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Looking East, Looking West: The International Political Attitudes of Malaysia's Successor Generation, 1971–81

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2009

Extract

There are many elements in analyses of why multinational cooperative organization efforts such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) succeed or fail. The outward manifestations of success include increased economic interdependence, larger numbers of economic, political, and security agreements, more frequent consultations among leaders, and more numerous instances of joint action in the international political and security domains. Observers and students of Southeast Asian politics may follow such events in the news media or in scholarly publications by other students.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1986

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References

The author is indebted to Dr. Josef Silverstein and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore for their assistance in the administration of the 1971 survey and to Dr. Isa bin Ramli of the Malaysian Ministry of Education for his assistance in the administration and preliminary analysis of the 1981 survey.

1 For an elaboration on this concept, see Knudsen, Bard Bredrup, Elite Images and Perceptual Predispositions: A Study of Some National and International Images in Western Europe (Oslo: Fridtjof Nansen Foundation, 1979)Google Scholar.

2 For a survey of academic works in this field, see Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., eds., Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

3 Nye, Joseph S., Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), p. 49 and passimGoogle Scholar.

4 Deutsch, Karl, et al. , France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribners & Sons, 1967), p. 46Google Scholar.

5 Hermann, Margaret G., Hermann, Charles F., and Hutchins, Gerald L., “Affect” in Describing Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Callahan, Patrick, Brady, Linda P., and Hermann, Margaret G. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 209210Google Scholar.

6 Ghazali Shafie's and Mahathir's comments as cited in Nicholas, Rhondda M., “ASEAN and the Pacific Community Debate: Much Ado About Something?”, Asian Survey 21, no. 12 (1981): 1204CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 These are among examples cited in Leng, Lee Yong, “Race, Language, and National Cohesion in Southeast Asia”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 11, no. 1 (1980): 122–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and in Weatherbee, Donald E., “The Diplomacy of Stalemate”, in Southeast Asia Divided, ed. Weatherbee, Donald E. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 130Google Scholar.

8 A classic study of this type is Ole Holsti's examination of John Foster Dulles' perceptions of and attitudes toward the Soviet Union. See Holsti, , “The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study”, in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. Rosenau, James N. (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 543–50Google Scholar. A recent example that brings together methodological developments of the last decade is Jerel Rosati, A., “The Impact of Beliefs on Behavior: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration”, in Foreign Policy Decision Making, ed. Sylvan, Donald A. and Chan, Steve (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), pp. 158–91Google Scholar. Hermann et al. also employed a form of this approach but their operationalization involved the use of “deeds” or behaviours (such as giving aid) as well as statements. Since it is actions such as the giving of aid that we want to predict knowing attitudes or affect, that approach is not compatible with this study's objectives. See Hermann et al., “Affect”, pp. 211–14.

9 For a useful background on elites and the question of commonality of views, see Benda, Harry J., “Elites”, in The Developing Nations, ed. Tachau, Frank (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1972), pp. 105115Google Scholar.

10 The sample and interview results are reported in Llewellyn Howell, D., “Building a Southeast Asian Identity: An Assessment of Attitudes of Filipino Leaders”, Southeast Asia Quarterly V, nos. 3–4 (1971): 111Google Scholar.

11 Lasswell, Harold D., Daniel Lerner, and Easton Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 13Google Scholar.

12 See the Atlantic Council of the United States, The Successor Generation: Its Challenges and Responsibilities (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council, 1981)Google Scholar; and The Teaching of Values and the Successor Generation (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council, 1983)Google Scholar.

13 The Teaching of Values, pp. 1924Google Scholar.

14 For a survey of recent literature on this question and some evidence in an American context, see Robert A. Wells, “The Vietnam War and Generational Differences on Foreign Policy Attitudes” (Paper presented at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association).

15 For example, despite media characterizations of the attitudes of what is termed “the Vietnam generation” in the United States, Robert Wells found, when using extensive national survey data, that the attitudes of that younger generation in the U.S. were only marginally different from those of the older generation. And, importantly, Wells found that the minor differences showed the younger generation to be more willing to use American troops abroad and less disapproving of U.S. involvement in Indochina in the 1960s and 1970s — both conclusions being contrary to the image gained through the media. See Robert Wells, “The Vietnam War and Generational Differences…”, pp. 20–23.

16 Howell, Llewellyn D., “Political Affect and State Behavior: Attitudes as Predictors of Foreign Policy Activity in Southeast Asia”, The Korean Journal of International Studies IX, no. 3 (Summer, 1978): 1134Google Scholar, and “Elite Attitudes and Foreign Policy Behavior in Southeast Asia”, Papers in Asian Studies III, no. 2 (The American University, Fall, 1981)Google Scholar.

17 Bogardus, Emory S., “Social Distance and ItsOrigins”, Journal of Applied Sociology 9, no. 3 (0102, 1925): 216Google Scholar. His definition was taken from an earlier one by R. E. Park.

18 See Hermann et al., “Affect”, p. 210; and Nye, Peace in Parts, p. 49 and passim.

19 See, for example, Smith, Tom W. and Dempsey, Glenn R., “The Polls: Ethnic Social Distance and Prejudice”, Public Opinion Quarterly 47, no. 4 (Winter, 1983): 584600CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 Reilly, John E., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1983 (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1983), p. 19Google Scholar.

21 The 1981 survey included the nationality “Vietnamese” only. For comparative purposes, the scores for Vietnamese from 1981 have been compared with those of “North Vietnamese” from 1971. Similarly, Vietnam in 1981 is compared with North Vietnam in 1971.

22 Within each sample, analysis of variance was applied to determine whether variation was being introduced by the following attributes: ethnic group, sex, urban/rural background, parent's occupation, school (location), and religion. Only ethnicity and religion introduced statistically significant variation and these two sets of groups were virtually coincident.

23 See Howell, “Political Affect and State Behavior” and Howell, “Elite Attitudes and Foreign Policy Behavior in Southeast Asia”. Confirming results derived through use of a different methodological approach can be found in Kegley, Charles W. Jr, and Howell, Llewellyn D., “The Dimensionality of Regional Integration: Construct Validation in the Southeast Asian Context”, International Organization 29, no. 4 (Autumn, 1975): 9971021CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 Note that this data was obtained before the 1973 war and long before the Camp David Accords.

25 A correlation of r = 1.00 would mean identical patterns, while one of r = 0.00 would imply absolutely no predictability from one pattern to the other.

26 See Regan, Daniel, “At the Crossroads of Civilizations: The Cultural Orientations of Malaysian Intellectuals”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 11, no. 2 (1980): 324–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 Both social and political attitudes are a part of common dimension, which means that both correlate highly with cooperative foreign policy behaviour. See Kegley and Howell, “The Dimensionality of Regional Integration”, pp. 1007–1013, especially Table 4, p. 1012.

28 These circumstances are described in Weatherbee, “The Diplomacy of Stalemate”. He comments specifically on Vietnam's ability to play on “the China danger” in its dealings with Indonesia. See p. 20.

29 The results of the original five nation ASEAN study are summarized in Howell, Llewellyn D., “Attitudinal Distance in Southeast Asia: Social and Political Ingredients in Integration”, Southeast Asia 3, no. 1 (1974): 577605Google Scholar. The Indonesia results are listed in Appendix B, p. 597.

30 Howell, “Attitudinal Distance”, p. 597.