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The Five Power Defence Arrangements and the reappraisal of the British and Australian policy interests in Southeast Asia, 1970–75

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 December 2009

Andrea Benvenuti  and
Moreen Dee
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Abstract

Working from recently declassified Australian and British government files, this paper examines the archival evidence on policy thinking in London and Canberra towards the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) during the period 1970–75. The article argues that one of the main reasons for the Heath government's decision to deploy a token military force in Southeast Asia as part of a multilateral defence arrangement with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore was the desire to uphold these Commonwealth connections. By contrast, Canberra was beginning to question the value of such arrangements in a rapidly changing Southeast Asian strategic environment.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , February 2010 , pp. 101 - 123
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 2010

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References

1 For the decision to bring forward the date of the final withdrawal, see Phuong Pham, ‘The end to “East of Suez”: The British decision to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, 1964 to 1968’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Oxford, 2001), ch. 7; Dockrill, Saki, Britain's retreat from East of Suez: The choice between Europe and the world? (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 202–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jones, Matthew, ‘A decision delayed: Britain's withdrawal from South East Asia reconsidered, 1961–68’, English Historical Review, 117, 472 (2002): 569–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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3 TNA, FCO 24/1072, Johnston to Douglas-Home, 2 Apr. 1971.

4 Sir Arthur Tange (Secretary, Department of External Affairs 1954–64; Secretary, Department of Defence 1970–79) quoted in Andrews, Eric, The Department of Defence: The Australian centenary history of Defence, vol. 5 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 148Google Scholar. For the Australian response to the British withdrawal, see Benvenuti, Andrea, Anglo-Australian relations and the ‘turn to Europe’, 1961–1972 (Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer, 2008), ch. 5Google Scholar.

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10 Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1966–67, vol. 756, col. 1969.

11 See Heath's address to the National Press Club in Canberra in TNA, FCO 24/203, British High Commission (henceforth BHC) Canberra to Commonwealth Office, telegram 1077, 14 Aug. 1968.

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15 TNA, CAB 148/101, DOP(70) 1st mtg, 1 July 1970.

16 TNA, CAB 148/101, DOP (70)13, FCO paper, ‘Priorities in Our Foreign Policy’, 21 July 1970.

17 Ibid. In an earlier paper, FCO officials had also pointed out that, among the political objectives that a British military presence in Southeast Asia was expected to serve were the maintenance of British influence in the region; the continuation of Britain's special relationship with the United States; and the preservation of its influence over American policy in Asia. TNA, FCO 49/304, British Policy in Southeast Asia, undated.

18 TNA, FCO 24/621, British Policy towards Australia and New Zealand after 1971, 8 June 1970.

19 TNA, FCO 24/621, Johnston to Grenhill, 8 Sept. 1970.

20 TNA, FCO 30/608, Johnston to Fingland, 15 Jan. 1970.

21 TNA, FCO 46/622, Cradock to Tomlinson, 15 July 1970.

22 TNA, FCO, 49/304, Aiers to Tomlinson, 16 July 1970; Aiers to Cradock, 20 July 1970; FCO 24/643, Aiers to Tomlinson, Royle and Douglas-Home, 16 July 1970.

23 TNA, FCO 46/622, Peck's comments to Cradock to Tomlinson, 17 July 1970, written note to Aiers to Tomlinson, Royle and Douglas-Home (16 July 1970), 17 July 1970.

24 TNA, CAB 148/101, DOP(70)10, UK military presence in South East Asia after 1971 – The basis for consultations with our Commonwealth allies, 17 July 1970.

25 The National Archives of Australia, Canberra (henceforth NAA), A1838, 696/1/9 part 12, Australian High Commission (henceforth AHC) London to Canberra, cablegram 11069, 26 June 1970.

26 Carrington, Peter, Reflect on things past: The memoirs of Lord Carrington (London: William Collins, 1988), pp. 113–45 and 193Google Scholar.

27 TNA, FCO 24/643, Tomlinson to Cradock, 17 July 1970.

28 Defence officials were also willing to consider the provision of further forces if consultations with Britain's Commonwealth allies showed this to be desirable. See TNA, CAB 148/101, DOP(70)10, UK military presence in South East Asia after 1971 – The basis for consultations with our Commonwealth allies, 17 July 1970.

29 Ibid.

30 TNA, CAB 148/101, DOP(70) 4th mtg, 22 July 1970. For Carrington's memorandum, see TNA, CAB 148/101, DOP(70)10, 17 July 1970.

31 TNA, CAB 148/101, DOP(70) 4th mtg, 22 July 1970; see also DOP (70)8, Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement, 20 July 1970.

32 TNA, CAB 128/47, CM(70) 8th mtg, 23 July 1970.

33 NAA, A1838, 696/1/9 part 11, AHC London to Canberra, cablegram 12646, 23 July 1970.

34 TNA, FCO 24/695, Hickman to Aiers, 29 June 1970.

35 NAA, A1838, 696/1/9 part 12, AHC Singapore to Canberra, savingram 2/70, 24 July 70.

36 NAA, A1838, 696/1/9 part 12, Memcon, Malcolm Fraser and Lee Kuan Yew, 19 June 1970.

37 NAA, A5882, CO988, AHC Singapore to Canberra, cablegram 2417, 28 July 1970.

38 NAA, A1838, 696/1/9 part 11, AHC Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, cablegram 2542, 26 June 1970.

39 NAA, A1838, 696/1/8 part 10, AHC London to Canberra, reporting a Malaysian High Commission in London announcement, memorandum 465, 24 June 1970.

40 NAA, A5882, CO988, AHC Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, cablegram 2893, 27 July 1970.

41 Ibid.

42 NAA, A1838, 696/1/9 part 12, AHC Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, cablegram 2660, 1 July 1970.

43 NAA, A1838, 696/1/9 part 12, AHC Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, cablegram 2686, 4 July 1970. Established in 1955 to prevent further communist intrusion in Southeast Asia, SEATO by 1970 was proving ineffectual as a collective defence organisation due to its inability to intervene in the Cambodian, Lao and Vietnamese conflicts because intervention required a unanimous decision by members. Questions on dissolving SEATO arose in 1973, and the end came in 1977.

44 NAA, A1838, 696/1/9 part 12, AHC Wellington to Canberra, savingram 15/70, 7 Aug. 1970.

45 NAA, A1838, 696/1/9 part 12, Canberra to AHC London, cablegram 8050, 24 June 1970.

46 NAA, A1838, 696/1/9 part 12, Canberra to AHC London, cablegram 8319, 29 June 1970.

47 NAA, A1838, 696/1/9 part 12, AHC London to Canberra, cablegram 11419, 3 July 1970.

48 NAA, A5882, CO988, Discussions with Lord Carrington: Australian position paper, July 1970.

49 NAA, A5840, vol. 3, Cabinet Decision 771 (FAD), 11 Dec. 1967; and Hancock, Gorton, pp. 226, 234. The Australian contribution included one infantry battalion, one battery (based at Terendak near Malacca in Malaysia), two destroyers or frigates (based in Singapore), fighter squadrons (based at Butterworth near Penang in northern Malaysia). See NAA, A1209, 1967/7334 attachment 2, DOD brief no. 25, May 1967.

50 NAA, A5882, CO988, Discussions with Lord Carrington: Australian position paper, July 1970.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 NAA, A5882, CO988, Cabinet Decision 575 (Ad Hoc), 31 July 1970; see also TNA, FCO 46/622, Memcon, Carrington and Australian ministers (Canberra), 31 July 1970. Under AMDA, Britain was responsible for the defence of Malaya/Malaysia against external aggression; this did not apply to Australia and New Zealand as they were not signatories to AMDA. In 1959, both countries associated themselves with the agreement in relation to Malaya, extending the association to Malaysia after its formation in 1963.

56 NAA, A5882, CO988, Cabinet Decision 575 (Ad Hoc), 31 July 1970. It is noteworthy that by 1970 internal security problems in Northern Ireland had already begun to place British military resources under strain. See Carver, Michael, Tightrope walking: British defence policy since 1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1992), pp. 100–1Google Scholar.

57 NAA, A5882, CO988, Cabinet Decision 575 (Ad Hoc), 31 July 1970.

58 Ibid.

59 See Howson, Peter, The Howson diaries: The life of politics (Ringwood: Viking Press, 1984), p. 648Google Scholar.

60 Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian relations, ch. 8.

61 TNA, FCO, 46/622, Memcon, Carrington and the Australian Cabinet, 31 July 1970; FCO 24/645, Carrington to FCO, telegram 862, 1 Aug. 1970; Johnston to Douglas-Home, 4 Aug. 1970; Moon to Stephens, 11 Aug. 1970; FCO 24/646, Carrington to Heath, 6 Aug. 1970.

62 NAA, A5882, CO988, Cabinet Decision 575 (Ad Hoc), 31 July 1970. Gorton was known for his scepticism towards a continuing Australian military presence in Southeast Asia. See Edwards, Peter, A nation at war: Australian politics, society and diplomacy during the Vietnam war 1965–75 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), pp. 199–201Google Scholar. See also Reid, Alan, The Gorton experiment: The fall of John Grey Gorton (Sydney: Shakespeare Head Press, 1971), p. 143Google Scholar; Hancock, Gorton, pp. 177–80.

63 NAA, A5882, CO988, Cabinet Decision 575 (Ad Hoc), 31 July 1970.

64 McDougall, Derek, ‘Australia and the British military withdrawal from east of Suez’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 51, 2 (1997): 191CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In 1968 the Marcos administration had revived Filipino claims over Sabah (Chin, Defence, pp. 149–62).

65 TNA, FCO 24/645, Carrington to FCO, telegram 862, 1 Aug. 1970.

66 TNA, FCO 24/645, Memcon, Carrington and the New Zealand Defence Council, 3 Aug. 1970; Carrington to FCO, telegram 427, 3 Aug. 1970; FCO 24/646, Memcon, Carrington and the New Zealand Cabinet, 3 Aug. 1970.

67 TNA, FCO 24/645, Memcon, Carrington and Lee Kuan Yew, 27 July 1970; FCO 24/646, Carrington to Heath, 6 Aug. 1970; DEFE 25/239, BHC Kuala Lumpur to FCO, telegram 17, 10 Aug. 1970; FCO 24/644, de la Mare to Tomlinson, 29 July 1970 and 31 July 1970.

68 TNA, FCO 24/645, Duff to Aiers, 3 Aug. 1970; Memcon, British and Malaysian officials, 29 July 1970; FCO 24/646, BHC Kuala Lumpur to FCO, 17 Aug. 1970; DEFE 25/239, BHC Kuala Lumpur to FCO, telegram 17, 10 Aug. 1970; FCO 24/664, Carrington to FCO, telegram 485, 29 July 1970.

69 For Malaysia's shift towards a less pro-Western and more non-aligned stance in foreign affairs, see Rajendran, M., ASEAN's foreign relations: The shift to collective action (Kuala Lumpur: Arenabuku 1985), 24–5Google Scholar; Parmer, Norman, ‘Malaysia: Changing a little to keep pace’, Asian Survey, 7, 2 (1967): 136CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ott, Marvin, ‘Malaysia: The search for solidarity and security, Asian Survey, 8, 2 (1968): 131–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rogers, Marvin, ‘Malaysia/Singapore: problems and challenges of the seventies’, Asian Survey, 11, 2 (1971): 127CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

70 Chin, Defence, p. 175.

71 Hawkins, David, The defence of Malaysia and Singapore: From AMDA to ANZUK (London: United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1972), p. 42Google Scholar.

72 For the legal basis of this loose consultative framework, see Chin, Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA: Some observations on the nature of an evolving partnership, Occasional Paper no. 23 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), pp. 17–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 NAA, A5931, CL 285, Communiqué issued in London in April 1970.

74 Chin, Five Power, pp. 1–2.

75 Chin, Defence, p. 177.

76 TNA, FCO 30/303, James to Douglas-Home, 8 Dec. 1971.

77 See Hancock, Gorton, p. 235; Kuhn, Rick, ‘Laborism and foreign policy: The case of the Vietnam war’, in From Evatt to Evans: The Labor tradition in foreign policy, ed. Lee, David and Waters, Christopher (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. 91Google Scholar; and Edwards, Nation at war, p. 350.

78 See for instance TNA, FCO 30/1364, Memcon, Douglas-Home and Whitlam (London), 19 Jan. 1972; FCO 24/1293, Radio Australia News Bulletin, 30 Mar. 1970; FCO 24/1294, BHC Canberra to FCO, telegram 731, 31 May 1972; Memcon, Douglas-Home and Whitlam (Canberra), 29 June 1972; Whitlam, ‘It's time for leadership’, 13 Nov. 1972, available at http://www.australianpolitics.com/elections/1972/72-11-13_it's-time.shtml [last accessed on 30 Jan. 2009].

79 For discussions between FCO and MOD officials on the possible effect of political change in Australia on the FPDA and British defence policy in Southeast Asia, see files TNA, FCO 24/1302 and 1303.

80 TNA, FCO 24/1294, Visit to Australia: Report by DUS(P), 3 July 1972.

81 TNA, FCO 24/1302, Five Power Defence Arrangements: Effect of a change of government in Australia, Apr. 1972.

82 British perceptions were somewhat vindicated by McMahon himself. In June 1972, during a tour of Southeast Asia, the Australian leader said in Jakarta that he did not ‘think that there was any real necessity to have a five-power arrangement so far as Britain, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia are concerned’. McMahon seemed anxious to avoid saying anything that could upset Australia's improving relations with Indonesia, a country that looked at the FPDA with some residual suspicion. In Malaysia and Singapore, McMahon reiterated Canberra's support for the FPDA, but doubts remained about Australia's attitude towards these arrangements. See Ingleson, John, ‘South-East Asia’, in Australia in world affairs, 1971–75, ed. Hudson, W.J. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 297Google Scholar.

83 TNA, FCO 24/1048, James to Tomlinson, 26 Oct. 1971.

84 TNA, FCO 24/1047, Heath to McMahon, 13 Dec. 1971; TNA, FCO, 24/1047, James to Grenhill, 8 Dec. 1971; and ‘Anglo-Australian relations: Prospects and initiatives’, 1 Dec. 1971, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs policy planning paper, attached to Hickman to Storar, 20 Dec. 1971; FCO 24/1048, James to Tomlinson, 26 Oct. 1971.

85 Edwards, Peter, Arthur Tange: The last of the mandarins (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2006), ch. 10Google Scholar.

86 NAA, A7942, F59, Five Power Arrangements and ANZUK, Defence Committee Agendum 6/1972, 4 Apr. 1972.

87 NAA, A7942, F59, Comanzukfor Singapore to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, DCR 253, April 1972; Five Power Arrangements and ANZUK, Defence Committee Agendum 6/1972, 4 Apr. 1972; Robby to Chief of Air Staff, 11 Apr. 1972.

88 NAA, A7942, F59, Five Power Arrangements and ANZUK, Defence Committee Agendum 6/1972, 4 Apr. 1972.

89 NAA, A7942, F59, Minute, Defence Committee Meeting, 13 Apr. 1972.

90 NAA, A7942, F59, ‘Withdrawal of Australian Forces from Malaysia/Singapore: AJSP no. 50/1972 – Plan Tabaret’, COS Committee Agendum 63/1972, 27 Nov. 1972; JPC Report, 17 Nov. 1972.

91 NAA, A7942, F59, Minute, COS Committee Meeting, 29 Nov. 1972.

92 Davison, Graeme, ‘The colonial strut: Australian prime ministers on the world stage’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 5, 1 (2005): 13Google Scholar, describes Whitlam as a self-assured leader ‘with aspirations to world stature, and an ego and physique to match’.

93 TNA, FCO 24/1335, BHC Canberra to FCO, telegram 1694, 5 Dec. 1972; McConville to Campbell, 6 Dec. 1972; Douglas-Home to BHC Canberra, telegram 1292, 6 Dec. 1972.

94 NAA: A1838, 696/1/30 part 1, cablegram 19616, AHC London to Canberra, 5 Dec. 1972; and cablegram 15672, Whitlam to Heath, 7 Dec. 1972.

95 See TNA, FCO 24/1335, McConville to Campbell, 6 Dec. 1972; FCO, 24/1554, Wilford to Norris, 9 Feb. 1973; FCO 24/1600, James to Norris, 12 Jan. 1973; and NAA, A7942, F59, Australian participation in combined military exercises and training in countries of the Southeast Asian and South West Pacific areas, 22 Dec. 1972.

96 TNA, FCO 24/1553, Note of Discussions by DUS(P) in Australian Department of Defence, 5 Feb. 1973; BHC Canberra to FCO, telegram 192, 3 Feb. 1973.

97 TNA, FCO 24/1553, Note of Discussions by DUS(P) in the Australian Department of Defence, 5 Feb. 1973.

98 NAA, A5931, CL 285, Decision 392 (FAD), 29 Mar. 1973; Submission 231, Apr. 1973.

99 TNA, FCO 24/1555, Wilford to Aiers, 10 Apr. 1973.

100 TNA, FCO, 24/1555, Wilford to Sykes, 16 Apr. 1973.

101 TNA, FCO 24/1556, Douglas-Home to British Embassy Washington, telegram 988, 30 Apr. 1973.

102 TNA, FCO 24/1555, BHC Wellington to FCO, telegram 234, 11 Apr. 1973; Watts to Hickman, 9 Apr. 1973; NAA, A5931, CL285, Cabinet Submission 491, 2 July 1973.

103 TNA, FCO 24/1553, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and neutralisation proposal for Southeast Asia, January 1973. It is worth noting that in 1971, Razak was instrumental in getting the ASEAN foreign ministers to adopt a declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). See ibid; Selat, Ahmand Mokhtar, ‘New directions in Malaysia's foreign policy: From Tunku to Abdullah Badawi’, in Malaysia's foreign relations: Issues and challenges, ed. Harum, Ruhanas (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 2006), p. 16Google Scholar; Parsons, Alf, Southeast Asian days (Brisbane: Griffith University, 1998), p. 111Google Scholar.

104 Leifer, Michael, Singapore's foreign policy: Coping with vulnerability (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 64Google Scholar; Ganesan, Narayan, Realism and interdependence in Singapore's foreign policy (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 42Google Scholar.

105 NAA, A5931, CL 285, Cabinet Decision 823, 2 July 1973.

106 Ibid. These 150 remaining servicemen were not be assigned to ANZUK.

107 NAA, A1838, 696/1/9 part 26, Defence Planning Division Brief, Australian Talks with British Defence Minister, William Rodgers, 21 May 1974.

108 See Smith, Hugh, ‘Defence policy’, in Independence and alliance: Australia in world affairs 1976–80, ed. Boyce, P.J. and Angel, J.R. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 49Google Scholar.

109 Wilson quoted in Ziegler, Philip, Wilson: The authorised life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1993), pp. 159–60Google Scholar.

110 This decision was reversed by Rowling's successor and National Party leader, Robert Muldoon; McCraw, David, ‘From Kirk to Muldoon: Change and continuity in New Zealand's foreign-policy priorities’, Pacific Affairs, 55, 4 (1982–83): 646, 657CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The New Zealand battalion would eventually be withdrawn in 1989.

111 Ashton, ‘British government perspectives on the Commonwealth’, p. 91.