Private Justice examines disciplinary practices in different workplace settings (i.e., hierarchical, participatory, and cooperative) in light of theoretical debates about the relationship between social structure and human agency, on the one hand, and the relationship between formal and informal law, on the other hand. This book challenges us to rethink how these relationships are conceptualized in a wide range of sociolegal theories and it examines the organization of “private justice” or nonstate law, in workplace discipline. Itzkowitz states that Henry succeeds in showing the “existence” of private justice, but he argues beyond that Henry's integrated theory of law is limited in a number of ways. Among its limitations, according to Itzkowitz, is that the aspiration of integrated theory not to separate parts (i.e., structure and action, formal and informal law) makes it “difficult to know where the analysis should begin” (p. 954). Rather than oppose the aspiration for integrated theory, Itzkowitz argues that “an integrative theory of law requires a different approach” (p. 960). Itzkowitz's disagreements with Henry exemplify some of the contemporary debates in law and social theory. In particular, as I read Itzkowitz's comment on Private Justice, he takes issue with two aspects of Henry's approach. First, he questions the utility of legal pluralism as a methodology and/or basis for integrated theory. Second, he questions the value of approaches that deconstruct relations of social control as opposed to those that predict which forms of law will prevail under certain social conditions.