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The PKI and the Attempted Coup
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2009
Extract
Despite the amount of commentary generated by the September 30th Movement in Indonesia, agreement beyond simple details of chronology may never be possible. The grisly drama began with the murder of six top army officers and a similar fate soon befell key leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The PKI's surviving remnant split into pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions each apparently more interested in sectarian wrangling than an objective assessment of their common debacle. Nor can one expect the army to provide an impartial analysis. The legitimization of its new political role required placing the Gestapu albatross firmly around the PKI's neck. And perhaps the best stamp of army success in that endeavour is the almost reflexive resort by commentators to the label “abortive Communist coup”. But this does not imply that the prevailing perception of Gestapu as a failed Communist plot is prime facie discredited because of its serviceability to Indonesia's present leadership. The army-cum-official version surely would not have gained such wide currency without something in its favour. It is the hope of the present article that additional light may be shed on this “something” through a comparative discussion of some representative views regarding Gestapu.
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References
1 A chronological account of the movement compiled mostly from the World Press can be found in France-Asie (Winter, 1965–1966), pp. 208–238. For a “reasonably representative sample of the positions taken publicly by the political elements most directly concerned” see Indonesia, I (Ithaca, New York), 04, 1966, pp. 131–204Google Scholar.
2 Gestapu is an Indonesian acroistic synonym for the September 30th movement. The usual terms for the attempted coup nowadays are G-30-S or G-30-S/PKI.
3 Professor Wertheim's pointed reference to the Untung Coup is an exception which helps prove the rule. Wertheim, W. F., “Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIX, Nos. 1 and 2 (Spring-Summer 1966)Google Scholar.
4 It may be aruged that the “truth” concerning Gestapu is unimportant; that its significance lay in its consequences, i.e., the replacement of the triangular structure of power which had evolved in Indonesia since the introduction of Guided Democracy in 1957 by a new pattern which saw the end of Sukarno and the PKI as political actors, the acsendancy of the army, and the like. But for the historian what actually happened is an important question in its own right. It should perhaps be added that this article, which evolved out of a review of Hughes' book discussed in the latter part of the essay, is based neither on the massive amount of primary documentation now available nor on any new evidence. It does not even attempt to exhaust the published writings on the attempted coup but is merely a preliminary comparison of some existing interpretations.
5 Hindley, Donald, “President Sukarno and the Communist,” American Political Science Review Vol. LVI (12, 1962 No. 4)Google Scholar and The Communist Party of Indonesia (University of California Press, 1964)Google Scholar.
6 Abangan refers to the nominally Islamic Indonesian as compared with the more devout santri.
7 Pauker, Ewa T., “Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?” Asian Survey (09, 1964 & Vol. IV, No. 9)Google Scholar. For another “anti-domestication” argument see van der Kroef, Justus M., “Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power,” Pacific Affairs Vol. XXXVII, No. 4 (Winter 1964–1965)Google Scholar. The thrust of this article is that the PKI had emerged as the strongest force in Indonesia and every move by the party is (pre) judged accordingly. For example, when PKI “encouragement” of the land reform campaign in central Java had to be “called off because of mounting opposition of other political parties, the press, and local military” it is not an indication of PKI weakness but of PKI “muscle flexing” which earned the party hundreds of new recruits, p. 381.
8 Pauker, op. cit., p. 1065.
9 Ibid., p. 1065.
10 Cf. Feith, Herbert, “Indonesia's Political Symbols and their Wielders,” World Politics Vol. XVI (10 1963)Google Scholar.
11 Lev, Daniel, “Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup” Asian Survey (02 1966), p. 106Google Scholar. Lev's admittedly tentative judgement appeared before a great deal of evidence was available, including the trial transcripts touched on later in this essay. It is unlikely that any information since revealed has furnished the “incontrovertible proof that the PKI was behind the affair” required by him to alter his thesis. Enough facts would seem to have become available, however to cast doubt on Lev's contention that Sukarno was ignorant of the coup. A much less moderate statement of the thesis that Gestapu was an internal army affair is an article by Lucian Rey whose scholarly credentials are rendered suspect by his rather shrill, leftist tone as exemplified in his concluding passage. “But all we can really say is that the PKI was wrecked by the sudden brusque emergence of forces into the political area which had been brewing silently in the officers' clubs of Semarang and Jogjakarta … It is hopeless to suppose that the revolutionary forces will always have perfect vision. As consolation, we can only imagine what will be re-created and re-crystallized from the ruins of the PKI in the opacity which remains.” Rey, Lucian, “Dossier of the Indonesian Drama,” New Left Review, (03-04 1966)Google Scholar.
12 Lev, op. cit., p. 105.
13 Wertheim, op. cit., p. 120–121. Nasakom, a basic Sukarnoist concept, is an acroistic rendering for the coalition of nationalism, religion and Communism elements as the three major strands in Indonesian society.
14 van der Kroef, Justus M., “Gestapu in Indonesia,” Orbis Vol. X (Summer, 1966 No. 2)Google Scholar.
15 Ibid., p.466.
16 Ibid.
17 Fic, Victor M., “September 30th Movement in Indonesia: 1965 Gamble that Failed.” Presented at the International Conference of Asian History, Department of History,University of Malaya(August 5th-10th, 1968)Google Scholar. I would like to thank Professor Fic for permission to quote his paper. Since it is not easily available a lengthy summary is included in the body of the article.
18 Moreover, for this reason, the book is given more space in this review than its intrinsic merits warrant. Among other things, it is marred by an extraordinary number of factual inaccuracies as already pointed out in two separate reviews by knowledgeable critics, DrLiddle, William and MrCastles, Lance. Tarzie Vittachi, The Fall of Sukarno (Andre Deutsch, 1967)Google Scholar.
19 Ibid, p. 75.
20 Ibid., p. 76.
21 Ibid
22 Ibid., p.
23 Fic., op. cit., p. 27
24 Ibid., p. 29.
25 Ibid., p. 30.
26 Ibid., p. 32.
27 A line of reasoning, it might be noted, based on an anti-domestication outlook: the Communists had they not been caught unawares by unexpected developments had sufficient strength to wage a considerable struggle. It is not difficult to think of alternative explanations based on the domestication theme.
28 Fic, op. cit., p. 46.
29 For details on members of the Revolutionary Council including party affiliation see Indonesia, op. cit., p. 140.
30 Wertheim, op. cit., p. 115. John Hughes was also sceptical regarding the genuineness of Aidit's Confession published by a Japanese newspaper. Hughes, John, The End of Sukarno (London: Augus and Robertson, 1968), pp. 167–168Google Scholar (published in the United States in 1967 under the title Indonesian Upheaval.) Commentators prone to maximize PKI involvement in Gestapu tend, on the other hand, to be disposed more favourably to the validity of Aidit's confession. See, for instance, Sutter, John O, Two Faces of Konfrontasi: “Crush Malaysia” and the Gestapu,” Asian Survey (10, 1966), p. 541 (note 28)Google Scholar. It would indeed seem that prior ideological or analytical predispositions are of greater moment in such judgments than careful application of the canons of historiography.
31 Text of live broadcast on Jakarta home service, February 13, 1966 My references to the trial materials are from those used by Professor Fic in his analysis, which he kindly lent me. It should be noted that these were monitored by the BBC overseas services and are only a small proportion of the voluminous trial proceedings now available.
32 Cf. note 30. The two instances are from The Trial of Njone on February 16 and 18, 1966.
33 Wertheim, W.F., “From Aliran Toward Class Sturggle in the Countryside of Java”, (Kuala Lumpur: International Conference on Asian History, 5th-10th 08 1968)Google Scholar. I would like to thank Professor Wertheim for permission to cite his unpublished paper. For readers not familiar with Indonesia I would add that my criticisms of these articles in no way detract from Professor Wertheim's seminal contributions to the history and sociology of modern Indonesia.
34 Van den Kroef who laments the “distorted view” of observers unable “despite mounting evidence … to accept PKI involvement in Gestapu” suggests a radically different reason for the “pogram against Communists.” In his opinion it stemmed from a “long pent-up popular resentment against the PKI's aggressive policies of the past few years, aggravated by reports of torture murder by PKI terror squads during Gestapu.” van der Kroef, Justus M., “How Dead is the Indonesian Communist Party?” Communist Affairs Vol. 5, No. 1 (01-02, 1967), p. 3Google Scholar. Both Wertheim and Van den Kroef base their views on the slimmest of empirical evidence and, at best, each can be considered no more than working hypotheses. A more sophisticated hypothesis, although one not even susceptible to empirical testing, considered the Communists as serving a scapegoat function, a visible displacement object for the latent violence engendered in the hot house environment of pre-Gestapu Indonesia and lacking adequate outlets. Wilner, Ann Ruth, “The Communists Phoenix and the Indonesian Garuda: Reflections on Cyclical History.” World Politics (No. 3, 04, 1967) p. 516Google Scholar.
35 A more convincing leitmotiv in PKI history is the party's response to the divergent pulls of nationalism and internationalism, Indonesian conditions and Comintern policies. See especially McVey, Ruth, The Rise of Indonesian Communism. (Cornell U Press, 1965)Google Scholar
36 See note 2, p. 119.
37 Ibid.
38 Ra'anan, Uri, “The Coup that Failed: A Background Analysis,” Problems of Communism, (15 03, 1966), p. 43 (my emphasis)Google Scholar.
39 See note 29.
40 I do not concur with the view that the main fault of Hughes' book is its polemical anti-Communist and anti-Sukarno cast. Cf. McIlroy's, James competent review article in Persaudaraan, Journal of the Melbourne University Indonesian Studies Society (Vol. 1, No. 1, 09 1968)Google Scholar. The book's underlying weakness is more the defect of its virtues. That is, the very qualities which won its author a Pulitzer Prize for journalism are on the whole weakenss' from an academic perspective — for instance, the stress on day to day developments at the expense of conditioning historical and cultural factors, or the almost total lack of documentation.
41 Wilner, op. cit., p. 507.
42 Hughes, op. cit., p. 20.
43 He obviously relied heavily on the trial testimony, although there is little explicit documentation.
44 For a more explicit statement of this position, although one opened to criticism on many grounds see Dommen, Arthur J., “The Attempted Coup in Indonesia,” The China Quarterly (01-03 1966 No. 25)Google Scholar
45 of Wilner, p. 517ff
46 There is no mention of the possibility that, either because of political motives or more prosaic prognostical errors, the PKI was informed by the Chinese doctors that Sukarno could not survive long.
47 Not that ambiguity is per se reprehensible: in analyzing Indonesian affairs it is often synonymous with realism or caution.
48 Hughes, op. cit., p. 110.