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Grievance Practices in Post-Soviet Kyrgyz Agriculture

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Kelley E. Cormier
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Abstract

This article examines legal consciousness in action as expressed in grievances arising from commercial transactions among sellers and buyers in the new post-Soviet economy of Kyrgyzstan. Using focus groups, direct observation, and participant observation, I investigate the transformation of disputes between Kyrgyz vegetable growers and processors. My data show variation in the way grievances are dealt with among Kyrgyz farmers. Farmers opt out of the contractual relationship, remain in the relationship, or practice a combination of the two over time. The farmers included in this study did not seek legal remedies through the court system. Data also reveal that expressions of grievances transform in tandem with an evolution of feelings—from anger and distrust to understanding and even sympathy for the party responsible for the grievance.

Type
2006 Graduate Student Paper Competition: The Winning Essays
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , Spring 2007 , pp. 435 - 466
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 2007 

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