¹ The literature on the 30 September 1965 coup is growing rapidly. For evaluations of published and unpublished materials on the coup see, e.g., Bass, Jerome R., “The PKI and the Attempted Coup,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, March 1970, pp. 96–105Google Scholar; Weatherbee, Donald E., “Interpretations of Gestapu, the 1965 Indonesian Coup,” World Affairs, March 1970, pp. 305–317Google Scholar; and van der Kroef, Justus M., “Interpretations of the 1965 Indonesian Coup. A Review of the Literature,” Pacific Affairs, Winter 1970–1971, pp. 557–577.Google Scholar

² Pauker, Guy J., “Indonesia: The Year of Transition,” Asian Survey, February 1967, p. 140.Google Scholar

³ Gunawan, B., Kudeta. Staatsgreep in Djakarta. De Achtergronden van de 30 September-Beweging in Indonesië (J.A. Boom en Zoon, Meppel, 1968), p. 121.Google Scholar

⁴ Antara Daily News Bulletin, February 17, 1965 (special issue)Google Scholar, and Hindley, Donald, “Indonesian Politics 1965–1967. The September 30 Movement and the Fall of Sukarno,” The World Today, August 1968, p. 346.Google Scholar

⁵ Cf, e.g., the testimonies of PKI Central Committee members Supit, Karel and Pardede, Peris in G-30 S. Dihadapan Mahmillub 3 (djilid II) di Djakarta (Perkara Dr. Subandrio) (P.T. Pembimbing Masa, Djakarta 1967), pp. 188–191Google Scholar, 203–207, (hereafter cited as Subandrio Trial A), and, again, Pardede's testimony in G-30 S. Dihadapan Mahmillub I (Perkara Njono) (P.T. Pembimbing Masa, Djakarta, 1966), pp. 130–131.Google Scholar

⁶ Biasa, Mahkamah Militer Luar, Putusan Nomor: PTS-027/MLB-I/K/1968 (Kamarusaman bin Ahmad Mubaidah), (Djakarta, 1968, mimeo), p. 17.Google Scholar

⁷ Cf. Subandrio Trial A, pp. 173–182.

⁸ Notosusanto, Nugroho and Saleh, Ismail, The Coup Attempt of the “September 30 Movement” in Indonesia (P.T. Pembimbing Masa, Djakarta, 1968), p. 7.Google Scholar

⁹ Crozier, Brian, Since Stalin. An Assessment of Communist Power (Coward McCann, New York, 1970), pp. 148–149, and Christer Hogstedt, “Indonesia's Political History and the 1 October Coup — A Swedish Leftist View,” Joint Publications Research Service (Washington, D.C.), JPRS 37,363; TT: 66–33792, p. 13.Google Scholar

¹⁰ G-30-S. Dihadapan Mahmillub 2 di Djakarta (Perkara Untung), (P.T. Pembimbing Masa, Djakarta, 1966), p. 46. See also Gunawan, op. cit., p. 153.Google Scholar

¹¹ Hughes, John, Indonesian Upheaval (David McKay, New York, 1967), pp. 52–53.Google Scholar

¹² On Sukarno's probable foreknowledge of the coup, see e.g., Hughes, op. cit., pp. 56, 114, and Shaplen, Robert, Time Out of Hand. Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia (Harper & Row, New York, 1969), pp. 99–114.Google Scholar For an opposite view see e.g., Dahm, Bernhard, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (Pall Mall Press, London, 1971), pp. 229 and 299.Google Scholar Sukarno's foreknowledge of the Gestapu affair may well be more extensive than is even now supposed. For example, on the night of the coup, at about 10 o'clock in the evening, Sukarno received a letter from Untung which almost certainly contained disclosures of the planned coup events. During the trial of Pono, a principal PKI coup leader, in January, 1972, further evidence was introduced about Untung's letter to Sukarno on the evening of the coup (Sinar Harapan, January 26, 1972).Google Scholar Reports of Sukarno's conduct toward Supardjo, one of Gestapu's chief leaders, at Halim Airbase on October 1, 1965, are also persuasive that the President was well aware of the coup and approved it. See Soewargana, Oejeng, “Persoalan ‘Dewan Djenderal’ dan Perentjana ‘Gerakan 30 September’” (unpublished ms., 1971), pp. 9, 12.Google Scholar Mr. Soewargana has kindly provided me with a copy of his paper. Soewargana, a Bandung publisher and a confidant of General A.H. Nasution, former Defense Minister and Indonesia's most prestigious soldier, has had access to top level Army data on the coup and to recent interrogation records of Gestapu suspects. On February 13, 1967, General Nasution in a statement over Radio Djakarta revealed that well before the coup Sukarno had been informed of its existence by Army Brigadier General Sugandhi, who in turn had been approached by Aidit to participate in the plot. Sukarno turned Sugandhi aside, however, with the warning not to give in to “this Communist phobia.”

¹³ Feith, Herbert, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 394–409, 520–538.Google Scholar

¹⁴ For details see Justus Kroef, M. van der, The Communist Party of Indonesia. Its History, Program and Tactics (University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1965), pp. 229–239.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Oltmans, Willem L., De Verraders (P.R. van Amelrooij, Utrecht, 1968), pp. 205–206.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Biasa, Mahkamah Militèr Luar, Berkas: No. PTS-017/MLB-XIV/O.D./1966. Tgl. 23 December 1966. Perkara: Omar Dani (Djakarta, 1966, mimeo), book I, pp. 3, 287, 320. I am grateful to Mr. Oejeng Soewargana for making the transcript of the Dani and other trials available to me.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Oejeng Soewargana, op. cit., p. 1.

¹⁸ Subandrio Trial A, p. 184; Biasa, Mahkamah Militèr Luar, Berkas No: PTS-013/MLB-XI/BDR/1966. Tanggal 23 Oktober 1966. Perkara: Hadji Dr. Subandrio. (Djakarta, 1968, mimeo), (hereafter cited as Subandrio Trial B), Vol. I, pp. 203–204.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Schlereth, Einar and Bintang, Batjo Daeng, Indonesien: Analyse eines Massakers (März Verlag, Frankfurt, 1970), p. 153.Google Scholar

²⁰ Hughes, op. cit., p. 103.

²¹ On the warnings given to Subandrio, Parman, Yani, Harjono and others, see Jones, H.P., Indonesia: The Possible Dream (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, New York, 1971), p. 374; Hughes, op. cit., pp. 15–16, 104; Gunawan, op. cit., pp. 141, 144; Subandrio Trial B, Vol. II, pp. 26–28, 119–120.Google Scholar

²² See by Kroef, Justus M. van der: “Indonesian Communism's Drive to Power,” Communist Affairs, March–April 1965, pp. 3–9Google Scholar, and “Indonesian Communism's ‘Revolutionary Gymnastics,” Asian Survey, May 1965, pp. 217–232.Google Scholar

²³ Sukarno, , Subur, Subur, Suburlah PKI (Jajasan “Pembaruan”, Djakarta, 1965)Google Scholar; Bintang Timur (Djakarta), May 24, 1965Google Scholar, and Peking Review, June 4, 1965, pp. 8–12.Google Scholar

²⁴ The Straits Times (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur), December 24, 1964.Google Scholar

²⁵ See the PKI monthly, Review of Indonesia (Djakarta), January 1965, p. 2.Google Scholar

²⁶ Aidit's confession appears as an appendix to the article by Arthur J. Dommen, “The Attempted Coup in Indonesia,” The China Quarterly, January-March 1966, pp. 168–170.Google Scholar

²⁷ Shaplen, op. cit., p. 113. That Aidit may not have been averse to a coup d'etat is suggested by other sources. One prominent leader of the American “New Left” who had a lengthy conversation with Aidit in Havana in July, 1963, subsequently reported that the PKI chairman had said that the Indonesian Communists were only using the democratic process so long as it was to their advantage, but that if they found it necessary “they would institute a guerilla war and topple the government”. Luce, Phillip Abbott, The New Left Today (The Capitol Hill Press, Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 62.Google Scholar

²⁸ On the Biro Chusus see the testimony of Sujono Pradigdo, a member of the Biro and chairman of the PKI's Central Verification Commission, in the Sudisman trial, in Biasa, Mahkamah Militer Luar, Berkas: Berita Atjara Persidangan. Perkara: Sudisman (Djakarta 1967, mimeo), Vol. 2, pp. 415Google Scholar, 447; Pradigdo's testimony in the Supardjo trial in Biasa, Mahkamah Militèr Luar, Berkas: Berita Atjara Persidangan. Sidang Ke-7 s/d Ke-XVI. Perkara: M.S. Supardjo (Djakarta, 1967, mimeo) book II, pp. 494–496; and Notosusanto and Saleh, op. cit., pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

²⁹ Mortimer, Rex, “Unresolved Problems of the Indonesian Coup,” Australian Outlook, April 1971, p. 97.Google Scholar

³⁰ Ibid, pp. 97–98.

³¹ Cf. D.N. Aidit's address on January 30, 1965, commemorating the fourteenth anniversary of the party paper Harian Rakjat, in Review of Indonesia, February 1965, p. 5Google Scholar, and the PKI Central Committee's January 1, 1965 New Year's statement in Review of Indonesia, January 1965, p. 3. On December 12, 1964, principal Indonesian party leaders, including Aidit, met at the President's palace in Bogor and agreed that the solution of land reform questions would follow the path of “consultation and discussion” without resort to “insinuation, intimidation and weapons.” The declaration also indicated that “revolutionary mass action” would continue to be developed, however.Google Scholar

³² For an example of such difficulty see the position of Rex Mortimer, op. cit. p. 98. On the other hand see Willner, Ruth Ann, “The Communist Phoenix and the Indonesian Garuda,” World Politics, April 1967, pp. 512Google Scholar for similarities in background between the Communist coups of 1926–27 and 1948 and Gestapu. See also Jones, op. cit., p. 379, who writes: “We in the embassy were aware that the PKI had plans for a coup and we assumed these plans would be implemented when, as, and if, Sukarno was about to be gone from the political stage.”

³³ McVey, Ruth T., The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1965), pp. 323–346.Google Scholar For the PKI version see Sedjarah, LembagaPKI, Pemberontakan Nasional Pertama di Indonesia (1926), (Jajasan “Pembaruan,” Djakarta, 1961).Google Scholar

³⁴ For developments within the PKI just prior to the Madiun coup see esp. Alers, Henri J., Om een Rode of Groene Merdeka. Tien Jaren Binnenlandse Politiek Indonesië 1945–1953 (Uitgeverij “De Pelgrim,” s.l., 1956), pp. 15, 182–197.Google Scholar

³⁵ Mortimer, Rex, “Indonesia: Emigré Post-Mortems on the PKI,” Australian Outlook, December 1968, pp. 347–359Google Scholar, and Kroef, J.M. van der, “Indonesia's Gestapu: the View from Moscow and Peking,” The Australian Journal of Politics and History, August 1968, pp. 163–176.Google Scholar

³⁶ Utrecht, Ernst, Indonesië's Nieuwe Orde. Ontbinding en Neokolonisatie (Kritiese Biblioteek van Gennep, Amsterdam, 1970), p. 33.Google Scholar

³⁷ Nasution, A.H., “Political Restructuring after ‘G-30-S’,” Pacific Community (Tokyo), January 1971, p. 320.Google Scholar

³⁸ Hindley, Donald, “President Sukarno and the Communists: the Politics of Domestication.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56 (1962), pp. 915–926.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ Lee, Oey Hong in De Volkskrant (Amsterdam), June 18, 1971.Google Scholar See also Lee, Oey Hong, Indonesische Pers en Regering tijdens de Geleide Democratie (Dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 1971).Google Scholar The English version of Oey Hong Lee's book puts it that “Prior to the Untung coup” the situation of the PKI could be summarised by saying that “Politically it was ensconced in a myth about peaceful evolution to socialism … Basking in the luxurious warmth of legality, the PKI lost all vigilance in regard to its enemies”. (Lee, Oey Hong, Indonesian Government and Press during Guided Democracy, Inter Documentation Company AG Zug, Switzerland, 1971, p. 228.)Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Pluvier, Jan M., “Revolutie en Contrarevolutie in Indonesië’,” De Nieuwe Stem (Amsterdam), December, 1967, pp. 652–660.Google Scholar Also in a more factual discussion of the events leading up to the Gestapu affair, Pluvier appears to be at pains to picture the PKI as a comparatively innocent victim of its opponents' hostility, noting for example, that the PKI “certainly inadvertently” had aroused its adversaries' hatred. Pluvier, Jan, “Indonesia before the Holocaust”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Winter, 1970, p. 19.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See my article cited in note 1 supra. For a view similar to that of the “Cornell Report” and holding that the Indonesian Army may have sought to “compromise” a “confused” PKI by “drumming up” its participation in the Gestapu affair see Vietnam Bulletin/Indonesië Informatie (Amsterdam), August 1, 1970, p. 6.Google Scholar This is a publication of a group of anti-Suharto Netherlanders equally opposed to American involvement in Vietnam and with which a number of prominent Dutch scholars on Indonesia, among them Professor W.F. Wertheim and Dr. J.M. Pluvier, are closely associated. Wertheim has also mooted the possibility that Gestapu may have been “a provocation from the right with the aim of seriously compromising the left in order to be able afterwards to settle accounts with them”. Indonesian military presumably instigated this “provocation.” See Wertheim, W.F., “The Missing Link — Suharto and the Untung Coup,” Information on Indonesia Quarterly (Sassenheim, Holland), 1970, No 2–3, pp. 12–15.Google Scholar

⁴² Harian Rakjat, July 15, 1964.Google Scholar Cf. also Aidit's remarks on the importance of guerilla warfare and of “armed struggle,” in Aidit, D.N., Kibarkan Tinggi Pandji Revolusi (Jajasan “Pembaruan,” Djakarta, 1964), pp. 34, 54, and 56–57.Google Scholar

⁴³ Cf. Aidit's report to the PKI Central Committee in Harian Rakjat, May 12–15, 1965Google Scholar; Peking Review, June 4, 1965, p. 10Google Scholar, and Tesis 45 Tahun PKI (Jajasan “Pembaruan”, Djakarta, 1965), p. 16.Google Scholar Cf. also Pauker, Guy J., “The Gestapu Affair of 1965: Reflections on the Politics of Instability in Indonesia”, Southeast Asia vol. I (1971), no. 1–2, p. 51, who notes that as of 1963 the PKI was preparing for a violent confrontation.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Palmier, Leslie, “The 30 September Movement in Indonesia,” Modern Asian Studies, 1971, No. 1, p. 16.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Aidit Menggugat Peristiwa Madiun (Jajasan “Pembaruan”, Djakarta, 1964), pp. 17, 31, and passim.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Thus, during his trial, Sudisman insisted that the PKI as such was not to blame for the coup, but that responsibility rested with individuals “who happened to be members of the PKI.” Cf. “Sudisman Against Treason,” Tricontinental (Havana), July-August 1968, pp. 18–19.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ The Straits Times, September 29, 1965.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Quarterly Economic Renew, Indonesia (The Economist Intelligence Unit, London), October, 1965, p. 8.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ The cost of living index, including food, clothing, housing and other items rose (March 1957 to February 1958, is 100) from 239 in March 1961 to 14,371 in September 1965, and subsequent to the coup “a picture of economic breakdown” was revealed to the Indonesian people and the world, “which can have few parallels in a great nation in modern times except in the immediate aftermath of war or revolution.” Panglaykim, J. and Arndt, H.W., The Indonesian Economy. Facing A New Era? (Rotterdam University Press, 1966), pp. 7 and 30.Google Scholar For an informative survey of the plight of the Indonesian economy at the time of the coup see also Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (Australian National University, Canberra), September 1965, pp. 1–15.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Luttwak, Edward, Coup d'Etat. A Practical Handbook (Fawcett publications, paperback, New York, 1969), p. 80. Italics in original.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See Untung's initial statement, broadcast over Radio Djakarta about 7:15 a.m. on October 1, 1965 in Indonesia (Cornell University), April 1966, p. 135.Google Scholar

⁵² Pauker, Guy J., “Indonesia in 1964: Toward a ‘People's Democracy’?” Asian Survey, February 1965, p. 95.Google Scholar

⁵³ See, e.g., by Pauker, Guy, “Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia,” Asian Survey, May 1961, p. 34Google Scholar, and “Indonesia: the PKI's ‘Road to Power’,” p. 263, in Scalapino, Robert A., ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia (Prentice Hall Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965); and Palmier, op. cit., p. 14.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Earlier I have stressed the necessity for the PKI to retain momentum as a background factor in the coup. See my “‘Gestapu’ in Indonesia,” Orbis, Summer, 1966, p. 466.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ On the patterns of dissension within the Indonesian Army see, e.g., Gregory, Ann, “Factionalism in the Indonesian Army,” Journal of Comparative Administration, November 1970, pp. 341–354Google Scholar and Ulf Sundhausen, “Das Selbstverstandnis der indonesischen Armee und ihre Rolle in der Politik,” Europa-Archiv, March 25, 1971, pp. 205–216.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Utrecht, op. cit., pp. 32–33. During the trial of PKI Politburo member Rewang, in early December, 1971, a prominent PKI figure, Sukatno, testified to the existence of a group of dissident “progressive” officers in the Army who would counter the planned coup by the “Council of Generals”. According to Sukatno the PKI extended full support to the plans of the young “progressive” officers. Antara Daily News Bulletin, December 9, 1971.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 33.

⁵⁸ Schlereth and Bintang, op. cit., p. 159.

⁵⁹ Antara Daily News Bulletin, January 27, 1970, p. I; September 19, 1970Google Scholar, p. III; August 2, 1971, p. III, and Far Eastern Economic Review, May 29, 1971, p. 4.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See by Kroef, Justus M. van der, “The Sino-Indonesian Rupture,” The China Quarterly, January-March 1968, p. 20Google Scholar, and “Die indonesische Armee zwischen Sukarno und den Kommunisten,” Europa-Archiv, November 25, 1965, pp. 831–842.Google Scholar See also Djakarta Daily Mail, June 2 and August 10, 1965.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Subandrio Trial A, p. 295, Subandrio Trial B, Vol. II, p. 556; The New York Times, October 11, 1966Google Scholar; Sinar Harapan (Djakarta), October 11, and 14, 1965Google Scholar, Armed Forces Daily Mail (Djakarta), October 14, 1966.Google Scholar

⁶² Peking Review, February 5, 1965, pp. 6–8.Google Scholar

⁶³ McVey, Ruth T., “Indonesian Communism and China,” in Tsou, Tang, ed., China in Crisis (University of Chicago Press, 1968), Vol. 2, p. 380.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Sabah Times (Kota Kinabalu), September 14, 1965.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ The New York Times, May 18, 1971.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Address of the Acting President, General Soeharto before the Gotong Royong House of Representatives on August 16, 1967, part III, Special Issue of Antara Daily News Bulletin (n.d.), pp. 27–28.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Adie, W.A.C., “Peking's Purge and Foreign Policy,” Mizan, July/August 1966, pp. 154, and Shaplen, op. cit., p. 112.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ McVey, op. cit., p. 380.

⁶⁹ For details see Kroef, Justus M. van der, “Peking, Hanoi, and Guerilla Insurgency in Southeast Asia,” Southeast Asian Perspectives, September 1971, pp. 1–67.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Cf., e.g., the column of Menon, N.C. in The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), May 30, 1971.Google Scholar Despite Peking's official support for Rawalpindi “Some pro-China freedom fighters are already active in East Pakistan” against the Rawalpindi government. Schanberg, Sydney H., “Pakistan Divided,” Foreign Affairs, October 1971, p. 130.Google Scholar On Peking's current policy of simultaneously fostering cordial diplomatic relations with Burma, while covertly assisting with arms and training the armed anti-government insurgency of Burmese Communists see The New York Times, February 14, 1972.Google Scholar