Article contents
Grounding is not a Strict Order
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2015
Abstract:
The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive nor asymmetric nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also argues that truthmaking is neither irreflexive nor asymmetric nor transitive.
Keywords
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2015
References
Armstrong, D. M. (2004) Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Audi, P. (2012a) ‘A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding’. In Correia, F. and Schnieder, B. (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 101–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Audi, P. (2012b) ‘Grounding: Toward a Theory of the in virtue of Relation’. The Journal of Philosophy, 109
(12), 685–711.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barnes, E. (2014) ‘Symmetric Dependence’. Unpublished manuscript. Available at: http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phlejb/symmetric%20dependence.pdf.Google Scholar
Correia, F. (2010) ‘Grounding and Truth-functions’. Logique et Analyse, 53
(211), 251–79.Google Scholar
Fine, K. (2010) ‘Some Puzzles of Ground’. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 51
(1), 97–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fine, K. (2012) ‘Guide to Ground’. In Correia, F. and Schnieder, B. (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 37–80.Google Scholar
Jenkins, C. (2011) ‘Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive?’. The Monist, 94
(2), 267–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, S. (2011) ‘Outline of a Theory of Truth’. In Kripke, S., Philosophical Troubles (New York: Oxford University Press), 75–98.Google Scholar
Liggins, D. (2012) ‘Truth-makers and Dependence’. In Correia, F. and Schnieder, B. (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 254–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Litland, J. E. (2013) ‘On Some Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Grounding’. Essays in Philosophy, 14
(1), http://dx.doi.org/
10.7710/1526-0569.1453.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raven, M. (2013) ‘Is Ground a Strict Partial Order?’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 50
(2), 193–201.Google Scholar
Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2002) Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2005) ‘Why Truthmakers’. In Dodd, J. and Beebee, H. (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 17–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosen, G. (2010) ‘Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction’. In Hale, B. and Hoffman, A. (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press), 109–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schaffer, J. (2009) ‘On What Grounds What’. In Chalmers, D., Manley, D., and Wasserman, R. (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 347–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schaffer, J. (2012) ‘Grounding, Transitivity, and Contrastivity’. In Correia, F. and Schnieder, B. (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 122–38.Google Scholar
Schnieder, B. (2006) ‘Truth-making without Truth-makers’. Synthese, 152
(1), 21–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, J. (2014) ‘No Work for a Theory of Grounding’. Inquiry, 57
(5–6), 535–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- 81
- Cited by