^1. North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York, 1990), 100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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^3. Gerschenkron, Alexander, “On the Concept of Continuity in History,” in Continuity in History and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 11–39Google Scholar, and Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 5–30.Google Scholar

^4. The most helpful examples are in Gatrell, “Industrial Expansion,” and idem, The Tsarist Economy, 1850–1917 (New York, 1986), esp. the introduction and chaps. 1 and 2; Gregory, Paul R., Russian National Income, 1885–1913 (New York, 1982), chaps. 6, 7Google Scholar; Kahan, Arcadius, “Government Policies and the Industrialization of Russia,” Journal of European Economic History 27 (December 1967): 460–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Crisp, Olga, Studies in the Russian Economy Before 1914 (London, 1976), 33–34 and passim.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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^6. Gerschenkron, “Economic Backwardness,” 2.

^7. Gerschenkron, “Russian Agrarian Policies,” 246. Emphasis mine.

^8. Ibid., 229–46.

^9. Ibid., 248.

^10. Ibid., 247.

^11. Gerschenkron, “Economic Backwardness,” 7.

^12. Ibid., 18.

^13. Ibid.

^14. On emancipation, see note 6 above; on judicial and administrative reforms, see “Economic Backwardness,” 19.

^15. Gerschenkron, “Economic Backwardness,” 20.

^16. Ibid.

^17. Ibid., 28–29.

^18. Ibid., 29.

^19. The historiographical discussion presented here is not intended to be comprehensive but only to indicate the range of reinterpretations of Gerschenkron's view of continuity in Russian history. For fuller discussion of the relevant perspectives, see Don K. Rowney, “The State-Economy Relation in Russia: An Historiography of the Long-Scale View” (manuscript available from the author), which will be published in 1995 in Istoricheskie zapiski (Moscow).

^20. For example, la. Laverychev, V., “Gosudarstvennyi kapitalizm v poreformennoi Rossii,” Istoriia SSSR, no. 1 (January-February 1982): 20–38Google Scholar; Gindin, I. F., “Politika tsarskogo pravitel'stva v otnoshenii promyshlennykh monopolii,” in Ob osobennostiakh imperiaUzma v Raossii (Moscow, 1963)Google Scholar; Olegina, I. N., Industrializatsiia SSSR v angliiskoi i amerikanskoi istoriografii (Leningrad, 1971)Google Scholar, and idem, Kritika kontseptsii sovremennoi amerikanskoi i angliiskoi burzhuaznoi istoriografii po problemam industrializatsii SSSR (Leningrad, 1989).

^21. Kahan, “Government Policies,” 466, 468.

^22. Ibid., 468–69, 474–76.

^23. For example, Gatrell, “Industrial Expansion,” 99–110; Crisp, “The Pattern of Industrialisation in Russia,” in Studies, 33–54; Gregory, Russian National Income, 123–79; Hoch, Steven L., “The Banking Crisis, Peasant Reform, and Economic Development in Russia, 1857–1861,” American Historical Review 46 (June 1991): 795–820CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Olegina, Industrializatsiia v istoriografii, 86—92; Laverychev, “Gosudarstvennyi kapitalizm,” 20—38.

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^32. Ibid., 204–5.

^33. Ibid., 205.

^34. Ibid., 201. Emphasis mine.

^35. Ibid., 210.

^36. North, Institutions, 4.

^37. Ibid., 27–35.

^38. Ibid., 5.

^39. For a good general introduction to this subject together with an excellent bibliography, see Cross, Rod, “On the Foundations of Hysteresis in Economic Systems,” Economics and Philosophy 9 (1993): 53–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A more genial and often-cited discussion is found in David, Paul A., “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” American Economic Review (May 1985): 332—37Google Scholar. For an application to the contemporary situation of transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, see Stark, David, “Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe,” East European Politics and Societies 6 (Winter 1992): 17—54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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^41. Ibid., 99–100.

^42. Ibid., 58–59.

^43. Gregory, Russian National Income.

^44. For example, Kuznets, Simon, Economic Growth and Structure: Selected Essays (New York, 1965), 1–81Google Scholar, 142–212; also idem, Modem Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread (New Haven, 1966); Rosecrance, Richard, The Rise of the Trading State (New York, 1986)Google Scholar; Kennedy, Paul, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 1987).Google Scholar

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^46. The linear regression of State Expenditure on time is 0.94; that of Investment, 0.82. The two series, State Expenditure and Investment, are intercorrelated at 0.82.

^47. Gregory, Russian National Income, 56—57, and Appendixes F and G, 249—64.

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^51. Gregory, Russian National Income, Table G. 1, 261, Table G.4, 263.

^52. Ivanovskii, V. V., Uchebnik administrativanogo prava. (Politseiskoe pravo: Pravo vnutrennago upravleniia.) 3d ed. (Kazan, 1908)Google Scholar; Deriuzhinskii, V. F., Politseiskoe pravo: Posobie dlia studentov. 2d ed. revised and enlarged (St. Petersburg, 1908).Google Scholar

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^55. Deriuzhinskii, chap. 9, “Fabrichnoe zakonodatel'stvo,” 526–35.

^56. That is, an interest that goes beyond the mere right to tax activities and consists instead of at least a potential arbitrary right of ownership. As discussed by DeLong and Shleifer, this is characteristic of absolutist regimes. See De Long, J. Bradford and Shleifer, Andrei, “Princes and Merchants: European City Growth Before the Industrial Revolution” (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 4274, 1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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^58. This is a modification of the terminology employed in Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston, 1967).

^59. For a discussion of the preoccupations of the pre-industrial Russian state in wartime, see Pintner, Walter M., “The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia,” Russian Review 53 (1984): 231–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kahan, Arcadius, The Plow, the Hammer, and the Knout: An Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Russia (Chicago, 1985)Google Scholar, chap. 8. For the 1915 decrees, see “O nekotorykh merakh k obezpecheniiu toplivom uchrezhdenii armii i flota i putei soobshcheniia a ravno chastnykh predpriiatii, rabotaiushchikh dlia tselei gosudarstvennoi oborony,” Sobranie uzakoneniia, st. 865 (31 March 1915); “O rasprostranenii polnomochii, prisvoennykh Ministru Putei Soobshcheniia Imennym Vysochaishim Ukazom 4 ogo Marta 1915 goda, na dela po obezpecheniiu toplivom gosudarstvennykh i obshchestvennykh uchrezhdenii,” Sobraniie usikoneniia, st. 1091 (2 May 1915); “O Predostavlenii Ministru Torgovli i Promyshlennosti Osobykh Polnomochii po Obshchemy Rukovodstvu Prodovol'stvennym Delom v Imperii,” Sobrannie uzakoneniia, st. 1169 (19 May 1915); “Ob utverzhdenii pravil o Poriadke i usloviiakh raspredeleniia tverdago mineral'hago topliva mezhdu potrebiteliami,” Sobraniie uzakoneniia, st. 1215 (29 May 1915).

^60. Ob utverzhdenii polozheniia ob Osobom Soveshchanii dlia ob'edineniia meropriatii po obezpecheniiu deistvuiushchei armii predmetami boevogo i material'nago snabzheniia,” Sobraniie uzakoneniia, st. 1280 (7 June 1915).

^61. See the summary in Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik, no. 182 (Wednesday, 19 August–1 September, 1915), 1, cols. 2, 3.

^62. Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 446.

^63. Consumption, according to one source, is “what consumers do.” More helpfully, that same discussion makes clear the inherent competition between consumption and investment. It mentions only obliquely, however, the degree to which the state and private consumers potentionally compete for shares of national income. Cf. Pennant-Rea, Rupert and Emmott, Bill, The Pocket Economist (Cambridge, 1983), 37Google Scholar. Comparatively and over time, moreover, apparently small variations in the ratio of consumption to investment and state expenditure have made substantial differences in rates of economic growth and military power.

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