¹ Triṃśikā (ed. Sylvain Lévi), K. la–c:

ātma-dharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate/

vijñāna-pariṇāmo 'sau (pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā//)

² Bhāṣya (ed. Sylvain Lévi), 16, 7–8: upacāra iti yac ca yatra nāsti tat tatropacaryate/

³ Sphuṭārthā AK-vyākhyā (ed. Unrai Wogihara), 82, 31–2: tatra chandata upacārāh kriyante: yad vastu vyavahārāṃgaṃ teneha vyavahārārtha-saṃsiddhy-artham asad api sadrūpeṇa parikalpya kartṛ-kriyādi-vyavasthānaṃ kriyate/

⁴ Sthiramati interprets ātma-dharmopacāra as: ātmā dharmāś copacaryanta ity ātmadharmopacāraḥ, sa punar ātma-prajñaptir dharma-prajñaptiś ca/ (Bhāsya, 15, 20–1). In the Pāli texts, paññatti means “analytical and systematic expression of certain theory”. Cf. Puggala-paññatti.

⁵ Bodhisattvabhūmi (ed. Unrai Wogihara), 45, 14–19: yaś ca rūpādīnāṃ dharmāṇāṃ rūpādikasya vastunaḥ prajñapti-vāda-svabhāvaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ asad-bhūta-samāropato 'bhiniviśate/ yaś cāpi prajñapti-vāda-nimittādhiṣṭhānaṃ prajñapti-vāda-saṃniśrayam nirabhilāpyātmakatayā paramārtha-sad-bhūtaṃ vastv apavadamāno nāśayati sarveṇa sarvaṃ nāstīti.

⁶ Nāgārjuna uses the terms sattva-śūnyatā () and dharma-śunyatā () as the two kinds of śūnyatā in his Mahāprajñāpāramitā Upadeśa (Taisho Tripiṭaka, No. 1509, Vol. 25, 287b). In commenting on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Candrakīrti uses the terms ātma-nairātmya and ātmīya-nairātmya (MM-kārikā, ad. XVIII, K. 2): evaṃ yogino yadaivātma-nairātmyaṃ pratipadyante tadaivātmīya-skandhavastu-nairātmyam api niyataṃ pratipadyante/ (Prasannapadā (ed. L. de la Vallée Pousin), 346, 2–3).

⁷ MM-kārikā, XXII, K. 3a–b: pratīya para-bhāvam yaḥ so 'nātmety upapadyate/

⁸ ibid., XXIV, K. 18a–b: yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe/

⁹ Bodhisattvabhūmi (ed. U. Wogihara), 280, 18–281, 1: punaḥ sarva-dharmāṇāṃ bodhisattvaḥ saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtānāṃ dvi-vidhaṃ nairātmyaṃ yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti/ pudgalanairātmyaṃ dharma-nairātmyaṃ ca// tatredaṃ pudgala-nairātmyaṃ/ yan naiva te vidyamānā dharmāḥ pudgalāḥ/ nāpi vidyamāna-dharma-vinirmukto ‘nyaḥ pudgalo vidyate‖ tatredaṃ dharma-nairātmyaṃ/ yat sarveṣv abhilāpyeṣu vastuṣu sarvābhilāpa-svabhāvo dharmo na saṃvidyate‖ evaṃ hi bodhisattvaḥ sarva-dharmā anātmāna iti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti‖

¹⁰ Yogācārabhūmi (Taisho, No. 1579, Vol. 30, 833b20).

¹¹ op. cit., 486b–c.

¹² Bhāṣya, 16, 1–2: ko 'yaṃ pariṇāmo nāma/ anyathātvaṃ/ kāraṇa-kṣaṇa-nirodha-samakālaḥ kāraṇa-kṣaṇa-vilakṣaṇaḥ kāryasyātma-lābhaḥ pariṇāmaḥ/ Cf. Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra (ed. Sylvain Lévi), 150, 23: pariṇāmo hi nāmānyathātvaṃ/ (from Vasubandhu's commentary); and AK-vyākhyā, 148, 4: ko 'yaṃ pariṇāmo nāmeti / Sāṃkhyānaṃ pariṇāmāśaṃ kayā pṛcchati/ saṃ tater anyathātvam iti/.

¹³ See Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā, the Namaskāra-śloka:

anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam/

anekārtham anānārtham anucchedam aśāśvataṃ//

yaḥ pratītya-samutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivaṃ/

deśayām āsa saṃbuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varaṃ//

See also ibid., XVIII, K. 11:

anekārtham anānārtham anekārtham anānārtham//

ētat tal loka-nāthānāṃ buddhānāṃ śāsanāmṛtaṃ//.

In investigating the Buddhist theory of relational origination (pratītyasamutpāda), Nāgārjuna immediately draws our attention to the relationship of mutual dependency (parasparāpekṣā) between mutually denying opposites, such as “origination (A)/cessation (B)”, “continuity (A)/discontinuity (B)”, “unity (A)/diversity (B)”, and “movement (A)/ standstill (B)”. Among these four pairs of opposites “unity/diversity” is static, i.e. it does not involve changes in temporal sequence (akālika), whereas “continuity/discontinuity” is dynamic, i.e. it involves changes in time (kālika). In both cases, however, the relationship involves a denial by each of the other.

By showing the logical absurdities which result from our usual understanding of reality such as (i) Reality is A, (ii) Reality is B, (iii) Reality is both-A-and-B, (iv) Reality is neither-A-nor-B, Nāgārjuna demonstrates that reality can only be approached through the negation of each pair of these mutually excluding opposites, i.e., (i) Reality is not A, (ii) Reality is not B, (iii) Reality is not both-A-and-B, (iv) Reality is neither-A-nor-B. Nāgārjuna points out that our mind cannot function without attaching “self-nature” (svabhāva) to things, but true nature of things in reality is devoid of self-nature (niḥsvabhāva), i.e. it is “empty” (śūnya).

“Emptiness” (śūnyatā) is then the true nature of all things, saṃskṛta as well as asaṃskṛta dharmas, which include everything that is relationally originated (pratītyasamutpanna). It is synonymous with what Buddhists called dharmatā, tathatā, yathābhūtatā, etc., and with what we call “reality”, “noumenon”, “absolute”, etc. Reality for Buddhists, then, is not the absolute beyond phenomena but the absolute within phenomena. It is immanent in every concrete event, and yet it is inaccessible to our intellect.

¹⁴ Triṃśikā, K. 2c–d: tatrālayākhyaṃ vijñānaṃ vipākaḥ sarva-bījakaṃ/

¹⁵ ibid., K. 3a–b: asaṃviditakopādi-sthāna-vijñaptikam ca tat/ According to Sthiramati, upādānam upādiḥ/ sa punar ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā rūpādi-dharma-vāsanā ca/ (Bhāṣya, 19, 11–12); and sthāna-vijñaptir bhājana-loka-samniveśa-vijñaptiḥ/ (ibid. 19, 21).

¹⁶ ibid., K. 4d: tac ca vartate srotasaughavat/

¹⁷ ibid., K. 5a: tasya vyāvrttir arhatve/

¹⁸ Sthiramati, Bhāṣya, 18, 6–7: tatra hetu-pariṇāmo yā ālayavijñāne vipāka-niṣyandavāsanā-paripuṣṭiḥ/

¹⁹ Triṃśikā, K. 18:

sarva-bījaṃ hi vijñānaṃ pariṇāmas tathā tathā/

yāty anyonya-vaśād yena vikalpaḥ sa sa jāyate//

²⁰ ibid., K. 19:

karmaṇo vāsanā grāha-dvaya-vāsanayā saha/

kṣīṇe pūrva-vipāke 'nyad-vipākaṃ janayanti tat//

²¹ ibid., K. 5b–d ; tad-āśritya pravartate/

tad-ālambaṃ mano-nāma vijñānaṃ mananātmakaṃ//

²² ibid., K. 6:

kleśaiś caturbhiḥ sahitaṃ nivṛttāvyākṛtaiḥ sadā/

ātma-dṛṣṭy-ātma-mohātma-mānātma-sneha-saṃjñitaiḥ//

²³ ibid., K.7b–d:arhato na tat/

na nirodha-samāpattau mārge lokottare na ca//

²⁴ ibid., K. 8b–c: trtīyah ṣaḍ-vidhasya yā/

viṣayasyopalabdhiḥ

²⁵ ibid, K. 15 and 16:

pañcānām mūla-vijñāne yathā-pratyayam udbhavaḥ/

vijñānānāṃ saha na vā taraṅgāṇāṃ yathā jale//

mano-vijñāna-saṃbhūtiḥ sarvadāsaṃjñikād ṛte/

samāpatti-dvayān middhām mūrcchanād apy acittakāt//

²⁶ For instance, regarding sarvatraga-caitasika he says: tathā hy ete ālayavijñāne [= the eighth] kliṣṭe manasi [= the seventh] pravṛtti-vijñāneṣu [ = the six vijñānas] caviśeṣena pravartante/ (Bhāṣya, 25, 16–17).

²⁷ Bhāṣya, 18, 7–10 : phala-pariṇāmaḥ punar vipāka-vāsanā-vṛtti-lābhād ālaya-vijñānasya pūrva-karmākṣepa-parisamāptau yā nikāya-sabhāgāntareṣv abhinirvṛttiḥ/ niṣyanda-vāsanāvṛtti-lābhāc ca yā pravṛtti-vijñānānaṃ kliṣṭasya ca manasa ālayavijñānād abhinirvṛttiḥ/ As for hetu-pariṇāma, see n. 18 above.

²⁸ Triṃāikā, K. 17:

vij āna-parināmo 'yam vikalpo, yad vikalpyate/

tena tan nāsti, tenedaṃ sarvaṃ vij apti-mātrakaṃ//

Vasubandhu uses the terms vijñāna (rnam par śes pa) and vijñāpti (rnam par rig pa) with distinct difference. Cf. vijñāpti in the Triṃśikā (K. 2, 3) and Viṃśatikā (K. 2, 9, 17, 18, 19). As for t h e compound vijñāpti-mātra (with variants ending in -ka, -tā, and -tva), cf. Triṃśikā, K. 17, 25, 26, 27 (and K. 28. infra.); Viṃśatikā, K. 1, 22. The only exception is vijñānamātratva in the Triṃśikā, K. 28. Sthiramati in his commentary, however, replaces it with vijñāpti-mātratā. Cf. Bhāṣya, 43, 20. Non-Buddhist Indian scholars usually referred to this school as Yogācāra or Vijñānavādin.

²⁹ Regarding the ālayavijñāna, Sthiramati explains thus: tatrātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanāparipoṣād rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā-paripoṣāc cālayavijñānād ātmādi-nirbhāso vikalpo rūpādinirbhāsaś cotpadyate/ (Bhāṣya, 16, 2–4), “In this (transformation of vijñāna), as the karmic impression grown out of dichotomized conceptualization (vikalpa) of Self, etc., is ripened and the karmic impression grown out of vikalpa of (Elements such as) colour, etc., is ripened, so the dichotomies conceptualization (vikalpa) appearing like Self, etc., and (the vikalpa) appearing like (Elements such as) colour, etc., come into being from the ālayavijñāna.” Thus appeared ālayavijñāna is called ālayavijñāna-vijñāpti (kun gżi mam par śes paḥi rnam par rig pa). (Cf. Mahāyānasaṅgraha of Asaṅga: TTP, Vol. 112, No. 5549; MS-Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu: TTP, Vol. 112, No. 5551.)

³⁰ Triṃśikāvijñāpti-bhāṣya, 15, 24–16, 1 : ayaṃ dvi-prakāro 'py upacāro vijñāna-pariṇāma eva na mukhye ātmani dharmeṣu ceti kṛta etat/ dharmāṇām ātmanaś ca vijñāna-pariṇāmād bahir abhāvāt/

³¹ ibid., 16, 8–9 : evaṃ vijñāna-svarūpe bahiś cātma-dharmābhāvāt, parikalpita evātmā dharmāś ca, na tu paramārthataḥ santi/

³² ibid., 16, 15–19:

evam ca sarvaṃ vijñeyaṃ parikalpita-svabhāvatvād vastuto na vidyate/ vijñānaṃ punaḥ pratītyasamutpannatvād dravyato 'stīty abhyupeyaṃ/ pratītyasamu tpannatvaṃ punar vijñānasya parināma-śabdena jñāpitaṃ/ katham etad gamyate? vinā bāhyenārthena vijñānam evārthākāram utpady ata iti/ bāhyo hy arthaḥ svābhāsa-vijñāna-janakatvena vijñānasyālambana-pratyaya iṣyate, na tu kāraṇatva-mātreṇa/

³³ The term ābhāsa does not appear in Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā, except in Sthiramati's commentary. But Vasubandhu uses the term avabhāsana in his Viṃśatikā. See below, n. 34.

³⁴ Viṃśatikā, op. cit., K. la–b: vijñāptimātram evaitad asad-arthāvabhāsanāt/

³⁵ Among the followers of Vasubandhu, Dignāga (c. A.D. 400–80), in his Pramāṇasamuccaya, admitted only two types of the source of cognition (pramāṃa): one is direct perception (pratyakṣa) and the other is inference (anumāna). He maintained that pratyakṣa is devoid of conceptualization (vikalpa) and that by anumāna, which is conceptualized cognition (vikalpa), direct perception becomes concrete knowledge. Thus, Dignāga opened certain possibility for our empirical cognition to reach the cognized object in reality. On this base he systematized Buddhist logic.

Elaborating Dignāga's theory, Dharmakīrti (c. A.D. 650) established a unique Buddhist theory of epistemology and logic. Dharmakīrti maintained, in his Pramāṇavārtika, Pramāṇaviniścaya, Nyāyabindu, etc., that in the very first moment of direct perception we can cognize an object in its own aspect (svalakṣaṇa) existing in reality (sad-bhūta, paramārthasat). But at the next moment this direct perception gives way to inference, by giving judgement of what it is, recognizing it, and giving name to it by conceptualization.

According to Dharmakīrti, the Buddha's teachings are valid because they are based on these two sources of right knowledge, i.e. direct perception (pratyakṣa) and correct inference (anumāna).

³⁶ MV-bhāṣya, III, K. 3 (ed. G. Nagawo, 38; R. C. Pandeya's ed., p. 38):

svabhāvas trividhaḥ asac ca nityaṃ sac cāpy otattvataḥ/

sad-asat-tattvataś ceti svabhāva-traya isyate//

Pandeya also gives the following reading, ibid., 197:

svabhāvas trividho 'sac ca nityaṃ cāpy atattvataḥ/

sad-asat-tattvataś ceti svabhāva-trayam iṣyate//

³⁷ Triṃśikā, K. 20:

yena-yena vikalpena yad-yad vastu vikalpyate/

parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate//

³⁸ ibid., K. 21a–b:

paratantra-svabhāvas tu vikalpaḥ pratyayodbhavaḥ/

³⁹ ibid., K. 21c–d and K. 22a–b:

niṣpannas tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitatā tu yā//

ata eva sa naivānyo nānanyaḥ paratantrataḥ/

⁴⁰ ibid, K. 23a–c:

tri-vidhasya svabhāvasya tri-vidhā niḥsvabhāvatāṃ/

saṃdhāya sarva-dharmāṇāṃ (deśitā niḥsvabhāvatā)//

⁴¹ ibid., K. 24 and K. 25:

prathamo lakṣaṇenaiva niḥsvabhāvo 'paraḥ punaḥ/

na svayaṃbhāva etasyety aparā niḥsvabhāvatā//

dharmāṇāṃ paramārthaś ca sa yatas tathatāpi sah/

sarva-kālaṃ tathābhāvāt saiva vijñaptimātratā//

The romanized part is about paramārtha-niḥsvabhāva, which shows one of the finest and subtlest argumentations of Vasubandhu. It should be noted that the pronoun sa is masculine. Therefore it cannot be niḥsvabhāvatā, which is feminine. It is paratantra-svabhāva, as Sthiramati correctly interprets it.

Sthiramati comments as follows (Bhāṣya, 41, 21–4):

pariniṣpannaḥ svabhāvaḥ paramārtha ucyate/ sa yasmāt pariniṣpannaḥ svabhāvaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ paratantrātmakārāṃ paramārthaḥ tad-dharmateti kṛtvā tasmāt pariniṣpanna eva svabhāvaḥ paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā pariniṣpannasyābhāva-svabhāvatvāt/

“The nature-of-ultimate-being is said to be the ultimate being. Because that nature-of-ultimate-being is the ultimate-being, when it is considered as the dharma-ness of all dharmas which have the nature of being-dependent-on-other. Therefore, indeed, the nature-of-ultimate-being (pariniṣpanna eva svabhāvaḥ) is the nature-of-ultimate-non-being-ness (paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā). Because the nature-of-ultimate-being has not-real-existence abhāva) as its own nature.”

⁴² Commenting on the MS-alaṅkāra, XI, K. 41:

abhāva-bhāvatā yā ca bhāvābhāva-samānatā/

aśānta-śāntākalpā ca pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇaṃ//

Vasubandhu remarks,

pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇaṃ punas tathatā sā hy abhāvatā ca sarva-dharmāṇāṃ parikalpitā nābhāvatā ca tad-abhāvatvena bhāvāt/ bhāvābhāva-samanatā ca tayor bhāvābhāvayor abhinnatvāt/ … (op. cit., 65, 8–10), “The characteristic of the Pariniṣpanna is Such-ness. For it is not-being and not-non-being of all dharmas that are falsely reconstructed. Because it does exist as non-being. The equal-ness of being and non-being means that the two are not different …”

⁴³ Triṃśikā, K. 26:

yāvad vij āptimātratve vij ānaṃ nāvatiṣṭhati/

grāha-dvayasyānuśayas tāvan na vinivartate//

⁴⁴ ibid., K. 27:

vijñāptimātram evedam ity api hy upalambhatah /

sthāpayann-agrataḥ kiṃcit tan-mātre navatiṣṭhate//

⁴⁵ ibid., K. 28:

yadā tv ālambanaṃ vijñanaṃ naivopalabhate tadā/

sthitaṃ vijñānamatratve grāhyābhāve tad-agrahāt//

⁴⁶ Madhyānta-vibhāga, I, K. 4 (ed. S. Yamaguchi, 16; ed. R. C. Pandeya, 14):

artha-sattvātma-vijñāpti-pratibhāsam prajāyate/

vijñānaṃ, nāsti cāsyārthas tad-abhāvāt tad apy asat//

⁴⁷ Triṃśikā, K. 29:

acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānaṃ lokottaraṃ ca tat/

āśrayasya parāvṛttir dvi-dhā dauṣṭhulya-hānitaḥ//

⁴⁸ ibid., K. 30:

sa evānāsravo dhātur acintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ/

sukho vimukti-kāyo 'sau dharmākhyo 'yam mahāmuneḥ//

⁴⁹ Hsüan Tsang, Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi (), the Tenth Chüan, Taisho No. 1585, Vol. 31, p. 56a12 f. It is said that Hsüan Tsang translated this text into Chinese, compiling commentaries on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā written by ten great Indian scholars, and among them placing the highest authority on the interpretation of Dharmapāla.