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On Some Legal Incidents Affecting the Duration of base fees in the Hands of Purchasers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 August 2016

C. J. Bunyon*
Affiliation:
Institute of Actuaries

Extract

As a wish has been expressed for some further information as to the manner in which a base fee created by the conveyance of a tenant in tail may be converted into a fee simple, it is proposed to consider the question in the following pages.

It is well understood, that an estate in tail is an estate in fee inheritable by heirs special, namely by lineal descendants generally as heirs, or such descendants of a particular class, and that a tenant in tail may convert such an estate into a fee qualified to last so long as there shall be issue inheritable under the entail. Such a conversion may be made by any conveyance sufficient to pass a fee, and will in any such case bind the heir until entry by him,(a) but if enrolled in Chancery in the manner required by the Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries will, notwithstanding the want of the consent of the protector of the settlement, wholly bar the issue in tail, leaving the estate absolute during their existence, and liable only to be defeated by the failure of issue, and then by the entry of the remainderman. When the protector consents in the manner prescribed by the Act, there is no base fee, but the estate tail is converted into a fee simple and the remainders are absolutely barred.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Institute and Faculty of Actuaries 1875

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References

page 100 note (a) Watkin's Conveyancing, p . 119.

page 100 note (b) Cannon v. Rimington, 12 C. B., 1, 18.

page 100 note (c) Austin v. Llewellyn, 9 Exch. 276.

page 101 note (a) 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 74 s. 19.

page 101 note (b) 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 27.

page 102 note (a) 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 27, s. 23.

page 102 note (b) 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 74.

page 102 note (c) Penny v. Allen, 7 De Gex, M. & G., 409.

page 102 note (d) Morgan v. Morgan, 10 Eq., 103. See also Goodall v, Skerratt, 3 Eq. R., 295

page 102 note (e) Real Property Statutes, 89.

page 103 note (a) Real Property Statutes, 90.

page 103 note (b) 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 74 ss. 37,44.

page 103 note (c) Real P. Stats., 204–225.

page 105 note (a) This is described by Mr. Sprague in the course of the discussion on his paper “On Reversionary Life Interests as Securities for Loans” (see vol. xvii, p. 247): the borrower insuring his life, not for the whole term, but against that of the life tenant, and for, say, one year longer, and a power of attorney being given for the execution of a deed of confirmation immediately upon the death of the tenant for life.—ED. J. I. A.

page 106 note (a) Real Property Statutes, 89.

page 106 note (b) 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 74, ss. 60, 61. Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Viet., c. 71, s. 25).