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Individual Maxim Tokens, not Abstract Maxim Types
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 April 2024
Abstract
I argue that Kant’s Categorical Imperative should be applied to individual maxim tokens rather than abstract maxim types. The article is divided into five sections. In the first, I explain my thesis. In the second, I show that my thesis disagrees with Rawls. In the third, I argue for my thesis on the basis of the wording of the Categorical Imperative and on the basis of considerations about autonomy. In the fourth, I argue for my thesis on the basis of considerations about the ‘ought implies can’ principle. In the fifth, I provide a summary of the main argumentative moves and also explain some of the philosophical advantages of my thesis.
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- © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review
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