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The Burma Socialist Program Party and Its Rivals: A One-Plus Party System
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2009
Extract
After four years in eclipse, a new political party is emerging from, the shadows of military rule in Burma. It is part of the revolution set in motion by the men who seized power in March 1962. In the four years following that event, the military rulers have persisted in their determination to remake Burma along the lines set forth in their ideological stafement, Burmese Way To Socialism (BWS). Thus far, the coup leaders show no signs of growing tired and desiring to return to the barracks. However, to insure the completion of their revolution and to anticipate the day when they will step out of office, they are in the process of recruiting, training and organizing a new elite of soldiers and civilians who are loyal to their ideas, dedicated to their programs and pledged to carry on when they are given the opportunity.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1967
References
1. Forward, III, 17, (04 15, 1965) p. 5.Google Scholar
2. For a fuller discussion of the Union Party failures, see Trager, F., “Failure of the U Nu and the Return of the Armed Forces in Burma,” Review of Politics, XXV, (07 1963) 309–328CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also see my “From Democracy to Dictatorship in Burma,” Current History, (02 1964) 83–88.Google Scholar
3. On the formation of the NUF, see my “Parties, Politics and the National Election in Burma,” Far Eastern Survey, XXV, (1956 177–184Google Scholar. For an evaluation of the BWPP, see Josey, A.. “The Political Significance of the Burma Workers' Party,” Pacific Affairs, XXXI (1958) 372–379.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4. For a Burmese version of the 1958 AFPFL split, see Win, U Sein, The Split Story, (Rangoon: The Guardian Ltd., 1959).Google Scholar
5. The Guardian (daily) 12 7, 1965.Google Scholar
6. For a fuller discussion see The Pyidawtha Conference, August 4–17, 1952; Resolutions and Speeches. (Rangoon: Ministry of Information, 1952) 12–22.Google Scholar
7. The Guardian (daily) 12 16, 1965.Google Scholar
8. Ibid., December 10, 1965.
9. Ibid., December 12, 1965.
10. Ibid., December 10. 1965.
11. Forward, III, 15. (03 15, 1965) p. 13.Google Scholar
12. The classification refers to the peculiar factors of a national party dependent upon an external force — in this case the military — without roots in the society and experienced leadership, faced with the challenge of small factions of political and ethnic dissidents, who have no hope of coming to power or gaining their ends so long as the military remains united and holds power.