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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2009
The facts and evaluations presented here were designed to outline some of the characteristics of the Burmese class-structure. Of particular relevance seems to be the occupational structure and its modification during the last three or four decades. The income distribution among various occupational groups also helped in this characterization. The differentiation and cooperation between the different elites was described, together with the setting in which they function, the qualification for admission and the patterns of mobility comparing the standard of aspirations with the channels available. In this context roles and status image were discussed including the rough after status components, status symbols and the preferred occupational hierarchy in terms of social prestige. Finally the internal cohesiveness of the social strata in so far as distinct self-conscious entities are concerned was examined.
The material presented may be summed up as follows:
1. The population of Burma was split into two main parts: a small elite concentrated in government administration, party bureaucracy and the military on the one hand, and the peasants, small traders, business and hired labourers on the other hand. In between the two is a very small group of middle-class people and skilled workers.
2. Although the average income level was exceedingly low, at least until 1962, the span between the highest and lowest income categories was rather great.
3. The modern elite was small and though the internal differentiation is slight the antagonism is considerable. Before the coup the main adversary groups (excluding the underground) were administrators, politicians and students. The elite groups enjoyed little autonomy and freedom of action as there was no alternative outlet except the government bureaucracy, the military and an underdeveloped party bureaucracy. The weakness of the legal opposition parties and trade unions, the small number of independent economic organizations made it difficult for oppositional elite to develop and be institutionalized in relatively independent power positions. This had many repercussions on the already limited ability of the political and social centre to cope with economic and political problems.
4. Despite the generally universalistic criteria, for acceptance in the various elite groups, and the not insignificant de facto mobility, channels for such upward mobility were few and restricted to certain sectors of the political and government bureaucracy. This enabled the ruling elite to exert much influence on the chanelling of desirable recruits, but created permanent pressure from unemployed or underemployed high school and university graduates.
5. Leaving the ethnic minorities aside, crystallized class-oriented groups were very rare, and the main criteria for belonging to the few that existed were the type of education received and the amount of exposure to Western culture. This dividing line drawn by these criteria did not coincide entirely with that between town and countryside. There was little difference in this respect between the majority of the urban and the rural population.
Accordingly, Burma's class structure appears to be in a state of extensive flux. It would seem, therefore, that the primary problem is to achieve a more institutionalized differentiation of the sub-elite strata. This would particularly bridge the gap between the elites and the rest of the population and facilitate communication as there would be more “non congruent” status groups capable of serving as intermediaries between the elites and the more sophisticated, differentiated population.
1 The following is a list of books and papers dealing with the history, geography, population, economy, and religions of Burma: Furnivall, J. S., The Government of Modern Burma, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1960Google Scholar. (Second edition) Furnivall, J.S., An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma, People's Literature Committee and House, Rangoon, 1957Google Scholar. Hlaing, Aye, “Trends of Economic Growth and Income Distribution in Burma 1870–1946”, Journal of the Burma Research Society, Vol. XLVII, 06 1964, Part I, pp. 89–148Google Scholar. Nash, Manning, The Golden Road to Modernity: Village Life in Contemporary Burma, John Wiley and Son, 1965Google Scholar. Pye, Lucian W.. Politics Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity, Yale University Press, 1962Google Scholar. Silverstein, Josef, “Burma”, in Kahin, M. G.. Government and Politics of Southeast Asia, Cornell University Press, 1959, pp. 75–182Google Scholar. Smith, Donald E., Religion and Politics in Burma, Princeton University Press, 1965Google Scholar. Tinker, Hugh, The Union of Burma, Oxford University Press, 1961Google Scholar. Trager, Frank N., Building a Welfare State in Burma 1948–1956, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1956Google Scholar. Walinsky, Louis J., Economic Development in Burma 1955–1960, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1962Google Scholar. Cady, John F., A History of Modern Burma, Cornell University Press, 1958Google Scholar.
2 Nash, Manning, “Southeast Asian Society, Dual or Multiple?”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, 05 1964, p. 419Google Scholar.
3 Sundrum, R. M., “Urbanization: The Burmese Experience”, Journal of Burma Research Society, Vol. XL, 06 1957, Part I, Table XVIIIGoogle Scholar.
4 Sundrum, R. M., Census Data on the Labor Force and the Income Distribution in Burma, Department of Economics, Statistics and Commerce, University of Rangoon, 1958, p. 17Google Scholar.
5 M. Nash, op. cit., p. 413.
6 R. M. Sundrum, Census data …, op. cit., p. 17.
7 According to one source, the number of clerks increased to 250,000, three times the pre-war figure. See H. Tinker, 1961, op. cit., p. 156.
8 The rest were unpaid family workers and were presumably more or less equally divided among these two categories.
9 Within this context the growth of the urban population from 10.4% to 15.4% since 1931 should also be mentioned as well as the slight rise in the percentage of living in cities with a population of less than 10,000 and the slight decline in the percentage living in cities of more than 100,000. See Mehta, Surider K., The Labor Force in Urban Burma and Rangoon 1953: A Comparative Study, Ph. D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1959, pp. 45–46Google Scholar.
10 See for example Myrdal, G., Asian Drama, Pantheon, 1968, p. 470Google Scholar. Breese, G., Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries, Prentice Hall, 1966, pp. 44–46Google Scholar.
11 R. M. Sundrum, “Urbanisation: The Burmese Experience”, op. cit., p. 123.
12 Not only minority groups, but also the more educated people tended to concentrate in the cities, particularly in Rangoon. In the thirties 2/3 of persons with college and higher degrees and 3/4 of persons holding degrees in engineering, education, law and medicine were living in Rangoon. It may also be interesting to add that until the fifties the age-sex composition of the urban population, especially in Rangoon, was highly abnormal, mainly because of the large floating population of foreign migrants. The sharp decline in the post-war period is reflected in the higher sex ratio found in the 1953 census.
13 For a comparative analysis of patterns of urbanization in Europe and developing countries see: Sjoberg, Gideon, The Pre-industrial City: Past and Present, The Free Press, 1965Google Scholar.
14 R. M. Sundrum, “Urbanism …, op. cit., pp. 111–112.
15 Russett, B. M. and others, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1964, pp. 155–157Google Scholar.
16 $ 1 = K 5.
17 These findings refer to national averages. See also H. Tinker op. cit., p. 155.
18 For further details, see L. J. Walinsky, op. cit., p. 37.
19 The 1957 census gathered data on population and cottage industries in 252 centres classified as townships, including 708,000 households with a total population of close to 3·3 million. Data on income were taken from a sample of 1·1 million persons aged 11 years or more, who had been gainfully occupied for at least some time during the year of the census.
20 For further information, see in F.N. Trager, Building a Welfare State …, op. cit., p. 73. Silverstein, Josef, “Problems in Burma: Economic, Political, and Diplomatic”, Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 2, 02 1967, p. 120Google Scholar.
21 Holmes, R.A., “Burmese Domestic Policy: The Politics of Burmanization”, Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 3, 03 1967, pp. 188–197CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
22 M. Nash, “Southeast Asian Society .. ”, op. cit., p. 418.
23 L.W. Pye, op. cit., p. 63.
24 L.W. Pye, op. cit., p. 147.
25 Nash, M., “Party Building in Upper Burma”, Asian Survey, Vol. III, No. 4, 04 1963, p. 147Google Scholar.
26 Ibid.
27 L.W. Pye, op. cit., p. 146.
28 An illuminating example of the importance of these qualities and of their impact on everyday life is given by M. Nash, The Golden Road …, op. cit., Ch. 3, and Ch. 7, and M. Nash, “Party Building …”, op. cit.
29 Pfanner, David E. and Ingersoll, J., “Theravada Buddhism and Village Economic Behavior: A Burmese and Thai Comparison”, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, 05 1962, p. 343CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Maung, Mya, “Cultural Values and Economic Change”, Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 3, 03 1964, p. 759Google Scholar.
30 D.E. Pfanner, Ibid.
31 D.E. Pfanner, op. cit., pp. 344, 349.
32 Silverstein, Josef and Wohl, Julian, “University Students and Politics in Burma”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, Spring 1964, p. 54Google Scholar.
33 Fischer, Joseh, Universities in Southeast Asia, Ohio State University Press, Ohio, 1964, p. 29Google Scholar.
34 For a detailed analysis of the clash between these two elites, see L.W. Pye, op. cit., pp. 48, 77.
35 If minorities are included, this statement has to be modified. Without ignoring the effects of the interaction between ethnic minorities and the Burmese majority on the class structure, this issue seems to be related rather to the vulnerability of the political structure and the problem of national identity.
36 For the relevance of the concept “status congruency ” to questions of social integration and mobility, see for example: Galtung, John, “Rank and Social Integration. A Multidimensional Approach”, in Berger, Joseph, Zelditch, Morris Jr, and Anderson, Bo (eds.), Sociological Theories in Progress, Houghton MifBin Co., Boston, 1966, Vol. 1, pp. 145–198Google Scholar. Lenski, Gerhard E., “Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 19, No. 4, 08 1954, pp. 405–413CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Lissak, Moshe, Social Mobility in Israel, Israel Universities Press, 1969Google Scholar.
