Antony Lentin's biography of John Andrew Hamilton, who in 1913 became Lord Sumner when he was appointed a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary (a Law Lord), is timely. The year 2009 sees both the 150th anniversary of Lord Sumner's birth and the establishment of the U.K. Supreme Court as separate from the House of Lords. The new Supreme Court justices serve no legislative function, as they are prohibited from serving in Parliament. Lord Sumner's career provides an early example of the desire for a politically neutral judiciary, as he was the first High Court judge appointed for his work as a lawyer rather than for his contributions in party politics.

As the title suggests, Lentin's biography highlights Lord Sumner's transitional status as a Law Lord. Indeed, the biography develops two dominant narratives: first, Lord Sumner's resistance to changing times, and second, his frustrated ambition. In the first category, Lord Sumner's biography provides a window into the legal and cultural shifts of the early twentieth century. Lord Sumner came of age in an era when judges were increasingly expected to remain impartial on political matters, and his progress to the bench exemplified this trend. His outspokenness on controversial issues, however, makes it impossible to consider him apolitical. Lord Sumner's often-eloquent speeches on subjects ranging from reform of the House of Lords (he supported it) to self-government in India (he opposed it) provoked his opponents to lambast him for partisanship. Thus, he could serve as an example of both the old and the new models of a Law Lord. Lord Sumner's history also provides a window into the end of the imperial era. As Lentin remarks, “Sumner was an imperialist when the Empire both reached and passed its zenith” (p. 246). Indeed, Lord Sumner spent his retirement years decrying the diminution of the British Empire, particularly in regard to India.

The second narrative strand is the more personal of the two, chronicling the slow beginnings of Lord Sumner's legal career and his failure to obtain the office of Lord Chancellor. Lord Sumner was raised in a middle-class family and benefitted from an excellent education in classics at Manchester Grammar School and Balliol College, Oxford. He was called to the bar in 1883 and soon became the assistant of a successful commercial lawyer. He attracted little work, however, and earned a living primarily through writing biographies. He was among the first contributors to The Dictionary of National Biography, composing around 300 entries, and he published one book, Reference HamiltonLife of Daniel O'Connell (1888). Eventually he did establish himself as a commercial lawyer, and his subsequent rise to the Court of Appeal and then to the House of Lords was rapid. Despite being well qualified and ambitious and having been considered for the office by several Prime Ministers, Lord Sumner never became Lord Chancellor, leading Lentin to speculate that this “failure no doubt fed his chronic feelings of deprivation, the sense, noted by Schuster, that he was not prized at his true value” (p. 158). Lentin sympathizes with his subject, but he is measured in his speculation, basing it on contemporary letters, memoirs, and biographies.

The majority of the biography concerns Lord Sumner's public life and work. One of his primary nonjudicial appointments was to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference as principal British delegate on reparations, and his insistence on securing a substantial reimbursement for Britain earned him the enmity of economist John Maynard Keynes. Although he was frequently characterized as a Tory, Lord Sumner's politics, nonetheless, are difficult to classify. On the one hand, he opposed Irish Home Rule, speaking in the House of Lords against negotiating with Sinn Féin and against the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. On the other hand, his decision in Johnstone v. Pedlar (1921) found in favor of an Irish-born, naturalized American citizen who joined Sinn Féin in its fight to break with the United Kingdom. Lentin explains this latter position as “respect for the rule of law,” as Lord Sumner considered the case “an attempt by the Executive to flout the Constitution” (p. 133). Lord Sumner always supported the power of Parliament against the encroachments of the executive.

Lentin's biography provides a well-researched, nuanced portrait of a complex man, suitable for a wide audience. The discussion of Lord Sumner's cases should prove useful to legal scholars, especially since his judgments continue to be cited in myriad national courts. Historians will benefit from the analysis of Lord Sumner's participation in events such as the Paris Peace Conference, and the examples of Lord Sumner's colonialist ideology will interest postcolonial scholars. Finally, the book may appeal to more general readers as it describes early-twentieth-century debates about currently topical issues, including how a state should deal with terrorism, the desirability of judicial activism, and the appropriate balance of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial authorities.