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Expedition turned Invasion: The 1888 Sikkim Expedition through British, Indian and Chinese eyes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2021

YI MENG CHENG*
Affiliation:
Peking Universityyimeng24@hotmail.com

Abstract

A fresh look at the 1888 Sikkim Expedition using both Chinese and English language sources yields very different conclusions from that of previous research on the subject. During the course of policymaking, the British Foreign Office and the British Government of India did not collaborate to devise a plan to invade Tibet; conversely, their aims differed and clashed frequently. During the years leading to war, the largest newspapers in British India gave plenty of coverage to the benefits of trade with Tibet, thus influencing British foreign policy and contributing indirectly to the outbreak of war. The Tibetan army was soundly defeated in the war, while the British troops suffered only light casualties. Although the Tibetan elites remained committed to the war, the lower classes of Tibetan society quickly grew weary of it. During the war, the British made much use of local spies and enjoyed an advantage in intelligence gathering, which contributed greatly to their victory. Finally, although the war was initially fought over trade issues, the demarcation of the Tibetan-Sikkim border replaced trade issues as the main point of contention during the subsequent peace negotiations. During the negotiations, Sheng Tai, the newly appointed Amban of Tibet, tried his best to defend China's interests.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Asiatic Society

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References

1 The Tibetan History Reader edited by Gray Tuttle and Kurtis R. Shaeffer, which is otherwise extremely comprehensive in its scope, spanning from prehistoric to modern Tibet, does not mention the 1888 war at all. See Tuttle, Gray and Schaeffer, Kurtis R. (eds.), The Tibetan History Reader (Columbia, 2013)Google Scholar. Discussion of the Sikkim Expedition is also missing from a recently published volume of essays on Tibetan military history, which has covered better known events such as the Gorkha Wars (1788–92) and Zhang Yintang's military reforms in 1906–7. See S. Fitzherbert and Alice Travers, ‘Asian Influences on Tibetan Military History between the 17th and 20th Centuries’, Revue d'Etudes Tibétaines, 2020, pp. 5–367.

2 Lamb, Alastair, British India and Tibet, 1766–1910 (Washington DC, 1986)Google Scholar.

3 Heather Stoddard, ‘The Great ‘Phi gling dmag zlog’ of 1888. The first hands-on confrontation between Tibet and the British Raj with the participation of leading lineage holders of the ‘1900 Sngag mang Phur thog gos dkar lcang lo can’, lay mantrins of Reb kong, Ambo, in the Dga’ Idan Pho brang state military ritual to ‘Turn back the Philing’ Foreigners’, unpublished paper from the Proceedings of the 11th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Bonn, 2006, available at https://www.academia.edu/4117775/The_Great_Phi_ling_dmag_bzlog_of_1888 (accessed 8 August 2020). Given my inability to read Tibetan sources, Stoddard's work is of much value in corroborating Chinese language accounts.

4 Extending this mindset even further, one would easily subscribe to the following fallacy. Since Sheng Tai, as the representative of the Qing court, was a traitorous figure, the Zongli Yamen and indeed the entire Qing court would naturally adopt a policy of appeasement towards the British invaders; in stark contrast to the ruling classes, the entire population of Tibet, even including the peoples of Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal, were united in their opposition to the invaders. Hence, according to this line of reasoning, the court at Beijing and the local population of Tibet were diametrically opposed to each other. An executive agent of the central government, the Amban, was ostensibly responsible for several duties including the preservation of order, the provision of disaster relief, the maintenance of frontier defence and all diplomatic negotiations in the region. The Amban also served as the sole intermediary between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, the two theocratic rulers of Tibet, and the central government in Beijing. While the Amban's powers were strengthened during Emperor Qianlong's reign (1735–96), by the mid-nineteenth century the lamaist elite had regained its prominence and “the role of the Amban was reduced to the control of external relationships”. See Oidtmann, Max, Forging the Golden Urn: The Qing Empire and the Politics of Reincarnation in Tibet (New York, 2018), p. 47CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Dabringhaus, Sabine, ‘The Ambans of Tibet—Imperial Rule at the Inner Asian Periphery’, in Diundam, Jeroen and Dabringhaus, Sabine (eds.), The Dynastic Centre and the Provinces: Agents and Interactions (Leiden, 2014), pp. 116117Google Scholar, 125.

5 Chinese scholar Wu Fengpei edited and published an impressive collection of reports and memorandums by successive Ambans to the Qing court, while Australian scholar Julie Marshall has compiled historical documents relating to Tibetan, Nepalese, Sikkimese and Bhutanese relations with China and Britain. Fengpei, Wu, Qingdai zangshi zoudu [Reports and memorandum relating to Tibetan affairs during the Qing dynasty] (Beijing, 1994)Google Scholar; Marshall, Julie G., Britain and Tibet 1765–1947: A selected annotated bibliography of British relations with Tibet and Himalayan states including Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan (London, 2005)Google Scholar.

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8 Telegram from Secretary of State, London to Viceroy, Simla, 28 May 1888, FO 17/1108, p. 126.

9 Letter from Foreign Office to Indian Office, 23 August 1888, FO 17/1108, p. 111.

10 Letter from Foreign Office to Indian Office, 25 February 1889, FO 17/1109, p. 64. Unfortunately, the date of the newspaper article was not specified, and I have not been able to find the enclosed article.

11 J. Walsham to Indian Office, 22 April 1889, FO 17/1109, p. 99.

12 Codell, Julie F., ‘Introduction: The Nineteenth-Century News from India’, Victorian Periodicals Review 37, 2 (2004), p. 111Google Scholar.

13 Ibid.

14 G. Somasekhara, Telugu Press and Indian Freedom Movement (Raleigh, 2018), p. 17.

15 Gupta, Uma Das, ‘The Indian Press 1870–1880: A Small World of Journalism’, Modern Asian Studies 1, 2 (1977), p. 233Google Scholar.

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17 C. E. Buckland, Dictionary of Indian Biography (London, 1906), pp. 11, 391.

18 British journalism has always been replete with examples of businessmen turned editors or journalists, who capitalised on public opinion in their newspapers to promote their business interests. Ye Kang also noted that “Times journalist and newspaper business partner was only one of the multiple identities of (Charles F.) Bell; his other identity was a British businessman”. Thus, when the “Urabi government's reforms damaged British business interests, especially the interests of prominent cotton merchants”, “Bell made use of his other role as a journalist to disseminate news about the Egyptian crisis to the British public”. See Ye Kang, Yulun jiushi zheyang zhizao de, pp. 123, 127.

19 Pricila, R., ‘A Survey of the Press in Tamil Nadu in the Early Phase of National Movement’, Academia and Society 2, 2 (2016), pp. 8788Google Scholar.

20 Alastair Lamb, Britain and Chinese Central Asia: The Road to Lhasa, 1767 to 1905 (London, 1960), pp. 150–151.

21 See R. D. O'Brien, Darjeeling: The Sanitarium of Bengal, and its surroundings (Calcutta, 1888), p. 61; L. S. S. O'Malley, Bengal District gazetteers: Darjeeling (Calcutta, 1907), p. 74.

22 J. Ware Edgar, Report on a visit to Sikhim and the Thibetan frontier in October, November, and December 1873 (Calcutta, 1874), pp. 46–50, 60.

23 C. R. Markham, ‘Travels in Great Tibet, and Trade between Tibet and Bengal’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London 19, 5 (1875), p. 342.

24 Madras Mail, 12 January 1886, p. 4.

25 Pioneer, 4 February 1886, p. 6.

26 Pioneer, 23 August 1886, p. 6.

27 Pioneer, 28 October 1887, p. 1.

28 Pioneer, 29 July 1886, p. 2.

29 Pioneer, 21 August 1886, p. 5.

30 Pioneer, 5 June 1886, p. 1.

31 Pioneer, 5 December 1887, p. 4.

32 Madras Mail, 13 January 1888, p. 4.

33 Pioneer, 16 January 1888, p. 1.

34 Charles E. Drummond Black, The Marquis of Dufferin and Ava: Diplomatist, Viceroy, Statesman (London, 1903), p. 261.

35 Viceroy of India to Sir John Walsham, 18 July 1888, FO 17/1108, p. 93.

36 P. R. Rao, India and Sikkim, 1814–1970 (New Delhi, 1972), p. 71.

37 India Office Records, Report of Native Papers, IOR L/R/5/14, p. 263.

38 D. C. Boulger, ‘Our relations with the Himalayan states’, Asiatic Quarterly Review 5 (1888), p. 303.

39 Ibid, p. 261. A scholar has pointed out that a circulation of 500–600 could be considered rather large in the context of British India, because many readers accessed the newspapers in libraries, bazaars and schools, and some better educated people even read newspapers aloud for their illiterate compatriots. But this still does not change the fact that the circulation of vernacular newspapers including the Sahachar lagged far behind that of better endowed newspapers founded by the British. See Codell, ‘Introduction’, p. 119.

41 Das Gupta, ‘The Indian Press’, p. 219.

42 Li Fusen, Lun Yingguo diyici ruqin xizang [A discussion of Britain's first invasion of Tibet], Wuling xuekan 38, 4 (2013), p. 109.

43 Qin Heping, Xiaoyan hou de chensi—youguan 1888 nian Longtushan chongtu de zairenshi [Deep reflections after the smoke has settled—revisiting the 1888 conflict at Lingtu], Xinan minzu xueyuan xuebao 4 (1999), p. 41.

44 Alex McKay, ‘19th Century British Expansion on the Indo-Tibetan Frontier: A Forward Perspective’, The Tibet Journal, 28, 4 (2003), p. 63.

45 Letter from Dufferin to Viscount Cross, 14 February 1888, FO 17/1108, pp. 25–26.

46 Letter from Godley to Walsham, 14 March 1888, FO 17/1108, p. 46.

48 Lan Guohua, Shixi nibo'er, budan, xijin zai yingguo qinzang zhanzheng zhong zhi juese—jian lun wanqing zhengfu waijiao zhi shidang [An analysis of the role of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim in the British invasion of Tibet], Junshi lishi 6 (2004), p. 26.

49 Wu Fengpei, Qingdai zangshi zoudu [Reports and memorandum relating to Tibetan affairs during the Qing dynasty] (Beijing, 1994), p. 755.

50 Letter from Paul to Edgar, 25 May 1888, FO 17/1108, p. 124. This point has already been acknowledged in existing scholarship, in particular in a paper exploring the role of Bhutan in the 1888 Sikkim Expedition. See Matteo Miele, ‘The British Expedition to Sikkim of 1888: The Bhutanese Role’, West Bohemian Historical Review 2 (2018), p. 209.

51 Letter from Paul to Edgar, 9 July 1888, FO 17/1108, p. 133. Italics in original text.

52 Lan Guohua, Shixi nibo'er, budan, xijin zai yingguo qinzang zhanzheng zhong zhi juese—jian lun wanqing zhengfu waijiao zhi shidang [An analysis of the role of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim in the British invasion of Tibet], Junshi lishi 6 (2004), p. 25.

53 See Huang Hongzhao, Yingguo qinzang zhanzheng he 1890 zhongying huiyi zangyin tiaoyue shulue [The British invasion of Tibet, the 1890 Sino-British conference and the Tibet-India treaty], Zhongguo zangxue 3 (1991), p. 129; Li Fusen, Lun yingguo diyici ruqin xizang [A discussion of the first British invasion of Tibet], Wuling xuekan 38, 4 (2013), p. 109.

54 Pioneer, 26 March 1888, p. 4. During Tendook Pulger's tenure as estate manager, the British Indian government advanced him a loan of 3,000 rupees, which is indicative of the trust he enjoyed from the British Indian authorities. See N.a., Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Government of India, for 1881–82 (Np, 1883), p. 191.

55 L. S. S. O'Malley, Bengal District gazetteers: Darjeeling (Calcutta, 1907), p. 84.

56 Letter from Paul to Edgar, 9 July 1888, FO 17/1108, p. 133.The emphasis on the phrase “for many years past” in the original text shows the enormous contribution rendered by Pulger.

57 Captain H. A. Iggulden, The 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment in the Sikkim Expedition of 1888 (London, 1900), p. 103.

58 Lieutenant C. J. Markham, Report on the Sikhim Expedition: from January 1888 to January 1890 (Calcutta, 1890), p. 17.

59 Iggulden, The 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment, p. 65.

60 Markham, Report on the Sikhim Expedition, p. 42.

61 Dawa Tsering, Dajiling lishi guishu wenti yanjiu—jianlun xijin yu zhongguo xizang de guanxi [A study of Darjeeling's belonging from a historical perspective—with a discussion of the relationship between Sikkim and Chinese Tibet] Xizang Yanjiu 3 (2018), p. 32.

62 Bengal Government Secretariat, The Gazetteer of Sikkim (Calcutta, 1894), p. xxi.

63 Kanchanmoy Majumdar, ‘The role of Sikkim in Indo-Nepalese relations in the nineteenth century’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 38 (1977), p. 665.

64 Bkra-zhis Don-grub, Qingdai xizang yu bulukeba [Tibet-Bhutan relations during the Qing dynasty] (Beijing, 2012), p. 216.

65 Alastair Lamb, British India and Tibet, 1766–1910, p. 149. Also see J. Claude White, Sikhim and Bhutan: Twenty-one years on the North-East Frontier, 1887–1908 (London, 1909), p. 290.

66 M. Aris, ‘Himalayan encounters’, in Les habitants du toit du Monde. Études recueillies en hommage à Alexander W.Macdonald, (eds.) S. Karmay and P. Sagant (Nanterre, 1997), pp. 187–188. The original text contains a footnote “Goat-meat is not eaten in Bhutan, and it is looked down on in Tibet”. Hence the term “eaters of goat-meat” certainly refers to the British in a derogatory way.

67 The only published compilation of Bhutanese sources during the Qing dynasty is Pan Meiyue and Du Jiexiang (eds.), Qing ji bulubake (budan) hanwen shiliao jizhu [A collection of Chinese language sources from Bhutan during the late Qing dynasty, with annotations] (Xinbei, 2018). However, the vast majority of sources collected have already been previously published in Xizang zouyi: Chuanzang zoudi hebian and Qingji waijiao shiliao. Apparently Chinese language sources alone do not shed enough light for scholars to arrive at a conclusion.

68 Li Fusen, ‘Lun Yingguo diyici ruqin xizang’ [A discussion of Britain's first invasion of Tibet], Wuling xuekan 38, 4 (2013), p. 108.

69 Luciano Petech, Aristocracy and Government in Tibet, 1728–1959, translation Shen Weirong and Song Liming. (Beijing, 1990), pp. 110, 120–121.

70 Wu Fengpei, Qingdai zangshi zoudu [Reports and memorandum relating to Tibetan affairs during the Qing dynasty] (Beijing, 1994), p. 654.

71 Deng Ruiling and Feng Zhi (eds.), Xizang tongshi [A complete history of Tibet] (Zhengzhou, 2016), p. 487.

72 Yu Su, Qingji yingguo qinlue xizang shi [A history of British invasion of Tibet during the late Qing] (Beijing, 1959), p. 82.

73 Deng Ruiling and Feng Zhi (eds.), Xizang tongshi, p. 487.

74 Map adapted from: G. Flack, ‘“Biutang” or “Camp Byutan” located’, Postal Himal 80 (1994), p. 77. This map was drawn by Edward Stanford in 1904.

75 F. G. Cardew, A Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army to the Year 1895 (N.p, 1903), p. 393. The Sikkim battle reports prepared by the British intelligence department listed clearly the nature of each wound sustained by every casualty, even including details such as the position, severity and mechanism of injury. See Markham, Report on the Sikhim Expedition, pp. 51–57. British scholar George V. Kiernan's claim that the Battle of Lingtu took place on 19 March is wrong. Besides, although Kiernan wrote that the British did not suffer any casualties at the Battle of Lingtu, while the Tibetan troops only sustained light casualties, he did not provide any footnotes. See George V. Kiernan, ‘India, China and Sikkim: 1886–1890’, Indian Historical Quarterly 31 (1955), p. 37.

76 N.a., Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India (N.p., 1907), p. 62.

77 Wu Fengpei, Qingdai zangshi zoudu [Reports and memorandum relating to Tibetan affairs during the Qing dynasty] (Beijing, 1994), p. 654.

78 Ibid, p. 690.

79 Xizang zizhiqu zhengxie wenshiziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Xizang wenshi ziliao xuanji [A selection of literary and historical materials relating to Tibet] Vol. 7 (Lhasa, 1985), p. 17.

80 Sun Wenlang, ‘Tushu zhizhan—xizangren de diyici kangying zhizhan’ [The war in the year of the Earth Rat—the first anti-British war of the Tibetans], Dang'an shikong 9 (2003), p. 26.

81 Xizang zizhiqu zhengxie wenshiziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Xizang wenshi ziliao xuanji [A selection of literary and historical materials relating to Tibet] Vol. 7 (Lhasa, 1985), p. 17. It also seems improbable that the British soldier would have understood Tibetan, since none of the British members of the expedition were known to have learned Tibetan.

82 Su Faxiang and Tashi Dolma, ‘Lun Longtushan zhanyi jiqi zai zhongguo jindaishishang de diwei’ [A discussion of the Battle of Lingtu and its significance in modern Chinese history], Zhongyang minzu daxue xuebao 1 (2006), p. 87. This has been corroborated by a letter written by Bka’-drung Nor-nang Dbang-’dus-tshe-ring, a Tibetan official and poet, to a Mr Snyan-grong. The poem contained in the letter mentions “Worrying for that reason, some monks/ Expert in the practice of prognostication and profound, fierce mantras,/ Endeavour to direct upon the heads of the enemy host/ The thunderbolts which reduce to dust whatever they touch”. See N. L. Nornang and L. Epstein, ‘Correspondence relating to the Anglo-Tibetan War of 1888’, The Journal of the Tibet Society 2 (1982), p. 82.

83 History Department of Peking University (ed.), Xizang difang lishi ziliao xuanji [Selected historical materials on Tibet] (Beijing, 1963), p. 159.

84 Pema Namgyal et al. (eds.), Xizang bainian shi yanjiu [A study of the past 100 years of Tibetan history] (Beijing, 2015), p. 198.

85 Ibid, p. 204.

86 Wu Fengpei, Qingdai zangshi zoudu [Reports and memorandum relating to Tibetan affairs during the Qing dynasty] (Beijing, 1994), p. 740.

87 Stoddard, ‘The Great ‘Phi gling dmag zlog’ of 1888’, p. 12.

88 He Wenxuan (ed.), Qingchao zhuzang dachen dashiji [Important events regarding the Amban during the Qing dynasty] (Beijing, 1993), p. 398; Wu Fengpei, Qingdai zangshi zoudu [Reports and memorandum relating to Tibetan affairs during the Qing dynasty] (Beijing, 1994), p. 648.

89 Ibid., p. 740.

90 Ibid, pp. 744, 746.

91 Ibid.

92 Hanzhang, Ya, Dalai lama zhuan [Biography of the Dalai Lama] (Beijing, 1983), p. 126Google Scholar.

93 According to the British army intelligence reports in the National Archives of India, the kashag requisitioned saltpetre, sulphur, and lead from civilians throughout Tibet for the manufacture of gunpowder. See Extract from the diary of the Assistant Superintendent, Bussahir, for the week ending 27 October 1888, File No. Pros. May 1889, Nos. 259—391, PR_000005002569, National Archives of India; Copy of a letter from the Revd. J. Weber, Moravian Missionary, to the Deputy Comissioner of Simla, dated “Poo”. the 30th October 1888, File No. Pros. May 1889, Nos. 259—391, PR_000005002569, National Archives of India.

94 Analysing this phenomenon, Lieutenant Colonel Graham of the British artillery arrived at a somewhat different conclusion, pointing out that “Prisoners taken came from all districts of Tibet, proving that the Central Government of Lhasa was implicated in this invasion and that their probably intention was the annexation of Sikkim, if the Indian Government had remained passive”. I do not agree with his analysis, because if the kashag had indeed planned to annex Sikkim, they could have done so in 1887, when the Sino-British negotiations over the Macauley Mission entered a stalemate, instead of waiting until 1888. Also, in that case the kashag would have stationed large numbers of troops at Lingtu and its environs, instead of the tiny force of only 300 men. See Graham, A. T. J., ‘The Sikkim Field Force of 1888 and its commander’, Journal of Royal Artillery 87 (1960), p. 13Google Scholar.

95 A. W. Paul to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, 2 November 1888, File No. Pros. May 1889, Nos. 259—391, PR_000005002569, National Archives of India.

96 Major L. A. Waddell, Among the Himalayas (Westminster, 1899), p. 280.

97 Bengal Government Secretariat, The Gazetteer of Sikkim (Calcutta, 1894), p. xix.

98 Hou Jian, Chen Guangrong, Xizang difang banfengjian banzhimindi shehui de kaiduan—Longtushan zhanyi qianxi [The beginnings of semi-feudal and semi-colonial Tibet—a brief analysis of the Battle of Lingtu], Xizang yanjiu 3 (1988), p. 45.

99 Wang Haiyan and Wang Xing, 19 shiji mo 20 shiji chu yingguo qinlue xizang de yingxiang—yingzang zhanzheng zhi ximula huiyi de pochan [The impact of British aggression of Tibet during the late 19th and early 20th centuries—from the British-Tibetan war to the failure of the Simla Conference], Shandong ligong daxue xuebao 19, 3 (2003), p. 51.

100 Rong Wang, Ying diguo zhuyi ruqin xizang de lishi shishi fenxi [An analysis of the facts behind British imperialist aggression of Tibet], Xizang fazhan luntan 5 (2004), p. 31; Sun Wenlang, Tushu zhizhan—xizangren de diyici kangying zhizhan [The war in the year of the Earth Rat—the first anti-British war of the Tibetans], Dang'an shikong 9 (2003), p. 27; Zhou Juan, 1616 nian zhi 1959 nian de budan yu zhongguo xizang guanxishi yanjiu [A study of the relations between Bhutan and Chinese Tibet, 1616–1959] (unpublished Lanzhou University PhD thesis, 2007), p. 89.

101 Bayley, Steuart Colvin, ‘The Sikkim Expedition of 1888’, Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, 58, 3005 (1910), p. 736Google Scholar.

102 Dhanalaxmi, Ravuri, British Attitude to Nepal's Relations with Tibet and China (1814–1914) (New Delhi, 1981), p. 90Google Scholar.

103 Mingzhu, Feng, Zhongying xizang jiaoshe yu chuanzang bianqing [Sino-British negotiation over Tibet and affairs of the Sichuan and Tibetan frontier] (Beijing, 1997), p. 118Google Scholar.

104 Sykes, Percy, The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand: A biography (London, 1926), p. 166Google Scholar.

105 Memorandum by A. W. Paul, 30 December 1888, File No. Pros. May 1889, Nos. 259–391, PR_000005002569, National Archives of India.

106 For instance, Zhu Shaoshuai has asserted that “although China lost many rights at the Tibet-India Treaty signed at the Sino-British conference, the inclusion of every clause involved negotiations between the Amban and Tibetan authorities, as well as hard fought negotiations with the British by the Amban”. Zhu Shaoshuai, Zhuzang dachen yu xizang diyici kangying zhanzheng [The Amban and the first anti-British war in Tibet] (unpublished Tibet University MA thesis, 2010), p. 52. Besides, see Liang Zhongcui, ‘Yingguo qinzang “xianxingzhe” zhi kelaode huaite shuping’ [A discussion of Claude White, the “pioneer” of the British invasion of Tibet], Hubei minzu xueyuan xuebao 5 (2016), p. 52; Wang Xiaoyun, Qingmo zhongying xizang difang tiaoyue yanjiu [A study of Sino-British treaties signed in Tibet during the late Qing] (unpublished Northwest Normal University MA thesis, 2007), p. 28.

107 Memorandum by H. M. Durand, 1 January 1889, FO 17/1109, p. 48; Memorandum by H. M. Durand, 1 January 1889, FO 17/1109, p. 70.

108 Hsu, Immanuel C.Y., ‘Modern Chinese Diplomatic History: A Guide to Research’, The International History Review 1, 1 (1979), p. 102Google Scholar.