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Introduction: Commentaries on Ensuring Corporate Misconduct by Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Donald C. Langevoort
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Abstract

This essay reviews some of the more striking findings in Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith's Ensuring Corporate Misconduct: How Liability Insurance Undermines Shareholder Litigation (2010), particularly concerning the tension between two competing narratives of shareholder litigation—one stressing the important deterrent effect of such litigation, the other viewing such litigation as abusive plaintiff opportunism. The essay then introduces commentaries on the book by Carol Heimer and Jodi Short, which follow.

Type
Review Essay
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 38 , Issue 2 , Spring 2013 , pp. 475 - 479
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 2013 

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