴ Metal Bulletin (London), 12 12 1961.Google Scholar

³⁵ Although The Washington Post, 31 December 1991, ran a good article by Russell Warren Howe, entitled ‘Union Minière: an enigma of Congo crisis’, the allegations against the U.N. were not reported at all by The New York Times.Google Scholar

³⁶ Gavshon, Arthur, The Last Days of Dag Hammarskjöld (London, 1963), p. 125. His assertions were mainly the outcome of interviews with Swedish officials, not necessarily the best or most objective sources of information about the Secretary-General.Google Scholar

³⁷ For example, Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation (New York, 1967), p. 262, claimed that the charges of financial ties were ‘quickly and easily refuted’, although offering no specifics.Google Scholar See also, Urquhart, Brian, Hammarskjöld (New York, 1972), p. 575.Google Scholar

³⁸ Copies of the original documents can be found in the Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis.Google Scholar

³⁹ Ibid. Researchers interested in the Secretary-General's collection of personal papers in Stockholm are advised to consult Trachtenberg, Larry, ‘A Bibliographic Essay on Dag Hammarskjöld’, in Jordan, Robert S. (ed.), Dag Hammarskjöld Revisited (Durham, 1983).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Dun and Bradstreet report, dated 5 November 1959; Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indianapolis.Google Scholar According to Le Monde (Paris), 24–2507 1960, Detwiler was also directly affiliated with the Lamco group itself.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Börje Hjortzberg-Nordlund, ‘Mining Situation in the Republic of the Congo’, 30 September 1960; DAG-13/1.6.1.0, Box 72, U.N. Archives, New York.Google Scholar

⁴² Lamco's and Liberian Iron Ore's Securities and Exchange Commission Prospectus, 15 November 1961, p. 45, in Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indianapolis. See also Lisagor, Nancy and Lipsius, Frank, A Law Unto Itself: the untold story of the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell (New York, 1988).Google Scholar

⁴³ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation on ‘History and Status of Liberian-American Mining Company (LAMCO)’, 28 March 1958, released under mandatory review by the Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Ball, George, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York, 1982).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ According to Sorenson, Theodore C., Kennedy (New York, 1965), pp. 630–1, Fowler Hamilton ‘was nearly nominated’ as C.I.A. director, but was then assigned at the last moment to foreign aid.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ I.A.A.C.'s Annual Report, 1960, and Lamco's and Liberian Ore's…Prospectus, 1961; Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indianapolis.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Weissman, Stephen R., American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964 (Ithaca and London, 1974);Google ScholarKalb, Madeleine, The Congo Cables (New York, 1982);Google ScholarMahoney, Richard D., JFK: ordeal in Africa (New York, 1983); and Gibbs, op. cit.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ This assortment of American companies is discussed at length in Gibbs, ibid. ch. 4.

⁴⁹ The U.S. ambassador to Belgium noted ‘the emotional (sometimes near hysterical) atmosphere of Brussels’ due to international involvement in the Congo crisis. Cable from Douglas MacArthur II to State Department, dated 4 January 1962; National Security File, Countries Series, Box 20/30, John F.Kennedy Library, Boston.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Gavshon, op. cit. p. 126.

⁵¹ Kalb, op. cit.

⁵² Weissman, op. cit., which remains, in my opinion, one of the best accounts of the Congo crisis.

⁵³ See, especially, Krasner, Stephen, Defending the National Interest (Princeton, 1978). The neorealists emphasise the importance of state interests in international relations, an approach not well supported by the facts of the Congo crisis, since so much of the conflict involved private companies.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Hammarskjöld's plane was shot down by the U.S.S.R., according to Shevchenko, Arkady, Breaking with Moscow (New York, 1985), pp. 102–3. However, this Soviet defector's report is of very dubious reliability, as pointed out by Edward J. Epstein, ‘The Spy Who Came in to Be Sold’, in The New Republic, 15–22 July 1985, who found extensive factual errors and other serious flaws in Shevchenko's account.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ The importance of commercial rivalries is the main theme of my recent book on the Congo, Gibbs, op. cit., which appeared in 1991, before the recent revelations about Hammarskjöld's death.Google Scholar