¹ I have to apologize for the arrangement of this paper. The subject is so intricate that it is often necessary to discuss in one place passages and views also relevant in another.

² Th. Mommsen, Gesammelte Schriften iv, 92–145Google Scholar (cited here as Rechtsfrage). In this he followed Hofmann, F. (De origine bẹlli civilis Caesariani, Berlin, 1857)Google Scholar whom otherwise he tried to refute.

³ Hirschfeld, O., ‘Der Endtermin der gallischen Statthalterschaft Caesars’, Klio iv (1904), 76–87Google Scholar (Kleine Schriften 310–329).

⁴ Judeich, W., ‘Das Ende von Caesars gallischer Statthalterschaft und der Ausbruch des Bürgerkrieges’, Rhein. Mus. 68 (1913), 1–10Google Scholar.

⁵ Holmes, T. Rice, ‘Hirschfeld and Judeich on the Lex Pompeia Licinia,’ CQ x (1916), 49–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Hardy, E. G., ‘The Evidence as to Caesar's Legal Position in Gaul,’ Jour. Phil. xxxiv (1918), 161–221Google Scholar.

⁷ Marsh, F. B., The Founding of the Roman Empire² (Oxford, 1927), 275–288Google Scholar.

⁸ Stone, C. G., ‘1 March 50, B.C.’, CQ xxii (1928), 193–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Adcock, F. E., ‘The Legal Term of Caesar's Governorship in Gaul,’ CQ xxvi (1932), 14–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Stevens, C. E., ‘The Terminal Date of Caesar's Command in Gaul,’ Am. Jour. Phil. 59 (1938), 169–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ Balsdon, J. P. V. D., ‘Consular Provinces under the Late Republic,’ JRS 29 (1939), 57 ff.Google Scholar, 167 ff. (These articles—notes 3–11—are cited by authors' names only.)

¹² A somewhat similar conclusion was reached by Gelzer, M. (Hermes 63 (1928), 113 ffGoogle Scholar.), who also forgot that supposedly premature discussion was common and passed without remark.

¹³ Cf. Mommsen, Staatsrecht i³, 594 ff., for proof that definite termination (Amtsfrist) was the usual thing. Balsdon's attack on Mommsen's basic theories seems to me to be only partially successful.

¹⁴ BG 8, 39, 3. Hardy (p. 175) shows that the passage argues a definite end, not a permissive one.

¹⁵ Att. 7, 7, 6; 7. 9, 4.

¹⁶ Though Balsdon's attack on Mommsen's interpretation of the Sullan system is serious, it is by no means final. Mommsen does admit the difficulties, but cites as exceptions what to Balsdon become the rule (Rechtsfrage 119 ff.).

¹⁷ Mommsen deduced the existence of a clause (sanctio) in the Lex Pompeia Licinia forbidding discussion of Caesar's provinces before 1st March, 50, thus enabling Caesar to stay till the end of 49, from Fam. 8, 8, 9, and Hirtius, BG 8, 53 (Rechtsfrage 139).

¹⁸ Are we to believe that the Lex Vatinia would have allowed Caesar's recall in 57 because these enemies had been defeated ? L. Domitius—in 58— could on no account have claimed that the war was over.

¹⁹ Suet., Div. Iul. 22, 1Google Scholar; App., BC 2, 13, 49Google Scholar; Dio 38, 8, 5.

²⁰ Suet., Div. Iul. 28, 2Google Scholar: ‘Marcellus … rettulit ad senatum ut ei succederetur ante tempus, quoniam bello confecto pax esset ac dimitti deberet victor exercitus' (for a discussion of this passage, cf. Stevens, p. 176). Domitius, in 56, may have suggested no more than a recall on the legal day (Suet., Div. Iul. 24, 1Google Scholar).

²¹ Such words, e.g. as Cicero used in the speech (de prov. cons. 35) of which the law was the practical outcome. If Balsdon were right Cicero would have been ill-advised to mention the successes already obtained (ibid. 34).

²² Rechtsfrage 127: ‘unwiderleglich erwiesen.’

²³ pp. 163 ff. His argument is final in many respects.

²⁴ Cf. Marsh p. 280.

²⁵ Cf. pp. 34 f.

²⁶ Cic., Att. 7, 6, 2Google Scholar; Phil. 2, 10, 24; Suet., Div. Iul. 24, 1Google Scholar.

²⁷ Cf. also 2, 18, 65.

²⁸ Pomp. 51, 5; 52, 4; Caes. 21, 6; Crass. 15, 7.

²⁹ Mommsen, Staatsrecht i³, 636 ff.; iii, 331, 1089 ff., and the examples given in Lewis and Short.

³⁰ Below, pp. 30 ff.

³¹ His argument loses none of its force when it is admitted that Cicero's ten years did not necessarily mean 120 months, even though he may have been speaking with legal exactitude (Mommsen, Rechtsfrage 105 ff.).

³² p. 196, n. 118.

³³ True, if transierit is future perfect Cicero would be saying that in December, 50, the ‘legis dies’ was yet to come. There are few parallels for a concessive cum with the perfect subjunctive. Lewis and Short are silent (p. 496; 2. iv). I can find two examples: Caesar, BG 1, 26, 2 (cf. ed. Rice-Holmes p. 30 n.) where the verb in the main clause is in the perfect tense, and Nepos 9, 3, 4, where a concessive meaning is possible but not certain. Quotations for a temporal cum with the future perfect and a future in the main clause are numerous: e.g. Lewis and Short p. 491 (2. I. A.3.d.α), and Cicero, Att. 7, 9Google Scholar, 1; defin. 1,63; Brut. 96; de re pub.2, 48. But tempting though it is to claim this passage fully for our view one must admit the existence of some ambiguity.

³⁴ Probably no more than ‘consider my interests’. Or is it an allusion to the ‘ratio absentis’, and the ‘habe tu nostrarn’ which follows a Ciceronian pun ?

³⁵ That ‘ut Caesari succedatur’ could only mean ‘that a successor is to take over at some (future) date’ is clearly brought out by Hardy (pp. 176 and 182).

³⁶ Cf. p. 36, n. 89.

³⁷ I agree with Stevens that Hardy's suggestion that M. Marcellus was trying to avail himself of a possible doubt as to the continued force of the Lex Sempronia in the hope of avoiding the veto is untenable. The appointments of Cicero and Bibulus in 51 prove that the Lex Sempronia was no longer considered relevant. For a reason for Marcellus’ early action, cf. p. 39.

³⁸ Cf. p. 21, n. 29.

³⁹ This is conclusively proved by Crassus' departure—paludatus—on (probably) 14th November, 55 (Att. 4, 13, 2).

⁴⁰ Cf. Mommsen, Rechtsfrage 127.

⁴¹ Hardy 193 ff., q.v. for the authorities. Such, too, is the opinion of Holmes (RR ii, p. 74Google Scholar), Ferrero (Greatn. and Decl. 2, 59 f.Google Scholar), and, of course, Mommsen (Hist, of Rome v, 125: ‘in every respect the decisive voice lay with Caesar’) Ed. Meyer (Caesars Monarchic ² 141 f.), though he makes Caesar largely dependent on Pompey, admits the former's essential superiority: ‘so lag die Entscheidung in den Händen Caesars.’

⁴² Att. 8, 3, 3: ‘Marcoque Marcello consuli finienti provincias Gallias Kalendarum Martiarum die restitit (sc. Pompeius).’

⁴³ As has frequently been pointed out, a date early in 50 is also excluded by the testimony of Hirtius (8, 39, 3), whose ‘unam aestatem’ must refer to the summer of 50 (Holmes 52, (Holmes 52 f.). Stone's argument for 51 (p. 199) does not convince.

⁴⁴ For the sanctio and discussion of it, cf. p. 33.

^44a Studia Romana (Berlin, 1859), 84Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ App., BC 2, 30Google Scholar, 1 118. The date cannot be fixed definitely, but it must have been late in November or, more probably, early in December, 50 (cf. Holmes, RR ii, 324. f.Google Scholar).

⁴⁶ Cf. above p. 23, n. 35.

⁴⁷ Cf. also his statement in CAH ix, 636: ‘Until the command conferred oft Caesar … was at an end it was idle to raise as a vital issue whether Caesar would lay down his command.’ The same goes for his ‘subjective feeling’ (CQ 1932, 26) that the situation reached a critical stage towards the end of 50. The situation became critical not because the ‘legis dies’ had passed but because it was coming near and Caesar's enemies felt their time getting short.

⁴⁸ Merrill's explanation of the whole passage (Class. Phil. 1912, 248 ff.) sounds reasonable. It seems quite legitimate to assume that a supplementary motion would have mentioned this date.

⁴⁹ In effect, though not in law, this motion amounted to a recall. It was probably this proposal that Caesar had in mind (BC 1, 9, 2) when he spoke of the Senate's attempt to deprive him of ‘semestre imperium’. I agree with Hardy (p. 190) that he meant the first half of 49, whether six or four months. Part of a six months' period was officially counted as a whole (Mommsen, Rechtsfrage 106 f.).

⁵⁰ Which they had a quasi-legal right to do: Caesar needed no great army in Gaul in 49. But he does complain about it (cf. n. 49).

⁵¹ BC 1, 5. 7.

⁵² JRS xxiii (1933), 74 f.Google Scholar; cf. CR xxxiii (1919), 68Google Scholar, and Rice-Holmes, RR ii, 248Google Scholar, n. 3.

⁵³ Dio (39, 33–5) and Plutarch (Crass. 15, 7; Pomp. 52, 4; Cata Min. 43, 1–6) suggest an earlier passage. Cf. also Livy, Epit. 105.

⁵⁴ Mommsen, Staatsrecht ii³, 94. Cf. also Caes., BC 1, 85Google Scholar, 8, and Pompey's case in 52 when it was thought better to restore the imperium by renewing the grant of Spain.

⁵⁵ Fam. 8, 8, 8. Stevens (p. 190) challenges us to produce a reason why Syria was left out of the allotment. I suggest that the Parthian danger was considered too great for a praetor to govern this province, which both before and after was one of the most important consular provinces.

⁵⁶ Att. 5, 16, 4. This point seems also to have occurred to Stone (p. 195, n. 4).

⁵⁷ Or the law de iure magistratuum (Stevens, p. 180).

⁵⁸ A possible explanation of both this date and 13th November as of general significance for the provincial allotment is given by Balsdon (pp. 65 ff.).

⁵⁹ Cf. Mommsen, Staatsrecht ii³, 255, esp.: ‘Was den Anfangstermin anbelangt, so farad die Sortition jetzt wahrscheinlich gleich zu Anfang des Kalenderjahres statt, in dem die Provinz zu übernehmen war.’ Sortition in January, Lex Curiata and departure in March. Cicero, who did not leave until midsummer, was no doubt delayed by the incorrectness of the calendar: in 51 the seas will not have been open until about May.

⁶⁰ Perhaps the end of June, since Tiberius ordered his governors to leave Rome by the beginning of that month (Dio 57, 14, 5).

⁶¹ If Mommsen is to be believed (Rectsfrage 101 ff.).

⁶² ‘… iam enim sciemus de rebus urbanis, de provinciis, quae omnia in mensem Martium sunt collata. …’

⁶³ The vetoing of this motion would not have changed the Senate's desire to make Cilicia a praetorian province.

⁶⁴ For Adcock's attempt to make it the ‘legis dies’ cf. above p. 27. Balsdon (p. 67) has given an explanation of the significance of the date which would fit both 50 and 49, but is by no means certain.

⁶⁵ Stevens (p. 200) makes him joint proposer. But Caelius's language makes it plain that the idea did not come from Pompey.

⁶⁶ Cf. Caelius' opinion of Pompey (Fam. 8, 1, 3): ‘solet enim aliud sentire et loqui neque tantum valere ingenio ut non appareat quid cupiat.’ Here, too, Pompey thought and said two different things, and let his true wishes appear to the shrewd observer.

⁶⁷ Thus Marsh's objection (p. 281) to Hardy's explanation falls down.

⁶⁸ Tenney Frank's explanation of Pompey's ‘fairness’ (i.e. that he proposed to bring the calendar up to date in 49 so that 365 (sic—really 355) days would have passed by 13th November), a convincing bit of reasoning (CR xxxiii, 1919, 68 f.), strengthens the case for a date in 49.

⁶⁹ Cf. also Tyrrell and Purser iii², p. 243 n.

⁷⁰ Fam. 8, 14, 2; Dio 40, 60, 1.

⁷¹ No explanation has yet been found to suggest that this compromise could have been agreeable to the senatorial extremists, with whom Pompey was already pretty closely connected. They were mainly concerned with preventing the ‘ratio absentis’. Was that the reason why the proposal was dropped ?

⁷² Stevens' theory does not exclude the possibility of a proconsul taking out his Lex Curiata at any time during the ‘appointment-period’, while all preliminary steps could be taken beforehand.

⁷³ Like Holmes (p. 51, n. 1) and Balsdon (p. 176, n. 44), though independently from them, I take ‘post Kal. Mart.’ to refer to ‘placeret’ and not to ‘eum decedere’. This despite Hardy's objections (p. 205, n. 1). Pompey's was just then only concerned with postponing the discussion. The decree (§ 8) which was the result of his wishes refers only to a debate on ist March, not to a date of recall.

⁷⁴ Surely a verbatim report of what is briefly stated in Fam. 8, 8, 4. Dio (40, 59, 3) must have been thinking of these words when he wrote that Pompey wished Caesar to return ‘next year’ (50) on the expiration of his command, as he thought that ‘ut Caesari succedatur’ meant immediate supersession (Hardy p. 173).

⁷⁵ Cf. p. 32.

⁷⁶ Adcock pp. 20 f.

⁷⁷ BG 8, 53, 1. This passage is discussed below.

⁷⁸ This I take to be the meaning of ‘confidentia’ (Fam. 8, 8, 9). People, disturbed by the evident disagreement between Pompey and Caesar, felt that Pompey's decision had postponed the crisis. (Cf. also Tyrrell and Purser, ad loc, iii², p. 116).

⁷⁹ The same argument applies to Balsdon's explanation of the passage (pp. 175 ff.) which is really only an extension of the sanctio.

⁸⁰ Fam. 8, 4, 4: ‘interrogates de successione C. Caesaris, de qua, hoc est de provinciis, placitum est ut quam primum ad urbem reverteretur Cn. Pompeius, ut coram eo de provinciarum successione ageretur.‘ Pompey was present at this debate.

⁸¹ Fam. 8, 9, s: ‘Ipse (Pompeius) tamen hanc sententiam dixit nullum hoc tempore senatus consultum faciendum.’

⁸² Fam. 8, 9, 5: ‘Scipio hanc ut Kal. Mart. de provinciis neu quid coniunctim referretur’.

⁸³ This is Stevens' theory (pp. 178 ff.). His collateral supports, Balbus' visit to Rome and Plancus' presence at Ravenna, have no intrinsic significance and become important only in connection with the theory.

⁸⁴ The Senate had also fathered Caesar's greatness by giving him Transalpine Gaul in 59, though Cicero (Att. 8, 3, 3Google Scholar) and Plutarch (Pomp. 46, 4Google Scholar) ascribe a good deal of fatherhood of this kind to Pompey. But whatever the general implications of the paternity problem, in this passage it is clearly the Senate that is viewed as wielding a father's authority.

^84a E.g. Rice Holmes in his edition of BG (8, 53, 1—p. 399 n.) and RR ii, 299 ff.

⁸⁵ For a similar opinion of this passage, cf. Adcock, pp. 20 f.

⁸⁶ Cicero (Att. 7, 6, 2Google Scholar; 8, 3, 3) seems to have regarded the belated addition to the lex quaedam as effective.

⁸⁷ Adcock, p. 22.

⁸⁸ It is assumed here as certain that Caesar was convinced of the danger of even a few weeks not so much without imperium as without an army before his entry on the consulship (Fam. 8, 14, 2; Dio 40, 60, 1).

⁸⁹ Stevens (p. 171) and Balsdon (pp. 58 ff.) have tried to tear to shreds Mommsen's other ‘guarantee’, namely the fact that supersession in March would have been a constitutional anomaly (de prov. cons. 36–8). I am not fully convinced of the futility of Cicero's argument and can believe that Caesar may have considered this an additional safeguard.

⁹⁰ For what sounds like a correct appreciation of the good relations between Caesar and Pompey immediately after Luca, cf. Plut., Cato Minor 43, 10Google Scholar.

⁹¹ Cf. p. 40.

⁹² I cannot agree with the novel theory (Stevens, pp. 174, 180 f.; Balsdon, pp. 173 f.; CAH ix, 627 f.) that Pompey's legislation of 52 did not work against Caesar. For the re-enactment of the duty of personal attendance at elections was highly inconvenient for Caesar, and Pompey's codicil could be attacked as invalid. The Lex Pompeia de provinciis did put the provinces at the Senate's disposal at the critical time and it was perhaps realized too late that it made the veto possible. At any rate, persistent vetoing could be (and was) dubbed resistance to the State, and force could be used against it.

⁹³ Cf. e.g. Fam. 8, 14, 2.

⁹⁴ BG 7, 1, 1. Although Caesar probably only meant that the previous year's rebellion had been quelled, he had every reason to suppose three further years (January, 52, to January, 49) sufficient for final pacification.

⁹⁵ Pompey had not yet fully joined his enemies, and the dispensation should not have been difficult to get from one who had himself just received one, even if it had not formed part of the compact at Luca.

⁹⁶ ‘Probably in March, 52,’ according to Tyrrell and Purser (iii, p. lxv). Plutarch (Pomp. 56, 1) alludes to it after the co-optation of Scipio in Augnst, 52 (Pomp. 55, 11) Dio (40, 51, 2), who puts both at the beginning of Pompey's sole consulship, before the laws de vi and de ambitu, is in conflict with Livy, Epit. 107, Asconius in Mil. 31, and Appian, BC 2, 25, 96, who all indicate its passage after Milo's trial.

⁹⁷ That in the end Caesar did not intend to stand in 50 is further indicated by the facts that at the elections of 50 he had his own candidate in the person of Ser. Sulpicius Galba, and that he visited Cisalpine Gaul early in the year for the sake of the canvass of M. Antonius, not his own (Hirtius, BG 8, 50, 1–2 and 4). These points are made by Frank, Tenney (JRS xxiii, 1933, 74Google Scholar).

⁹⁸ Cf. Hardy p. 189.

⁸⁹ Cf. here Caesar' soffers in 50–49: he always wished to retain at least one legion and one province, or when he did offer to surrender the ‘absentis ratio' and to return (Fam. 16, 12, 3) he demanded that Pompey should go to Spain. Pompey's absence would free Caesar from the threat of Milo's fate.

¹⁰⁰ 40, 51, 2. The νόμοι here mentioned must be the Leges annales; for the Lex Vatinia or Pompeia Licinia had nothing to do with any lawful time for consular election.

¹⁰¹ Rechtsfrage 125 ff.

¹⁰² As a rule the tribunes were Caesar's adherents. In 51 surprise was shown at the election of one who professed senatorial leanings (Curio, Fam. 8, 4, 2Google Scholar). A new tribunician law would also obviate the now doubtful legality of the old.

¹⁰³ If we are right Caesar wrote first a letter to his tribunes, who then started their preparations for a bill with 50 in their view. The whole matter may have been well under way before Caesar asked for 49. It does not seem incredible to me that from an account of these negotiations, preserved in a lost historian (Asinius Pollio ?), Suetonius should have quoted the initial letter only.

¹⁰⁴ Having written this I find that Mr. Stone, whose purpose was quite different, came to a similar conclusion about this passage (p. 198): ‘Caelius is referring to some talk about having a law passed to enable Caesar to stand in 50 for the consulship of 49.’

^104a I admit, of course, that my theory of Caesar's ‘alternatives’ and ‘choice’ must be considered tentative and based on conjecture. It does, however, consider all three important passages (BC 1, 9, 2; Fam. 8, 8, 9; Suet., Div. Iul. 26, 1), and seems to offer the only solution of their contradictions. I think that Caesar's own testimony as to the date mentioned in the Lex Decem Tribunorum must stand, and that, at any rate after March, 52, he had no intention of being elected in 50. In that case Suetonius and Caelius were either talking nonsense or allowing for some other possibility, and I feel that the theory offered in this paper does something to combine all these statements into a reasonable whole.

¹⁰⁵ In 56 Cicero (de prov. cons. 34) suggested the need for two more years to round off the conquest after the real fighting was over.

¹⁰⁶ Dio 40, 59, 1; App., BC 2, 26, 99Google Scholar; Suet., Div. Iul. 28, 2–3Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁷ Fam. 8, 4, 4. ‘De successione Caesaris, hoc est de provinciis’ proves that the Senate preferred to discuss the general problem rather than the particular.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Plutarch (Pomp. 56, 2–3Google Scholar), who also suggests this acquiescence in a broken promise with a conscience satisfied by its apparent fulfilment.

¹⁰⁹ ‘Simulator’ (Q.F. 1, 3, 9); ‘solet enim aliud sentire et loqui’ (Fam. 8, 1, 3).

¹¹⁰ Cf. the cases of the cura annonae (57 B.C.), Ptolemy Auletes (56 B.C.), and Pompey's dictatorship (54 B.C.).

¹¹¹ The same goes for Balsdon's explanation of the ‘negotium’ (pp. 176 f.). He, too, would have us believe in friendly relations between Pompey and Caesar in 51. About 50 he says (p. 177): ‘The “negotium” had broken down,’ but does not explain how or why. I agree with his idea of a ‘gentlemen's agreement’ (of which I read after I had formulated my own theory), but put it into 56 when we know that Caesar and Pompey were partners rather than in 51 when their relations were strained.

¹¹² Cf. also Hardy (p. 180): ‘It was still possible that in a general debate on the provinces one or both of his provinces might be left out of the settlement, and consular or praetorian be selected from the rest.’

¹¹³ Cf. Fam. 8, 9, 2: ‘Galliae in eandem condicionem quam ceterae provinciae vocantur,’ as an explanation for the general stoppage of provincial appointments which Caelius foresaw.

¹¹⁴ Particularly Fam. 8, 8, 9 (pp. 38 f.) and Fam. 8, 11, 3 (p. 31 f.).

¹¹⁵ Mr. Stevens's answer (p. 208) stands and falls with the ‘appointment-period’.

¹¹⁶ M. Marcellus, in 51, admittedly tried to recall Caesar prematurely, but he, too, wished to prevent the ‘absentis ratio’ and made his attempt before, not after, the end of Caesar's command. For the probable reason for his early action cf. p. 39.