Hostname: page-component-5c6d5d7d68-xq9c7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-08-27T23:42:52.320Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Hiring Teams, Firms, and Lawyers: Evidence of the Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

John C. Coates ,
Michele M. DeStefano ,
Ashish Nanda  and
David B. Wilkins
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

How are relationships between corporate clients and law firms evolving? Drawing on interview and survey data from 166 chief legal officers of S&P 500 companies from 2006–2007, we find that—contrary to standard depictions of corporate client-provider relationships—(1) large companies have relationships with ten to twenty preferred providers; (2) these relationships continue to be enduring; and (3) clients focus not only on law firm platforms and lead partners, but also on teams and departments within preferred providers, allocating work to these subunits at rival firms over time and following “star” lawyers, especially if they move as part of a team. The combination of long-term relationships and subunit rivalry provides law firms with steady work flows and allows companies to keep cost pressure on firms while preserving relationship-specific capital, quality assurance, and soft forms of legal capacity insurance. Our findings have implications for law firms, corporate departments, and law schools.

Type
Articles
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , Fall 2011 , pp. 999 - 1031
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 2011 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

ALM Research. 2008. In‐House Law Departments. http://top500.law.com/search/basicSearchAction.action (accessed August 22, 2011).Google Scholar
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. American Economic Review 53:941–73.Google Scholar
Chayes, Abram, and Chayes, Antonia. 1985. Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm. Stanford Law Review 37:277–300.Google Scholar
Coates, IV, John, C. 2010. Causes and Consequences of CLO Turnover, Working Paper (on file with the author).Google Scholar
DeStefano Beardslee, Michele. 2009a. The Corporate Attorney‐Client Privilege: Third Rate Doctrine for Third Party Consultants. Southern Methodist University Law Review 62:727–802.Google Scholar
DeStefano Beardslee, Michele. 2009b. Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion Part I: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22:1259–1333.Google Scholar
DeStefano Beardslee, Michele. 2010. Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion Part II: How Far Should Corporate Lawyers Go? Georgetown Journal of. Legal Ethics 23:1119–96.Google Scholar
Dinovitzer, Ronit, et al., American Bar Foundation, and NALP Foundation for Law Career Research and Education. 2009. After the JD II: Second Results from a National Study of Legal Careers. http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/publications/338 (accessed August 22, 2011).Google Scholar
Dull, John E., and Gould, David J. 2002. DuPont's Legal Experiment. http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005533284 (accessed September 27, 2011).Google Scholar
Fong, Yuk‐Fai. 2005. When Do Experts Cheat and Whom Do They Target? RAND Journal of Economics 36:113–30.Google Scholar
Galanter, Marc, and Palay, Thomas. 1991. Tournament of Lawyers: The Growth and Transformation of the Big Law Firms Chicago: University of Chicago Press Google Scholar
Gibeaut, John. 2004. The Outside Looking In, 90 American Bar Association Journal 90:49–50.Google Scholar
Gilson, Ronald J. 1990. The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective. Maryland. Law Review 49:869–915.Google Scholar
Gilson, Ronald J., Mnookin, Robert H., and Pashigian, B. Peter. 1985. Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and how Partners Split Profits. Stanford Law Review 37:313–92.Google Scholar
Groysberg, Boris, Nanda, Ashish, and Nohria, Nitin. 2004. The Risky Business of Hiring Stars. Harvard Business Review 83:92–100.Google Scholar
Groysberg, Boris, Lee, Linda‐Eling, and Nanda, Ashish. 2008. Can They Take It with Them? The Portability of Star Knowledge Workers' Performance: Myth or Reality. Management Science 54:1213–30.Google Scholar
Heimer, Carol A. 2001. Solving the Problem of Trust In Trust in Society, ed. Cook, Karen S., 40–88. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.Google Scholar
Heinz, John, and Laumann, Edward. 1983. Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Heinz, John, Nelson, Robert, Sandefur, Rebecca, and Laumann, Edward. 2005. Urban Lawyers: The New Social Structure of the Bar. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
InsideCounsel. 2006. 200 Largest Legal Departments. http://www.insidecounsel.com/ (accessed August 22, 2011).Google Scholar
Lazega, Emmanuel, and van Duijn, Marijtje. 1997. Position in Formal Structure, Personal Characteristics, and Choices of Advisors in a Law Firm: A Logistic Regression Model for Dyadic Network Data. Social Networks 19:375–97.Google Scholar
Mitchell, Mark, and Mulherin, Harold. 1996. The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity. Journal of Financial Economics 41:193–229.Google Scholar
National Law Placement Foundation. 1998. Keeping the Keepers: Strategies for Associate Retention in Times of Attrition, Executive Summary. Dallas, TX: NALP Foundation for Law Career Research and Education.Google Scholar
Nelson, Robert L. 1988. Partners with Power: The Social Transformation of the Large Law Firm. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Nelson, Robert L., and Nielsen, Laura Beth. 2000. Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations. Law & Society Review 34:457–94.Google Scholar
Nelson, Robert L., Berrey, Ellen C., and Nielsen, Laura Beth. 2008. Divergent Paths: Conflicting Conceptions of Employment Discrimination in Law and the Social Sciences. Annual Review of Law and Social Science 4:103–22.Google Scholar
Regan, Milton C. Jr. 2004. Eat What You Kill. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Rosen, Robert E. 2002. We're All Consultants Now: How Change in Client Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services. Arizona Law Review 44:637–83.Google Scholar
Samuelson, S. S., and Jaffe, L. J. 1990. A Statistical Analysis of Law Firm Profitability. Boston University Law Review 70:185–211.Google Scholar
Slovak, Jeffrey S. 1979. Working for Corporate Actors: Social Change and Elite Attorneys in Chicago. Law & Social Inquiry 4 (3):465–500.Google Scholar
Slovak, Jeffrey S. 1980. Giving and Getting Respect: Prestige and Stratification in a Legal Elite. Law & Social Inquiry 5 (1): 31–60.Google Scholar
Susskind, Richard. 2008. The End of Lawyers: Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Uzzi, Brian, and Lancaster, Ryon. 2004. Embeddedness and Price Formation in the Corporate Law Market. American Sociological Review 69 (3): 319–44.Google Scholar
Wilkins, David B. 2004. From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market‐Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar. Harvard Law Review 117 (5): 548–1615.Google Scholar
Wilkins, David B. 2010. Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney/Client Relationship. Fordham Law Review 78:2067–2136.Google Scholar