Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-m9kch Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-07T01:52:06.226Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Desert and Dissociation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 March 2023

CHRISTOPHER BENNETT Open the ORCID record for CHRISTOPHER BENNETT [Opens in a new window]
CHRISTOPHER BENNETT*
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD c.bennett@sheffield.ac.uk
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I argue against the idea of basic desert. I claim that the supposed normative force of desert considerations is better understood in terms of dissociation. The starting point is to note that an important strategy in spelling out the apparent normative force of desert considerations appeals to the idea of complicity. I argue that the idea of basic desert cannot give a good explanation of this connection. I propose that it is rather dissociation that is explanatorily basic. I further argue that dissociation is an expressive action. Dissociation from wrongdoing—expressed as distancing from the wrongdoer—is an expressive attempt to do justice to the significance of wrongdoing in a way analogous to the expressive attempt to thank someone adequately for doing you a favor. I draw on the idea of dissociation as an expressive action to explain why it should be that a failure to dissociate is a source of complicity.

Keywords

desertblameexpressive actionmoral responsibilityretributivism
Type
Article
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 10 , Issue 1 , March 2024 , pp. 116 - 134
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

This paper was presented at the Moral Conversations workshop at the University of Oslo; the Desert conference at the Centre for Moral and Political Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; the Emotions in Legal Theory workshop at the University of Surrey; as well as to audiences at the Universities of Reading and Bristol. I am very grateful to the organizers of these events and for the helpful comments I received from participants. Thanks also to the editors and referees of this journal. I would like to record a special debt of gratitude to Andreas Brekke Carlsson for a conversation that led me to write this paper.

References

Bennett, Christopher. (2008) The Apology Ritual. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, Christopher. (2012) ‘Excuses, Justifications and the Normativity of Expressive Behaviour’. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 32, 563–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, Christopher. (2013) ‘The Expressive Function of Blame’. In Coates, D. Justin and Tognazzini, Neal (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 66–83.Google Scholar
Bennett, Christopher. (2016) ‘Expressive Actions’. In Abell, Catherine and Smith, Joel (eds.), The Expression of Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 73–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, Christopher (2021a) ‘Complicity and Normative Control’. The Monist, 104, 182–194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, Christopher. (2021b) ‘The Problem of Expressive Action’. Philosophy, 96, 277–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, Christopher. (2021c) ‘How and Why to Express the Emotions: A Taxonomy of Emotional Expression with Historical Illustrations’. Metaphilosophy, 52, 513–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, Christopher. (2022) ‘Could There Be Expressive Reasons? A Sketch of a Theory’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121891.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, Christopher. (2022) ‘What Goes On When We Apologize’. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 23, 115–135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Butt, Daniel. (2007) ‘On Benefiting from Injustice’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 37, 129–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Calhoun, Cheshire. (1989) ‘Responsibility and Reproach’. Ethics, 99, 389–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caruso, Gregg. (2021) Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment and Criminal Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feldman, Fred. (2020) ‘Desert’. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/desert/.Google Scholar
Fischer, John Martin, and Ravizza, Mark. (1998) Responsibility and Control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harvey, Jean. (1996) ‘Oppression, Moral Abandonment and the Role of Protest’. Journal of Social Philosophy, 27, 156–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hicks, Dan. (2020) The Brutish Museums: The Benin Bronzes, Colonial Violence and Cultural Restitution. London: Pluto Press.Google Scholar
Hieronymi, Pamela. (2001) ‘Articulating and Uncompromising Forgiveness’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, 529–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hill, Thomas E. Jr. (1979) ‘Symbolic Protest and Calculated Silence’. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9, 83–102.Google Scholar
Kadish, Sanford. (1985) ‘Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine’. California Law Review, 73, 323–410.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, Immanuel. (1991) Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kolnai, Aurel. (1973–74) ‘Forgiveness’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 74, 91–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lenman, James. (2006) ‘Compatibilism and Contractualism: The Possibility of Moral Responsibility’. Ethics, 117, 7–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levy, Neil. (2011) Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maja-Pearce, Adewale. (2021) ‘Strewn With Loot’. London Review of Books, 43. https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v43/n16/adewale-maja-pearce/strewn-with-loot.Google Scholar
McGeer, Victoria. (2013) ‘Civilising Blame’. In Coates, D. Justin and Tognazzini, Neal (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 162–88.Google Scholar
McKenna, Michael. (2011) Conversation and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
McKenna, Michael. (2019) ‘The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert’. Journal of Ethics, 23, 241–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Murphy, Jeffrie G. (1988) ‘Forgiveness and Resentment’. In Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton (eds.), Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pereboom, Derk. (2014) Freewill, Agency and Meaning in Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pereboom, Derk. (2021) Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phillips, Barnaby. (2021) Loot: Britain and the Benin Bronzes. London: Oneworld.Google Scholar
Raz, Joseph. (2009) The Authority of Law. 2d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Scanlon, T. M. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.Google Scholar
Shoemaker, David. (2015) Responsibility from the Margins. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shoemaker, David, and Vargas, Manuel. (2021) ‘Moral Torch-Fishing’. Noûs, 55, 581–602.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smart, J. J. C. (1961) ‘Freewill, Praise and Blame’. Mind, 70, 291–306.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sommers, Tamler. (2007) ‘The Objective Attitude’. Philosophical Quarterly, 57, 321–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stern, Lawrence. (1974) ‘Freedom, Blame and Moral Community’. Journal of Philosophy, 71, 72–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strawson, Galen. (1994) ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’. Philosophical Studies, 75, 5–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strawson, P. F. (1962) ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Proceedings of the British Academy, 48, 187–211.Google Scholar
Talbert, Matthew. (2019) ‘Moral Responsibility’. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/.Google Scholar
Todd, Patrick. (2019) ‘A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame’. Noûs, 63, 347–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vargas, Manuel. (2013) Building Better Beings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wallace, R. Jay. (1994) Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Waller, Bruce. (2011) Against Moral Responsibility. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Watson, Gary. (1996) ‘Two Faces of Responsibility’. Philosophical Topics, 24, 227–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wolf, Susan. (1990). Freedom Within Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar