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Reply to Max Gluckman

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2024

Richard L. Abel*
Affiliation:
Yale Law School

Extract

I am writing in reaction to the article by Spaeth, Meltz, Rathjen and Haselswerdt, “Is Justice Blind: An Empirical Investigation of a Normative Ideal,” which appeared in vol. 7, no. 1. The authors attempt to support the Aristotelian myth that blind justice can systematically obtain. The premise in the myth is fallacious, and confirmation of the authors' research hypothesis in three of their five data sets cannot therefore be an adequate basis for concluding that justice is blind in the cases comprising the three sets.

Type
Comment and Exchange
Copyright
Copyright © 1973 Law and Society Association.

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References

ABEL, Richard L. (1969) “Customary Laws of Wrongs in Kenya: An Essay in Research Method,” 17 American Journal of Comparative Law 573.Google Scholar
CARROLL, Lewis (1946) Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass. New York: Grosset & Dunlop.Google Scholar
DUNDAS, Charles (1915) “The Organization and Laws of Some Bantu Tribes in East Africa,” 45 Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 234.Google Scholar
GLUCKMAN, Max (1973) “Limitations of the Case-Method in the Study of Tribal Law,” 7 Law and Society Review 611.Google Scholar