The language used by witnesses and litigants can powerfully influence evaluations by legal decision makers of disputant credibility and blame. Previous experimental research has addressed this claim in many studies of undergraduates and law students. It is not known whether this generalization applies to sitting judges or whether it extends to other institutional contexts in which dispute settlement occurs, such as mediation centers. In this article we present findings from three experiments conducted with undergraduates, sitting judges, and practicing mediators. Speech style (powerful, powerless) and discourse (rule, relational) were manipulated in a 2×2 repeated measures design in each subject pool. The findings suggest that students' and judges' evaluations of disputant credibility, social characteristics, and blame are affected by speech style, while mediators' evaluations of the same are affected by particular interactions of speech style and discourse only. These findings are interpreted as a function of the prescriptive and behavioral language norms to which students, judges, and mediators are routinely exposed in their institutional contests. Implications for future law and language research are also discussed.

This essay argues that there is an important sense in which Foucault gets law wrong—that the pursuit of Foucault's own objectives had the unintended consequence of inhibiting a fruitful interrogation of the place of law in modernity. His immediate concern was with the emergence of distinctive manifestations of modern power that constitute a new configuration, the disciplinary society. The most distinctive feature of his account of the historical emergence of modernity was his expulsion of law from modernity. This “expulsion of law” is found in his metahistorical thesis that law constituted the primary form of power in the premodern era, and that although law lingers on in the doctrine of sovereignty, it is supplanted by discipline and government as the key embodiments of modernity.

The essay proposes an exercise in retrieval, a “retrieval of law,” to recuperate much in Foucault's thought that is suggestive for our understanding of law's role in the constitution of modern society. It rejects Foucault's opposition of law and discipline and makes use of his treatment of government and governmentality toward that end. It argues that a more adequate grasp of the place of law in modernity can be developed by establishing that law and discipline are complementary and characteristically combine in the ubiquitous presence of regulation as the mark of the modem condition.

The large U.S. legal profession hurts economic productivity in the United States and our economic competitiveness abroad according to a common claim A number of studies support that claim, but they suffer from serious flaws. I reexamine the hypothesis that large lawyer populations impair economic growth and suggest that it lacks theoretical and empirical support. The hypothesis depends on false assumptions about the organizational capability and interest of the legal profession; the empirical research in sup port of the hypothesis depends on flawed lawyer data, unusual combinations of high lawyer populations and low economic growth in one or two countries, and the unjustified use of lawyer population figures from the 1980s in analyses of economic growth prior to that period. I present the results of research on lawyer populations and economic growth among the US. states and in a sample of countries, correcting for the worst flaws of past research The results do not support the claim that large lawyer populations impair aggregate economic growth The analysis is not intended as the final answer on this important question but rather as an encouragement for a more sophisticated understanding of the role of lawyers in late modern economies.

Twentieth-century reform of the American law of evidence was initially premised on the ideals of legal progressivism, ideals splintered by American legal realism. In preparing the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence from 1939 to 1942, Harvard Law School professor Edmund M. Morgan attempted to reconstitute the framework of reform in light of the challenge of legal realism. The Model Code was based on granting greater discretion to the trial judge and changing the goals of the trial from a search for truth to a “rational” resolution of disputes. In large part due to these apparently radical and “corrosive” changes, the Model Code failed to win professional support and was not adopted by any state. The structure of the Model Code was used for the two subsequent evidence codification efforts, the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence. These codification efforts found greater academic favor in part because they fit within the post-World War II jurisprudence of reasoned elaboration. The Federal Rules also enjoyed extraordinary professional favor because the drafters explicitly affirmed truth as the goal of the rules. The irony is that the framework of the Federal Rules, since they are based on the Model Code, contradicts this message.

Recently most states have abandoned the traditional tort defense of contributory negligence and substituted a form of comparative negligence. Using an extensive data set of auto accident injury claims, we provide evidence on the relationship between negligence rules and claimants' litigation decisions to retain attorneys, file lawsuits and litigate versus settle out of court. Litigation choices appear to be rational responses to the varying incentives created by alternative tort standards. We find that in contrast to comparative negligence, claims arising under comparative negligence are associated with greater probabilities of attorney involvement, higher average award levels, and longer delays in securing payment. Only 37% of claims involving attorneys in contributory negligence states result in a lawsuit being filed compared to 49% and 47% under the pure and modified forms of comparative negligence, respectively. The study provides the first statistical evidence on the litigation costs of the new forms of comparative negligence.