This special thematic section is the first in a series of special sections that the Asian Association of Social Psychology (AASP) is developing for the Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology. Over the last four years, the AASP has guest edited one special issue each year on applied social psychology research in the journal in an attempt to encourage Asian social psychologists to engage in research that address real world problems in Asian societies. The special issues have featured a variety of research approaches (action research, program development, experiments, and so on) on a range of important social concerns (see Bernardo & Liu, 2018, for a retrospective view of these special issues). As part of its continuing cooperative relationship with the journal, every year for the next five years, the AASP will guest edit smaller special thematic issues, each with a more well-defined focus, in the hope of making stronger incremental contributions to research and theory on important areas of social psychology.

Indonesia has seen recent expansions of fundamentalist movements mobilising members in support a change to the current constitution. Against this background, two studies were conducted. In Study 1, we explored the intersection of religious and national identity among Indonesian Muslims quantitatively, and in Study 2, we qualitatively examined religious and national identification among members of moderate and fundamentalist religious organisations. Specifically, Study 1 (N = 178) assessed whether the association of religious and national identity was moderated by religious fundamentalism. Results showed that strength of religious identification was positively associated with strength of national identification for both those high and low in fundamentalism. Using structured interviews and focus group discussions, Study 2 (N = 35) examined the way that self-alignment with religious and national groups develops among activists of religious movements in Indonesia. We found that while more fundamentalist activists attached greater importance to their religious identity than to any other identity (e.g., national and ethnic), more moderate activists represented their religious and national identities as more integrated and compatible. We conclude that for Indonesian Muslims higher in religious fundamentalism, religious and national identities appear to be less integrated and this is consequential for the way in which collective agendas are pursued.

This research examines the anger and collective action intentions among different social classes in China. Based on social cognition theory with respect to social class, we proposed that the relationship between group-based anger and collective action intentions would be moderated by social class. To test this hypothesis, two studies were conducted. First, using data collected from a sample of 100 residents of Hubei Province, China, Study 1 found that the relationship between group-based anger and collective action intentions was moderated by social class: group-based anger can predict collective action intentions among the upper social class but not among the lower social class. Then, Study 2 employed a 2 × 2 completely randomised design. Its 118 participants were manipulated to experience a momentary change in their subjective social class and the level of their group-based anger before measuring their collective action intentions. The results were consistent with Study 1. Taken together, the findings suggest that social class does moderate the relationship between group-based anger and collective action intentions.

Men have an important role as allies in reducing discrimination against women. Following the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA), we examined whether men's identification with women would predict their allied collective action, alongside moral convictions, efficacy, and anger. We also examined whether identification with their own ingroup would decrease their willingness to improve women's situation. We tested the SIMCA, extended to consider ingroup identification among men, in Japan (N = 103) and the Philippines (N = 131). Consistent with the SIMCA, moral convictions and group efficacy predicted men's willingness to engage in collective action to fight discrimination against women. However, anger was not significant, and identification with the advantaged and disadvantaged groups played different roles in the two countries. We discuss the possible role of norms and legitimacy in society in explaining the pattern of results.

I review the interesting contributions to this special thematic section in light of what has been referred to as the four core motivations for collective action (i.e. moral conviction, and group identification, anger and efficacy beliefs). Specifically, I relate the key findings and insights from these articles — based on intriguing data from participant samples in the Philippines, Japan, Indonesia and China — to these core motivations for collective action, after which I raise the question of just how “core” these motivations are, with an eye to an abundance of cultural variance. I answer this question by suggesting a number of conceptual bridges to move the field forward toward a proper cultural psychology of collective action. Such a cultural psychology, in my view, does justice not only to the notion of core motivations for collective action but also to the abundance of cultural variance. Specifically, I suggest to think about culture in terms of guiding when collective action is more or less likely to occur, within which the core motivations reflect the psychological processes that facilitate it.