¹ Signatories to the Manila Pact in September 1954 were the United States, Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand. Pakistan was the only country to withdraw in 1973.

² Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand supported the American effort; Pakistan and France criticized it. Britain's position was ambiguous.

³ Before his election Nixon had argued for reconciliation with China and called SEATO “a somewhat anachronistic relic of the days when France and Britain were active members”. Richard Nixon, “Asia after Vietnam”, Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (Oct. 1967)Google Scholar.

4 Thai News, 2 Apr. 1969.

5 Bangkok Post, 8 May 1969.

6 Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand), henceforth FAB, Apr./May 1969, p. 350.

⁷ Thanat also said in an interview that he had sought Thanom Kittikachorn's consent “to make public our readiness to sit down and have a dialogue with representatives of China” — Sydney Morning Herald, 27 June 1972. Before the reshuffle the Thai government had decided to lift the ban on trade with China, to permit visits to China by sports and non-political groups, and to relax the anti-Communist laws. Bangkok Post, 4 Nov. 1971. The country's military leaders wished to retreat from the next logical step, the ramifications of-which were unclear to them.

⁸ FAB, Feb./Mar. 1972, p. 166.

⁹ Sydney Morning Herald, 28 June 1972.Google Scholar

¹⁰ New York Times, 22 Nov. 1968.Google Scholar

¹¹ FAB, Apr./May 1969, pp. 332-33.

¹² Manila Times, 19 May 1969.Google Scholar

¹³ Ibid., 20 Feb. 1972.

¹⁴ Japan Times, 16 Feb. 1972.

¹⁵ Manila Times, 19Mar. 1972.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Philippines Daily Express, 5 July 1972.Google ScholarDepartment of State Bulletin (henceforth DSB), 7 Aug. 1972, pp. 160–61Google Scholar.

¹⁷ New Zealand's Norman Kirk was elected on 28 Nov. 1972. Australia's Gough Whitlam on 2 Dec. Both established relations with China on 22 Dec. 1972.

¹⁸ The Age (Melbourne), 12 Jan. 1973.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Secretary of State William Rogers on 15 Feb. 1973 explained that he had discussions with Australian and New Zealand Ambassadors on the future of SEATO and added “I think we shall have to re-think some of the programmes”, DSB, 5 Mar. 1973, p. 254Google Scholar.

²⁰ Bangkok Post, 15 Apr. 1973.Google Scholar

²¹ Ibid., 26 July 1973.

²² Ibid., 22 July 1973.

²³ See Straits Times, 4 Oct. 1973.Google Scholar

²⁴ DSB, 1 Apr. 1974, p. 347.Google Scholar

²⁵ Bangkok Post, 27 Jan. 1974.Google Scholar

²⁶ Interview with Phan Wannamathee, Thai Ambassador to the U.K., 13 Feb. 1979.

²⁷ Sunday Times (Malaysia), 14 Apr. 1974.Google Scholar

²⁸ International Herald Tribune, 16 Apr. 1974.Google Scholar

²⁹ FAB, Jan.-Mar. 1974, p. 46.Google Scholar

³⁰ Ibid., Jan.-Mar. 1975, p. 23.

³¹ A four-month extension was granted and the last American technicians left by 20 July; those that remained (some 270) were said to be working under the 1950 Military Assistance Agreement.

³² Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean was the reported reason. Le Monde, 16 Jan. 1975.Google Scholar

³³ FAB, Apr-June 1975, p. 12.Google Scholar

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 17-18.

³⁵ Ibid., Apr.-June 1975, p. 25.

³⁶ Interview with Phan Wannamathee.

³⁷ Ibid. The Vietnamese Communists would not forget the fact that Thailand had been used as a base by the Americans for bombing raids on North Vietnam. This was their major grievance.

³⁸ Thailand was prepared to hand them over until the United States claimed title and shipped the majority home. New York Times, 6 May 1975Google Scholar.

³⁹ 7,500 were to be withdrawn by the end of June 1975 under the Thai-U.S. agreement of 5 May. Straits Times, 6 May 1975Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Japan Times, 27 May 1975.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Straits Times, 18 June 1975.Google Scholar These questions were (1) the return of the aircraft, (2) repatriation of 40,000 Vietnamese refugees, (3) the continued presence of U.S. forces in Thailand, (4) Vietnamese presence in Laos/Cambodia, (5) Vietnamese support for insurgency in Thailand. New York Times, 30 May 1975Google Scholar.

⁴² The Chinese asked for two things: (1) a non-hegemony clause in the joint statement, (2) agreement that Taiwan was part of China; both points were included in the communique as points 5 and 6 respectively. Thailand did not obtain China's pledge to cease supporting the insurgents but Kukrit seemed comforted by the Chinese attitude towards them. Mao told Kukrit how to handle the Communist Party by listing three don'ts, “don't condemn them, don't kill them, don't send troops to fight them”. Voice of the Nation, (Thailand), 3 and 9 July 1975Google Scholar.

⁴³ Philippines Daily Express, 5 Oct. 1974.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Ibid., 8 Oct. 1974.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 13 Apr. 1975.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 9 June 1975.

⁴⁷ On 25 June Marcos made the comment that the Philippines would support the inclusion of Asian Communist states into ASEAN. Ibid., 26 June 1975.

⁴⁸ Chongkhadikij, Theh, Bangkok Post, 18 July 1975.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Philippines Daily Express, 19 July 1975.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Bangkok Post, 22 July 1975.Google Scholar See also FAB, July-Sept. 1975, p. 89Google Scholar.

⁵¹ FAB, July-Sept. 1975, p. 73.Google Scholar

⁵² On the significance of the Manila Pact today, see the author's “Thailand and the Manila Pact”, World Today 36, no. 2 (Feb. 1980)Google Scholar.