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Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2024

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Abstract

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This paper examines the place of critical inquiry within law and society studies. It suggests that such inquiry requires a periodic reexamination of both methodological and theoretical assumptions. In terms of method, critical inquiry would emphasize the particular and intensive as opposed to the general and extensive. In terms of theory, it calls attention to the limits of state legality and invites attention to ordinary social transactions in which the law appears invisible but is nonetheless powerful. The authors argue that it is possible to be both critical and empirical.

Type
Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © 1987 The Law and Society Association.

Footnotes

This article is, with minor revisions, the “Plenary Session Address” presented by Susan S. Silbey at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Chicago, May 30, 1986.

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