^{page 260 note 1} Feith, H, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, (Ithaca, 1962), p. 385.Google Scholar

^{page 260 note 2} See Ali's statement to Parliament on 25 August 1953, in Antara, 26 August 1953.

^{page 260 note 3} Note that this paper is not concerned directly with the details of the Indonesian claim to West Irian, but with the way in which the Cabinet pursued this claim.

^{page 261 note 4} Thus Sukarno said in his Independence Day Speech of 1954:“We have asked for a debate on the problem of Irian Barat in the General Assembly of the United Nations. We ask those countries which are gathered in the UN to witness that the Dutch have unilaterally abrogated an agreement which they had signed.” See “Berirama Dengan Kodrat” Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, Vol II (hereafter DBR II) (Jakarta, 1965), 212.Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 5} See fn. 2 above.

^{page 261 note 6} And it continued to do so: see Von Balluseck's statement, United Nations General Assembly (hereafter UNGA) plenary session, 509 mtg., 10 December 1954, para. 110.

^{page 261 note 7} The term‘legal’ is used here in the western sense, in the sense generally accepted under international law. This may differ at times from the sense accepted in some non-western countries such as Indonesia. In the latter, for instance, many leaders would have regarded colonialism as‘illegal ’, meaning that it offended against the society on which it was imposed, though it was doubtful whether the International Court of Justice would have accepted such an interpretation. There is after all, no internationally-recognized law against colonialism per se.On this matter, see Sjatauw, J.J.G., “Western, Sosialist and Third World Attitude towards Peaceful Settlement of their International Disputes” (sic), Research Brief (Jakarta), 3 November 1969, pp. 28–38.Google Scholar

^{page 262 note 8} United Nations Papers Concerning the Dispute over Western Irian (Embassy of Indonesia, Canberra, 1957), pp. 9–10.Google Scholar

^{page 262 note 9} For list of Judges, see Yearbook of the United Nations (New York, 1951), p. 106;Google Scholar 1952, p. 43; 1953, p. 42.

^{page 263 note 10} The phrase‘members present and voting’ is interpreted to mean members casting a positive or negative ballot: abstentions are not counted as votes. See Rule 88 of the General Assembly Rules of Procedure, in‘Prof. Telders Study Group’ (comp.), United Nations Textbook (Leiden, 1959), p. 80Google Scholar. Thus for every one vote the Dutch gained, the Indonesians had to find two votes, if they were to secure the support of the Assembly on a particular matter.

^{page 263 note 11} Bone, Robert C. suggests that the Dutch could have been sure of at least 13 or 14 votes. See his The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem (Ithaca, 1958), p. 21.Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 12} Since Indonesia needed twice as many votes as the Netherlands; see fta. 10 above.

^{page 263 note 13} Antara, 18 October 1954. The former Indonesian politician and diplomat, Anak Agung Gde Agung, has said:“When the Indonesian Government had made its decision to bring the West Irian issue before the United Nations, it had counted on the support of the majority of Latin American countries”. See Gde Agung, Anak Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy (The Hague, 1973), pp. 105–106.Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 14} President Eisenhower reported to Congress:“… the United States … informed interested parties of US neutrality in the Assembly. This position was maintained in the Assembly. The United States abstained on all motions and votes, and took no part in the debate.” See US Participation in the UN — Report by the President to Congress for the Year 1954 (Washington, 1955), p. 85Google Scholar. See also Weiler, L. D. and Simons, A. P., The United States and the United Nations (New York, 1967), pp. 392–393.Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 15} For discussion of this point, see below, and the author's unpublished Ph.D. thesis “Indonesia at the United Nations, 1950–1965” (University of Queensland, 1974), 224–227Google Scholar.

^{page 263 note 16} Brackman, A.C., Indonesian Communism (New York, 1963), p. 197Google Scholar.

^{page 264 note 17} Antara, 18 October 1954.

^{page 264 note 18} See its Memorandum, A/2694, of that date.

^{page 264 note 19} ibid., para. 15.

^{page 264 note 20} ibid., para. 16.

^{page 264 note 21} See Higgins, R., The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations (London, 1963)Google Scholar, esp. p. 113; and Goodrich, L.M. and Simons, A.P., The United Nationsand Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Washington, 1962), esp. p. 108.Google Scholar

^{page 265 note 22} I.e. 7 votes in favour 3 against, with 5 abstentions. See UNGA General Committee, 92 mtg., 22 September 1954.

^{page 265 note 23} Assuming, of course, that no state voted in a way different from its stated intention.

^{page 265 note 24} UNGA plenary session, 477 mtg., 24 September 1954.

^{page 265 note 25} The First Committee (hereafter 1 C'tee) considers matters relating to international peace and security.

^{page 265 note 26} A/C.1/L.109.

^{page 266 note 27} Operative para. 1.

^{page 266 note 28} Operative para. 2.

^{page 266 note 29} Operative para. 3.

^{page 266 note 30} Von Balluseck, UNGA 1 C'tee, 726 mtg., 23 November 1954 para. 91.

^{page 266 note 31} ibid., para. 101.

^{page 266 note 32} See Sudjarwo, UNGA 1 C'tee, 726 mtg., 23 November 1954, para. 27.

^{page 266 note 33} A/C.1/L.109, operative para. 1.

^{page 267 note 34} A/C.1/L.110, co-sponsored by Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, India, Syria and Yugoslavia.

^{page 267 note 35} Sudjarwo, UNGA 1 C'tee, 735 mtg., 30 November 1954, para. 17.

^{page 267 note 36} Second preambular paragraph.

^{page 267 note 37} See above and fn. 31 for a discussion of the significance of this wording.

^{page 267 note 38} Operative para. 1.

^{page 267 note 39} Operative para. 2.

^{page 267 note 40} See fn. 37.

^{page 268 note 41} E.g. Peru, Mexico and Uruguay.

^{page 268 note 42} E.g. Brazil, Colombia, and Dominican Republic.

^{page 268 note 43} Canas, UNGA 1 C'tee, 735 mtg., 30 November 1954, para. 30.

^{page 268 note 44} A/C.l/L.lll, dated 30 November 1954.

^{page 268 note 45} Sudjarwo, UNGA 1 C'tee, 731 mtg., 27 November 1954, paras 57–58. As early as January 1951 Indonesia had shown itself to be sensitive to the question of self-determination for West Irian. Prime Minister Natsir, in a statement to the Parliament on 3 January, said:“Although we recognize the right of self-determination as the basis of the existence of our nation, we cannot accept the conception of this right as submitted by the Dutch with regardto Irian … the right to determine one's own lot cannot be used arbitrarily, so that part of a state like, for instance, provinces or townships, may use it.” See Indonesian Affairs, (Jakarta), I, 1 (January 1951), 3.Google Scholar

^{page 269 note 46} On the other hand, during the whole period that the issue was before the Assembly, the Dutch emphasized their view that they were in fact preserving and protecting the right of the Papuans to eventual self-determination. It became “… the most prominent argument on their defense during the General Assembly debates in the issue.” See Lijphart, A., The Trauma of Decolonization (New Haven, 1966), p. 19.Google Scholar

^{page 269 note 47} UNGA 1 C'tee, 735 mtg., 4 November 1954.

^{page 269 note 48} The vote encouraged Jakarta to believe that there would be little trouble in getting the plenary session to adopt the draft. See statement by the Minister of Information, Tobing, A.M., in Suluh Indonesia, 8 December 1954.Google Scholar

^{page 269 note 49} UNGA plenary session, 609 mtg., 10 December 1954.

^{page 269 note 50} Note here the importance of the interpretation of the phrase ‘members present and voting’ (see fn. 10). On only one ballot had the draft actually lost a supporter. Instead, what had happened was that many states which had abstained from voting in Committee, voted against the draft in the plenary session. In the former case, they were not counted among the ‘members present and voting’ — in the later case they were.

^{page 269 note 51} I have included in this total Haiti and Panama, which did not vote in the First Committee, but which voted against Indonesia in the plenary session.

^{page 269 note 52} Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru.

^{page 270 note 53} Riggs, R.E., Politics in the United Nations (Urbana, 1958), p. 42Google Scholar; van der Kroef, J.M., The West New Guinea Dispute (New York, 1958), p. 29Google Scholar and (by the same author)“West New Guinea in the Crucible,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXV (December 1960), p. 534.Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 54} Speech before the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat on 21 December 1957, translated as ‘Normalization or'Liquidation’ in Subandrio, Indonesia on March, Vol. II (Jakarta, n.d.), 21. My emphasis.

^{page 270 note 55} See, for instance, Brackman's remark that it was felt in Jakarta at least that if the Assembly passed a ‘mild resolution’ in Indonesia's favour:“… the“victory” would bolster the chronically shaky Ali Cabinet.” Brackman, p. 197.

^{page 270 note 56} Van der Kroef (1958), p. 31.

^{page 270 note 57} As Mohammad Hatta said in 1958:“… to permit West Irian to continue indefinitely as a bone of contention between Indonesia and the Netherlands is to afford communism an opportunity to spread in Indonesia … the most demanding voice (calling for the recovery of the territory), apart from that of President Sukarnohimself, is that of the Communist Party of Indonesia.” See “Indonesia Between the Power Blocs,” Foreign Affairs, 36, 3 (April 1958), pp. 486–487.Google Scholar

^{page 271 note 58} See van der Kroef (1958), p. 31.

^{page 271 note 59} In its ‘Review of the Week', the New York Times of 26 September 1954 remarked of the question: “The US position … was an awkward one. It had been an early sponsor of Indonesian demands for independence from the Netherlands. It was now, because of NATO considerations, forced,at least negatively, to side with the colonial power.” The case was linked with thatof Cyprus, where the British were under severe nationalist pressure. Both were seen as cases involving threatstothe strategic and political interests of NATO members.

^{page 271 note 60} Baldwin, Hanson, New York Times, 28 November 1954.Google Scholar

^{page 271 note 61} New York Times, 12 December 1954.

^{page 271 note 52} Jones, Howard P., Indonesia: The Possible Dream (New York, 1971), p. 178.Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 63} Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. For details of the trade balance between the US and the Latin American countries, see Direction of International Trade (New York, 1958), p. 54Google Scholar; 1959, p. 58. Itwas probably this economic dependence that Sudjarwohad in mind when he referred, rather contemptuously, to the Latin American states whichhad changed their votes as being“independent in name only.” See Suluh Indonesia, 13 December1954.

^{page 272 note 64} It seems that many Indonesian political leaders believed this to be the case. Anak Agung Gde Agung, by no means an anti-American politician, said:“Because of the special relationship between many Latin American countries and the US, and particularlyin view of the economic and financial assistance those countries were receiving fromthe US, (Washington's) neutral policy greatly influencedthe decisions of those Latin American countries. … When the US abstained in the voting concerning this issue, both in the First Committee and later in the General Assemblyitself, most of the countries followed the American example.” See Anak Agung Gde Agung, p. 106.

^{page 272 note 65} Antara, 4 January 1955.

^{page 272 note 66} ibid.

^{page 273 note 67} See ‘Tetap Terbanglah Radjawali’, DBR II, p. 234.

^{page 273 note 68} See statements to this effect by Sudjarwo, Antara, 25 January 1955, and Tobing, Antara,26 January 1955.

^{page 273 note 69} Antara, 26 January 1955. See also the statement by Foreign Minister Sunario, noting that because the matter had been debated in the UN:“… the entire world has become aware of the vital importance of the West Irian issue,” in Times of Indonesia, 23 October 1954.

^{page 274 note 70} ‘Europeanoriented’ in the sense that they had been designed by European lawyers and politicians (i.e. lawyers from the eastern and western European blocs and the US), to suit European concepts of how an international organization could and should be run.