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Networks of Power in the CAP System of the EU-15 and EU-27

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 July 2009

Christian H.C.A. Henning
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Abstract

This article utilizes a quantitative network approach to analyze complex interaction patterns of public and private actors in EU multi-level governance, concerning the common agricultural policy. It demonstrates, in particular, that the theoretically founded policy network approach provides a powerful tool for comparative politics allowing a quantitative analysis of complex governmental systems. At the micro level, lobbying strategies of different groups can be identified and compared, while at the macro level the classical Corporatism-Pluralism typology could be generalized using this network approach. Further, due to its explicit integration with a legislative decision-making model the suggested approach is a valuable tool in comparative politics as it allows testing to what extent observed lobbying structures are systematically related with specific policy outcomes. In this article the policy network approach is applied to the lobbying system of the Common European Agricultural policy of the EU-15 and EU-27.

Keywords

policy networkscomparative politicsEU-multilevel systemCAPinterest group theory
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 29 , Special Issue 2: Networks in European Union Governance , August 2009 , pp. 153 - 177
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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