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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 March 2011
The Nyāya-praveśa by Śaṅkarasvāmin, recently printed in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series of Baroda, is a text of great interest for the study of Indian logic; in fact, in spite of its conciseness it contains an extremely clear exposition of the Buddhist logic as it was taught in India, at least among some particular schools, as those of the Yogācāras and the Sautrāntikas in that lapse of time which separates Diṅnāga from Dharmakīrti. That the book was written after Diṅnāga, but before Dharmakīrti, is proved by its peculiarities, which in many a point differentiate the theories held by the author from those maintained by the other two great logicians already quoted.
page 381 note 1 The relation between the two schools is very close, and this explains why Buddhist doctors belonging to these sects are called by either name. The school which claims to have been founded by Asaṅga and after him by Vasubandhu, has very strict similarities in its dogmatics with the doctrine of the Sautrāntikas. Books like the Yogacaryābhūmi-śāstra, the Mahāyāna-samparigraha-śāstra, etc., follow very often the ancient scheme of the Sautrāntikas. On the other hand works like the Lanṅkāvatāra and the Śraddhotpāda-śāstra belong to a quite different tendency in which the vijñāna is elaborated according to mystic lines. I hope to publish very soon a note establishing these facts.
page 381 note 2 See my article “Bhâmaha and Diṅnāga”, Indian Antiquary, 1930, p. 142.
page 381 note 3 See my translation of the Nyāyamukha, Heidelberg, 1930Google Scholar. I must add that Uddyotakara also, refuting Diṅnāga, knows only five pakṣābhāsas: Nyāya-vāttika (ed. by Benares, Lakṣmaṇa-sāstrī, 1915), p. 113Google Scholar.
page 382 note 1 The chief points in which Dharmakīrti differs from Diṅnāga are the two fallacies, “iṣṭa-vighāta-kṛt” and “viruddhāvyabhicārin” and the theory of the example.
page 387 note 1 It is known that Sāṅkhya is a sat-kārya-vāda and that it admits only change but not destruction.
page 392 note 1 This will be maintained in fact by Dharmakīrti.
page 399 note 1 So the text, but it is known that according to the Mahīśāsakas, the past as well as the future, do not exist. Cf. Vasumitra's treatise on the sects (transl. by Masuda, p. 59; Walleser, , Die sekten des alten Buddhismus, p. 45)Google Scholar; cf. Abhidharma-kośa (transl. by La Vallée Poussin, v, 24 ff.).
page 402 note 1 The Jñāna-prasthāna is the fundamental work on the Abhidharma for the Sarvāsti-vādins.
page 405 note 1 Cf. my article Buddhist logic before Rimāga, J.R.A.S., 1929, p. 451 ff.
page 409 note 1 The definition of the pratyakṣa alluded to is 
which corresponds to an original svayam pratīto 'bhrānto 'rthaḥ; but of. Mahāvyutpatti 7621. K'uei-chi takes this definition from the 
Saṃyukta-saṅgīti-śastra, that is to say, from the 
(ch. xvi) by Sthiramati 
. But this definition is to be found already in the 
Saṅgīti-sāstra by Asaṅga. This fact is worth noting as it proves that Dharmakīrti when completing the definition of pratyakṣa as given by Diṅnāga followed some traditions current before him among the ancient Yogācāras.
page 410 note 1 For this question cf. Bhāmatī ad Śaṅkara, on Brahma-sütras, II, ii, 28.
page 412 note 1 The text is based only on the editions of the bs'Tan aggur available in India, that is to say the Narthang redaction.
