^1. Outdoor relief was the temporary provision of goods, coal, and/or cash to the recipients who lived at home. It was contrasted with “indoor relief provided in almshouses and other custodial institutions.

^2. Leading COS reformers include: Rev. S. H. Gurteen, founder of the first Charity Organization Society in the United States, in Buffalo, New York, in 1877; Louisa Lee Schuyler and Mrs. William B. Rice, founder and vice president of the State Charities Aid Association (SCAA), respectively; Theodore Roosevelt Sr. and Josephine Shaw Lowell, members of the New York State Board of Charities; Lowell was also a member of the SCAA and she helped found the NYCOS; Charles D. Kellogg of the Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity, who was the organizing secretary of the NYCOS; Edward T. Devine, secretary of the NYCOS from 1896 to 1917; and SethLow, founder of the Brooklyn Bureau of Charities, an independently wealthy Republican, president of Columbia University, and a two-time mayor of Brooklyn. For the best overview of the history of charity organization, see Watson, Frank Dekker, The Charity Organization Movement in the United States: A Study in American Philanthropy (New York, 1922).Google Scholar

The Charity Organization Societies across the country were staffed largely by elite, well to-do Protestant women. Among the major supporters of the NYCOS were William Waldorf Astor, August Belmont, Andrew Carnegie, J. Pierpont Morgan, and Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt. See Brandt, Lillian, The Charity Organization Society of the City of New York, 1882–1907, Twenty-fifth Annual Report for the Year Ending September 30, 1907 (New York, 1907), 266Google Scholar; Piven, Frances Fox and Cloward, Richard A., “The Historical Sources of the Contemporary Relief Debate,” in Block, Fred, Cloward, Richard A., Ehrenreich, Barbara, and Piven, Frances F., eds., The Mean Season: The Attack on the Welfare State (New York, 1987), 14–15.Google Scholar

^3. For an overview of “scientific charity” and the charity organization movement, see Lui, Adonica Y., “Party Machines, State Structure, and Social Policies: The Abolition of Public Outdoor Relief in New York City, 1874–1898” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1993), chap. 3Google Scholar; see also Katz, Michael B., In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America (New York, 1986)Google Scholar; Stewart, William Rhinelander, Philanthropic Work of Josephine Shaw Lowell (New York, 1911)Google Scholar; and Watson, The Charity Organization Movement.

^4. Stewart, Philanthropic Work, 197.

^5. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, 19.

^6. Ibid., 41–42.

^7. SCAA, “Annual Report of the Committee on Out-door Relief,” in Fourth Annual Report to the State Board of Charities, March 1876, 48.

^8. Stewart, Philanthropic Work, 134.

^9. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, 71.

^10. Skocpol, Theda, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 96.Google Scholar

^11. Mrs.Lowell, C. R., “Considerations upon a Better System of Public Charities and Correction for Cities,” in Eighth Annual Conference of Charities, 1881, 170.Google Scholar

^12. Low, Seth, “The Problem of Pauperism in the Cities of Brooklyn and New York,”Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference of Charities(Boston,1879),202–3Google Scholar, quoted in Warner, Amos Griswold, American Charities and Social Work, 3d ed. (New York, 1930), 211Google Scholar; Schneider, David M. and Deutsch, Albert, The History of Public Welfare in New York State, 1867–1940 (Chicago, 1941), 48.Google Scholar

^13. Skccpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 95.

^14. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, 58; Kaplan, Barry J., “Reformers and Charity: The Abolition of Public Outdoor Relief in New York City, 1870–1898,” Social Service Review 52 (1978): 205CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schneider and Deutsch, History of Public Welfare, 46.

^15. Piven and Cloward argue that the charity organization movement was a corporate-funded movement. See Piven and Cloward, “The Historical Sources,” 11–15. Katz also argues that “the abolition of outdoor relief and related policies … were forms of repression, attempts to weaken collective action, to reassert class control”; see Katz, Michael B., Poverty and Policy in American History (New York, 1983), 180–81Google Scholar. But while Katz believes that there was “no mistaking the class character of the campaign,” he also acknowledges that “class was not a straightforward factor in the controversies”; see Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, 52, 58. Among other important factors that Katz points out, as in his case of Brooklyn, is party politics (ibid., 46–52). That reformers were not mere agents of capital but had their own visions and agenda, see Donald T. Critchlow, The Brookings Institution, 1916–1952: Expertise and the Public Interest in a Democratic Society (Dekalb, Ill., 1985). As Critchlow suggests, the reformers' “relationship to corporate capitalism … proved to be multidimensional and varied” (12).

^16. A comparison of New York City with Brooklyn would offer an important contribution to the understanding of the politics of outdoor relief. But the case of Brooklyn warrants a separate study by itself, which is beyond the scope of this article. Michael Katz briefly discusses the case of Brooklyn in In the Shadow of the Poorhouse (see 46–52). But as Katz himself points out, a detailed historical study needs to be done (see chap. 2, n. 13). It is hoped that my study of New York City will shed some light on any future study of Brooklyn or other cities. (See also note 55 below.)

^17. Skowronek, Stephen, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (New York, 1982), chap. 2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^18. These studies focus on the period from the Progressive Era to the New Deal. Shefter argues that such machines were inimical to the expansion of social provision; these patronage-based organizations made deals with businesses and therefore were unable to deliver policies in the collective interests of the working class and other popular constituencies. Buenker, on the other hand, argues that the existence of patronage parties did not rule out the adoption of social programs; patronage-based machines had eclectic constituencies and consequently had to make some gestures to labor groups as well as to business and other supporters. Amenta and his colleagues find that the more patronage-dependent a political party was, the more concessions it made to business and conservative preferences in its policies. See Buenker, John, Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform (New York, 1973)Google Scholar; Shefter, Martin, “Regional Receptivity to Reform: The Legacy of the Progressive Era,” Political Science Quarterly 98 (Fall 1983): 459–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Amenta, Edwin, Clemens, Elisabeth S., Olsen, Jefren, Parikh, Sunita, and Skocpol, Theda, “The Political Origins of Unemployment Insurance in Five American States,” Studies in American Political Development 2 (1987): 137–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^19. In the comparative welfare-state literature, political scientists and sociologists have also pointed out the patronage basis of the American political party system and its important consequences on the timing and content of U.S. social-policy developments as compared to Europe. See, for example, Orloff, Ann Shola, “The Politics of Pensions: A Comparative Analysis of the Origins of Pensions and Old Age Insurance in Canada, Great Britain, and the United States” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1985)Google Scholar; Orloff, Ann S. and Skocpol, Theda, “Why Not Equal Protection? Explaining the Politics of Public Social Spending in Britain, 1900–1911, and the United States, 1880s–1920,” American Sociological Review 49 (1984): 726–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers.

^20. See Shefter, Martin, “Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy,” Politics and Society 7 (1977): 403–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Skocpol, and Amenta, , “States and Social Policies,” Annual Review of Sociology 12 (1986): 144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^21. McCormick, Richard L., From Realignment to Reform: Political Change in New York State, 1893–1910 (Ithaca, NY., 1981), 105.Google Scholar

^22. See, for example, the works of Amy Bridges, Ira Katznelson, Ann S. Orloff, Martin Shefter, Theda Skocpol, and Margaret Weir.

^23. The number of families aided by the NYAICP, the largest in the city, increased almost fivefold from 1873 to 1874; the number rose from 5,292 in 1873 to 24,091 in 1874, but the total sum expended, indicating the dried-up resources of the association, was only less than double the preceding year. See NYAICP, Thirty-First Annual Report, 1874, 74; also cited in Schneider and Deutsch, History of Public Welfare, 36.

^24. NYAICP, Thirty-first Annual Report, 1874, 40–50; in fact, the association was so concerned that it requested an explanation from the commissioners. Its 1875 annual report noted: “This extraordinary course on the part of the Commissioners of Public Charities appeared so incredible that the Managers of this Association addressed a letter to the Department, requesting definite information on the subject. No written answer was received.” (NYAICP, Thirty-second Annuai Report, 1875, 35).

^25. New York Times, 14 February 1874.

^26. Ibid., 24 January 1875.

^27. The SCAA was a private organization founded by Schuyler in 1872. The objective was to bring about reforms in the public charitable institutions in New York through the active interest of an organized body of voluntary visitors. They acted in cooperation with, and as an aid to, the local administration of those institutions and the official state boards of supervision. On the SCAA, see Ringenbach, Paul T., Tramps and Reformers, 1873–1916: The Discovery of Unemployment in New York (Westport, Conn., 1973), 14–15Google Scholar; Schneider and Deutsch, History of Public Welfare, 20–22; and Warner, American Charities, 201.

^28. The board was created by the state in 1867 as the Board of State Commissioners of Public Charities. It was authorized to visit and inspect all charitable and correctional institutions (except prisons) receiving state aid and all public almshouses. It had full power to inquire into the management and financial and physical conditions of all institutions under its supervision. The board was to report annually to the state legislature. Its powers and duties were expanded by the law of 1873 to cover all welfare institutions and agencies, whether or not they received state funds. The board became a constitutional body in January 1895 (see Schneider and Deutsch, History of Public Welfare, 15, 22, 32, and chap. 8).

^29. New York Times, 1 December 1875; also SCAA, “Annual Report of the Committee on Outdoor Relief,” in Fourth Annual Report to the State Board of Charities, March 1876, 48–49.

^30. New York Times, 7 December 1875; 11 December 1875; 30 December 1875.

^31. Anderson, M. B., “Outdoor Relief,” in Eighth Annual Report of the State Board of Charities of the State of New York, 1875, 106, 108, 115.Google Scholar

^32. Louisa Lee Schuyler, letter to Howard Potter, president of NYAICP, dated 23 November 1875, in AICP Notes and Correspondence, to and from Robert Hartley, Vol. III, 1872–76, CSS Collection, Columbia University, Box 86; New York Times, 1 December 1875.

^33. Robert Gordon, Bryce Gray, H. E. Pellew, and Robert Waller, letter dated 14 December 1875, in AICP Notes and Correspondence, to and from Robert Hartley, Vol. III, 1872–76, CSS Collection, Columbia University, Box 86.

^34. SCAA, “Annual Report of the Committee on Outdoor Relief,” in Fourth Annual Report to the State Board of Charities, March 1876, 47.

^35. SCAA, Third Annual Report to the State Board of Charities, March 1875, 25.

^36. See Katz, In the Shadow of die Poorhouse, 42–46; and Polsky, Andrew J., The Rise of the Therapeutic State (Princeton, 1991), 32–33.Google Scholar

^37. Major organizations, notably the NYAICP and the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, refused to surrender their lists of clients to the bureau's central registration office, on the grounds that it would harm their clients. The NYAICP feared the bureau's encroachment on its independence and refused to place itself under the supervision of any outside agency. The association's decision to withdraw from the Bureau of Charities in 1874 spelled the end of the bureau, which ceased functioning in 1875. On the Bureau of Charities, see Feder, Leah Hannah, Unemployment Relief in Periods of Depression: A Study of Measures Adopted in Certain American Cities, 1857 Through 1922 (New York, 1936), 45–46Google Scholar, 329; Ringenbach, Tramps and Reformers, 14; and Schneider and Deutsch, History of Public Welfare, 37–38. See also New York Times, 24 January 1875; and NYAICP, “Report Explanatory of Its Relation to the Bureau of Charities and Other Charitable Organizations in This City” (New York, 1875).Google Scholar

^38. Two of the three commissioners of charities heading the department were appointees of Mayor Wickham himself.

^39. Citizens' Association of New York, “Report of the Citizens' Association of New York Upon the Condition, etc., of the Institutions Under the Charge of the Commissioners of Public Charities and Correction; With Suggestions in Relation to Organizing a Bureau of Labor Statistics and Employment, and Depots in the West for the Distribution of Labor” (New York, 1868), 16.Google Scholar

^40. New York Times, 1 December 1875.

^41. For 1875, the Department of Public Charities and Correction reported actual expenditures on outdoor relief as follows: $26,826 for coal relief and $48,231 for cash relief; 6,724 families were relieved with money only, 7,563 families were relieved with money and coal, and 288 families were supplied only with coal. In 1876, 6,387 families were supplied with coal, and the actual expenditure for coal relief was $20,578. In 1877, 15,416 families were supplied with coal, and the actual expenditure was $31,831. See New York City Department of Public Charities and Correction, Annual Reports, 1875 to 1877.

^42. The outdoor relief appropriations were $90,000 for 1875 and $80,000 for 1876. This constituted close to 7 percent of the department's total budget ($1,183,000 in 1875; $1,165,000 in 1876). The elimination of cash relief for 1877 represented a reduction of close to 3 percent of the department's total 1876 budget. The itemization for outdoor relief was reduced from $80,000 to $50,000 in 1877. But this amount included money for purposes other than the outdoor poor. See New York City Board of Estimate and Apportionment, Minutes, 29 December 1876.

^43. Tammany Hall was headed by William Marcy Tweed from around 1866 to 1871. “Boss” Tweed and his closest associates were known as the Tweed Ring. In 1871, the ring's massive plundering of public funds was exposed. On the Tweed Ring, see Callow, Alexander B. Jr., The Tweed Ring (New York, 1966)Google Scholar; Mandelbaum, Seymour J., Boss Tweed's New York (New York, 1965Google Scholar, rpt. Westport, Conn., 1981); Myers, Gustavus, The History of Tammany Hail (New York, 1971)Google Scholar; Shefter, Martin, Political Crisis, Fiscal Crisis: The Collapse and Revival of New York City (New York, 1985), 17Google Scholar; and Zink, Harold, City Bosses in the United States: A Study of Twenty Municipal Bosses (Durham, N.C., 1930)Google Scholar. For an account of Tweed's trial, see Breen, Mathew P., Thirty Years of New York Politics (New York, 1899), 421–71.Google Scholar

^44. Hammack, David C., Power and Society: Greater New York at the Turn of the Century (New York, 1982), 159.Google Scholar

^45. Shefter, Martin, “Regional Receptivity to Reform: The Legacy of the Progressive Era,” Political Science Quarterly 98 (Fall 1983): 466.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^46. On Kelly's party reforms, see Hammack, Power and Society, 161; Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed's New York, 92, 111, 131; Shefter, Martin, “The Emergence of the Political Machine: An Alternative View,” in Hawley, Willis D. and Lipsky, Michael, eds., Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1976), 25–26.Google Scholar

^47. Shefter, “Emergence of the Political Machine,” 25–26.

^48. Ibid., 34.

^49. The board was composed of the mayor, the comptroller, the president of the Board of Aldermen and the president of the Department of Taxes and Assessment (New York State Law, Chapter 335, 1873). Kelly's appointment as city comptroller made the board an all-Tammany board in 1876.

^50. For details of the aldermen's protests, see Lui, “Party Machines,” 65–78. Teaford, Jon C., The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in America, 1870–1900 (Baltimore, 1984), 50Google Scholar. Boss Kelly began to centralize the Tammany organization in the 1870s. The outdoor-relief battle captured only part of the process—the attempts to achieve centralization and internal discipline. Tammany Hall did not become a full-fledged, centralized, and disciplined political machine until the 1890s under Boss Richard Croker. See Shefter, “Emergence of the Political Machine.”

^51. The 1873 City Charter vested the power over the city's budget in the Board of Estimate and Apportionment. The Board of Aldermen, an elective board, had only nominal advisory power over budgetary decisions. (New York State Law, Chapter 335, 1873); see also Durand, Edward Dana, The Finances of New York City [New York, 1898], 258–61.)Google Scholar

^52. Robert Hartley, “Special Circulars to Visitors of the AICP,” dated 15 January 1876, in AICP Notes and Correspondence to and from Robert Hartley, Vol. III, 1872–76. CSS Collection, Columbia University, Box 86.

^53. Economic hard times and concern for the plight of the poor alone cannot explain why City Hall cut appropriations for cash relief in 1877 but stubbornly resisted terminating coal relief for years after the depression ended in 1878. Moreover, it was willing to discontinue the distribution of cash relief in 1876, even before the depression was over.

^54. Watson, Charity Organization, 210.

^55. Brooklyn's reformers were quick to claim credit for themselves and publicize their “achievements” in terminating the city's relief program. The COS reformers in other cities were quick to embrace Brooklyn's “success” as the triumph of reform over corruption. But as Katz points out, the story was more complex. Katz suggests that in fact party politics, the “ongoing conflicts between Republicans and Democrats for control of the city,” was a key factor in the termination of the program in Brooklyn. The abolition was a Republican assault on sources of Democratic patronage in the city; see Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, 46–52. This suggests that the different relief-policy outcomes in New York City and Brooklyn might be due to the relative strengths of the two parties in the respective cities. Also, as the role of Tammany Hall in New York City's relief politics suggests, we may need to investigate carefully the internal party politics and institutional developments of Brooklyn's party organizations in order to understand more fully why relief policy outcomes varied in New York and Brooklyn. The different structures of municipal government between the two cities must also be investigated.

^56. White, Alfred T., “Public Outdoor Relief Practically Tested,” in Lend A Hand 1 (June 1886): 337.Google Scholar

^57. Low, “The Problem of Pauperism,” 204–5.

^58. Josephine Shaw Lowell, letter to Mr. Fanning, dated 2 November 1883, in the William Rhinelander Stewart Collection, New York Public Library Manuscripts, Box 23.

^59. New York City Board of Estimate and Apportionment, Minutes, 20 December 1883, 509.

^60. Ibid., 23 April 1885, 69; and 16 October 1885, 303; see also Central Council of the Charity Organization Society of the City of New York, Minutes, Vol. 2, 1884–1887, CSS Collection, Columbia University, Box 205.

^61. New York City Board of Estimate and Apportionment, Minutes, 15 May 1885, 99–100; 26 November 1886, 746.

^62. 9 December 1886, 773; 27 December 1886, 849–50.

^63. SCAA, Fifteenth Annual Report to the State Board of Charities, 1887, 19.

^64. Josephine Shaw Lowell, letter to Mr. Fanning, dated 17 December 1894, in CSS Collection, Columbia University, Box 23.

^65. For details on these ties, see Lui, “Party Machines,” chap. 2, esp. 82–86. On the constant deals struck between the different Republican and Democratic party organizations in the city, which these contracts suggest, see pp. 86–88 of my dissertation, and also Gosnell, Harold F., Boss Plan and His New York Machine: A Study of the Political Leadership of Thomas C. Platt, Theodore Roosevelt, and Others (Chicago, 1924).Google Scholar

^66. Figures for the coal contracts were calculated from awards announced in the Official Journal of the New York City Board of City Record for the respective years and the department budget from the Minutes of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment.

^67. New York Times, 24 January 1875.

^68. Tammany's complex relations with the local business community shifted as it moved from its early formative phase to its consolidation phase, beginning in the mid-1870s. On Tammany's institutional development, see Shefter, “Emergence of the Political Machine,” and “Regional Receptivity to Reform”; and Erie, Steven P., Rainbow's End: Irish Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840–1985 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988)Google Scholar. On the relation between Tammany's development and relief-policy choices, see Lui, “Party Machines,” 88–96.

^69. McDonald, Terrence J. and Ward, Sally K., eds., The Politics of Urban Fiscal Policy (Beverly Hills, 1984), 55, 57.Google Scholar

^70. Stewart, Philanthropic Work, 126.

^71. This discussion on mayor Hewitt's committee was drawn from the SCAA's Fifteenth Annual Report to the State Board of Charities, (pub. no. 47), 1887, 19–20.

^72. Heads of departments were appointed by the mayor to terms of office that often extended beyond the mayor's two-year tenure. The mayor's power of removal was limited. Heads of departments could be removed only for cause and was subject to the governor's approval (New York State Law, Chapter 335, 1873).

^73. Schneider and Deutsch, History of Public Welfare, 18–22.

^74. The reformers also considered the idea of pressing the New York State legislature to pass a law prohibiting the dispensation of public outdoor relief statewide. They tried to win political support from public charity officials across the state, but they failed to muster enough support for their cause. See Lui, “Party Machines,” 153–55. As Katz points out, the Superintendents of the Poor had consistently voted down every motion that called for the total abolition of public outdoor relief (see Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse, 56).

^75. Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State, 48.

^76. Kaplan, Barry J., “A Study in the Politics of Metropolitanization: The Greater New York Charter of 1897” (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1975), 89Google Scholar; Hammack, Power and Society, 199–202.

^77. See New York Times, 16 March 1892; Kaplan, “Greater New York,” 116; and Hammack, Power and Society, 103, 121, 125.

^78. Hammack points out that in 1827 Brooklyn real-estate promoters sought consolidation as a means of tapping Manhattan for revenues to pay for Brooklyn improvements; in 1833 the New York City delegation tried to stop the state legislature from granting Brooklyn its own charter on the ground that New York City would expand east in its own good time. But an effective movement for consolidation began in 1888 under the leadership of the reformer Andrew Haswell Green and the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York. See Hammack, Power and Society, 188.

For a discussion of Green's consolidation movement, the pro- and anti-consolidation forces, and the deadlock in 1894 after passage of the referendum on consolidation, see Lui, “Party Machines,” 159–66, which draws on Foord, John, The Life and Public Services of Andrew Haswell Green (New York, 1913)Google Scholar; Hammack, Power and Society; Kaplan, “Greater New York”; and Platt, Thomas C., The Autobiography of Thomas Collier Platt, compiled and edited by Lang, Louis J. (New York, 1910).Google Scholar

^79. Kaplan, “Greater New York,” 209, 212–13; Hammack, Power and Society, 215. See also Gosnell, Boss Platt, 57 n. 8 and chap. 4.

^80. Reform Republicans were swept into office by the reform tidal wave of 1894. Tammany was defeated in the city election after the disclosures of the Platt-inspired Lexow Committee police investigation. Charges of corruption also brought down the oncedominant McLaughlin Democratic organization in Brooklyn in 1893 and 1895. See Kaplan, “Greater New York,” 201, 215, 218; Syrett, Harold Coffin, The City of Brooklyn, 1865–1898: A Political History (New York, 1944), 230–31Google Scholar; and Platt, Autobiography, 287, 293.

^81. Kaplan, “Greater New York,” 218; Hammack, Power and Society, 217. As Kaplan points out, Platt's interest in consolidation was probably also part of a deal with Tammany to divide the spoils of the city, eliminating the hated reformers who starved both parties; see Kaplan, “Greater New York,” 217.

^82. Richard L. McCormick, From Realignment to Reform, 90; Hammack, Power and Society, 217.

^83. Kaplan, “Greater New York,” 207, 227, 243; Syrett, City of Brooklyn, 263.

^84. Lieutenant Governor Saxton, for example, stated that he did not desire the effacement of Brooklyn, and many upstate Republicans had advocated defeat of the Lexow Consolidation Bill. See Kaplan, “Greater New York,” 243, 253, 271, 276. On the conflicts between Morton and Platt over consolidation, see Lui, “Party Machines,” 172–79.

^85. See Kaplan, “Greater New York,” 280.

^86. Devine, Edward T., “Public Outdoor Relief— II,” Charities Review 8 (June 1898): 129.Google Scholar

^87. The Greater New York Charter of 1897, chapter 13, section 4, stated: “No Commissioners shall have the power to dispense any form of outdoor relief except as provided in section 17 of this chapter.” Section 17 stated: “The Commissioners are hereby authorized and empowered to insert in their annual estimate of expenditures an item of expenditure for the relief of the poor adult blind.” In Seth Low Papers, Columbia University, Box 139, “Charities and Correction” folder.

^88. Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 22, 54; Weir, Margaret and Skocpol, Theda, “State Structures and the Possibilities for ‘Keynesian’ Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States,” in Evans, Peter, Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York, 1985), 118.Google Scholar

^89. Pluralism attempts to explain governmental decisions in terms of the conflicting play of organized group interests in society, of pressure-group politics; the state in the pluralist model is a neutral arbiter of competing interests in society. See, for example, Dahl, Robert, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, 1961)Google Scholar; and Skocpol, Theda, “Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal,” Politics and Society 10:2 (1980): 157CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For criticisms of pluralism and pressure-group politics, see, for example, Schattschneider, E. E., The Semi-Sovereign People (New York, 1960)Google Scholar; Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S., “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962): 947–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and idem, “Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework,” American Political Science Review 57 (September 1963): 632–43.

^90. As Skocpol and McCormick note, the distributive policies of nineteenth-century patronage parties “were above all shaped by the needs and proclivities of parties that were not merely a ‘mirror’ of opinion nor a ‘medium’ through which pressures were transmitted”; see Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 18, 40–41; and McCormick, Richard P., The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill, 1966), 354.Google Scholar