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Regulatory policy entrepreneurship and reforms: a comparison of competition and financial regulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2019

Hadar Y. Jabotinsky Open the ORCID record for Hadar Y. Jabotinsky [Opens in a new window]  and
Nissim Cohen
Hadar Y. Jabotinsky*
Affiliation:
Department of Public Administration & Policy, The University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel The Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Research of the Law, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Nissim Cohen
Affiliation:
Department of Public Administration & Policy, School of Political Sciences, The University of Haifa, Haifa 31905 Israel
*
*Corresponding author. Email: hadarjabotinsky@gmail.com
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Abstract

This article proposes a new perspective for analysing regulatory reforms by emphasising the important role of policy entrepreneurs. We provide a framework for understanding the interaction between appointed regulators and politicians, as well as other players in the policy arena, by emphasising the strategies that entrepreneurial regulators use to promote their agendas. Analysing the individual regulatory entrepreneur’s barriers, goals and strategies helps us gain a better microunderstanding of how regulatory reforms are actually achieved. We maintain that when regulators act as policy entrepreneurs, they change policy outcomes by adopting strategies that promote their agendas. We develop this argument by analysing two case studies of regulatory reforms in Israel: one in the banking sector and one involving changes in competition policy.

Keywords

competition policyfinancial regulationpolicy entrepreneursregulatorsregulatory reforms
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 40 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 628 - 650
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2019

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Footnotes

Both authors contributed equally to this research.

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