Historically, radar has been villified as a source of the many accidents, either as collisions or strandings, which have occurred around the world since the end of the war. More truthfully the blame should have been laid not so much on the equipment as on the operator, and it would appear from the many court findings that it is the man who has been unable or perhaps unwilling to extract the level of data needed to navigate his ship successfully from the basic range and bearing information that the radar sensor provides. This shortcoming has been recognized for many years and attempts to correct it have been manifold. There has been heavy investment both by shipowners and education authorities to provide simulators, to offer short courses and to provide anti-collision training, and there has been a marked emphasis on the significance of plotting and radar interpretation in the certificates of competency and D.T.I, examinations. Nevertheless, the lessons which it was hoped would breed good radar practice and which were germinated in the classrooms rarely seemed to come to fruition in the more hostile environment of the ship's bridge. The reasons or the excuse for this lack are not hard to find. There is insufficient space, there is no table, the bridge is single handed, there is too much to do. There are numerous excuses or reasons offered. Many of the arguments are well founded, but these tend only to be a cloak for a more fundamental reason, a reason which is rarely expressed.