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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2018
This paper argues that the principle in Woolwich Building Society v IRC (No 2) (1993) that the citizen has a prima facie right to the repayment of money voluntarily paid in response to an unlawful demand by a public authority, should not be regarded aspart of the private law of restitution creating aprivate law right but as a free standing public law principle enforceable in the Administrative Court, broadly analogous to a legitimate expectation. The flexible process and the discretionary nature of the judicial review jurisdiction is more appropriate to the issues that arise than is the private law of restitution with its emphasis on bipolar disputes. Underlying the argument is the claim that the rule of law should not give automatic protection to a person who voluntarily makes a payment to a public authority while believing that payment to be unlawful. More generally, the paper suggests that the enterprise of seeking to subsume restitutionary principles within a single conceptual framework may be misconceived.
1. (1993) AC 70. See generally J Beatson (1993) 109 LQR 401; P Birks (1992) PL 580.
2. (1988) 1 All ER 961.
3. See IRC, exp National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd (1982) AC 617.
4. Apart from the case of officers of the court such as the Official Receiver considered as quasi-trustees, although the same rationale could be extended to other public authorities being based specifically on the high standards of conduct expected of public functionaries: see Ex p James (1874) LR Ch App 609; Ex p Seward (1885) 16 QBD 308; Re Taylor (1907) 1 KB 865; Blackpool and Fleetwood Tramcar Co v Bisthan with Norbreck District Council (1910) 1 KB 592. In Woolwich (1992) 3 All ER 737 at 758, 759 Lord Goff suggested that, even if there was an extra-statutory discretion to repay, it would not be reviewable except on the narrow ground of bad faith. It is difficult to see why this should be so.
5. See IRC v National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses (1981) 2 All ER 93 at 103, 109; R v IRC, exp Rossminster (1980) AC 952; R v Lancashire County Council, exp Huddlestone (1986) 2 All ER 941 at 945; and see text above nn 37,38 below.
6. Eg Hoffmann-La-Roche v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (1975) AC 295 at 366; London and Clydesdale Estates v Aberdeen District Council (1980) 1 WLR 182 at 189-90.
7. See Boddington v British Transport Police (1998) 2 All ER 203; Wandsworth Borough Council v Winder (1985) AC 461.
8. See Woolf, H Protection of the Public: A New Challenge (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1990) pp 29–32 Google Scholar.
9. R v IRC, ex p Woolwich Building Society (1990) 1 WLR 1400.
10. Below n 83.
11. Roy v Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee (1992) 1 All ER 705.
12. (1983) 2 AC 237.
13. See R v North and East Devon Health Authority, exp Coughlin (2000) 2 WLR 622; P Craig ‘Legitimate Expectations: A Conceptual Analysis’ (1992) 108 LQR at 79–98; Schonberg, S Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
14. See eg C Harlow ‘Public and Private Law: Definition without Distinction’ (1980) 43 MLR 241; Sir H Woolf ‘Public Law - Private Law: Why the Divide?’ (1986) PL 220; S Fredman and G Morris ‘The Costs of Exclusivity: Public and Private Re-examined’ (1995) PL 68.
15. The Nolan principles are ‘selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership’ . See First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (1995) Cm 2850-1. Oliver's ‘key values’ are dignity, autonomy, respect, status and security: see Oliver, D Common Law Values and the Public-Private Divide (London: Butterworths, 1999)Google Scholar, Oliver, D in Taggart, M (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997)Google Scholar.
16. This raises the different debates about the public-private distinction concerning the limits of the law's reach and also the extent to which ideas associated with the private permeate the law's public activities: see Cooper, D ‘Private Country? Hunting, Land and Judicial Intervention’ in Holder, J and McGillveray, D (eds) Locality and Identity: Environmental Issues in Law and Society (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1999).Google Scholar
17. See R v Somerset County Council, exp Fewings (1995) 1 All ER 513, per Laws J. This traditional liberal view is, of course, subject to communitarian values of positive freedom, according to which the community has a right to act collectively (see Berlin, I Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1969)Google Scholar.
18. See eg D Oliver ‘Public Law Procedures and Remedies - Do we Need Them?’ (2002) PL 91.
19. Rawls, J A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971) pp 5–11Google Scholar; Dworkin, R Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977) pp 103, 134–136.Google ScholarPubMed
20. In practice, utilitarianism is often drawn upon in an attempt to reconcile competing claims. Its most well-known problems include its assumption of commensurability and its denial of moral sensibilities, except as de facto claims and its lack of respect for the individual except as a unit of welfare. For example, utilitarianism could justify refusing restitution to an ascetic in the interests of a hedonist. See Sen, A and Williams, B (eds) Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
21. W B Gallie ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1955-56) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56.
22. Raz, J The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press) ch 13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
23. See Chang, R (ed) Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason (Cambridge: Harvard, 1997)Google Scholar; I Berlin and B Williams ‘Pluralism and Liberalism: A Reply’ (1994) 42 Pol S 306. For judicial recognition that hard choices may not be susceptible to reason, see Airdale NHS Trust v Bland (1993) 1 All ER 82 1 at 854–855.
24. (1912) 223 US 280 at 285–286 (endorsed in Woolwich (see n 1 above) by Lord Goff at 173, Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 19).
25. See De Smith, S A, Sir Woolf, H and Jowell, J Principles of Judicial Review (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) p 122pp.Google Scholar
26. See IRC v Coombes and Co Ltd (1991) 2 AC 283; IRC v Rossminister (1980) 1 All ER 80 at 94–95; cf Hoffman-La Roche v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (1975) AC 295 at 366 (grant of an interlocutory injunction to enforce a statutory instrument alleged to be ultra vires).
27. Boddington v British Transport Police (1998) 2 All ER 203.
28. Re F (Infants) (1977) Fam 165; cf R v Paddington Valuation Officer, exp Peachey Property Corpn Ltd (1966) 1 QB 380 at 402.
29. (1765) 19 St TR 1029.
30. G Postema Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) p 42. An analogy might lie in the rule that superior orders is no defence, although in the stronger setting of a wrong to a third party: Keighley v Bell (1866) 4 F and F 703.
31. (1992) 3 All ER 737 at 759.
32. For a review of the issues in the context of a statutory discretion to repay, see Tower Hamlets London Borough Council v Chetnik Developments (1988) 1 All ER 961.
33. See E Weinrib ‘Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice’ (2000) Theoretical Inquiries in Law. Cf J Gordley “’ The Purpose of Awarding Restitutionary Damages”: A Reply to Professor Weinrib’, ibid p 39.
34. See Waldron, J Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)Google Scholar; Gordley, n 33 above.
35. See eg A Hutchinson (2001) 21 LS 65.
36. See O'Reilly v Mackman (1983) 2 AC 237.
37. (1997) QB 306.
38. (1987) QB 815.
39. See nn 73, 84 below.
40. See Birks, P An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983) pp 294–299.Google Scholar
41. O'Reilly v Mackman (1983) 2 AC 237
42. Laslett, J (ed) Two Treaties of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963) pp 127–128 Google Scholar.
43. Above n 17.
44. Dunlop v Woolhara Municipal Council (1982) AC 158 at 17 1, per Lord Diplock.
45. Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 29; R v Somerset County Council, exp Fewings (1995) 1 All ER 513.
46. Western Fish Products Ltd v Penwith District Council (1978) 38 P & CR 7.
47. Credit Suisse v Allerdale Borough Council (1997) QB 306.
48. Eg in tort only collateral challenge or actions based on the additional elements of misfeasance in public office, negligence, breach of statutory duty, or, by virtue of statute, under EC law or the Human Rights Act 1998: see Hoffman-La Roche v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (1975) AC 295 at 359; X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council (1995) 2 AC 633 at 749; cf M Amos ‘Extending the Liability of the State in Damages’ (2001) 21 LS 1.
49. The authorities are fully discussed in Woolwich (1993) AC 70. The threat of legal proceedings is not in itself duress.
50. Mason v New South Wales (1959) 102 CLR 108 at 139–142; Steele v Williams (1853) 22 LJ Ex 225; South of Scotland Electricity Board v British Oxygen Co Ltd (No 2) (1958) 2 All ER 225; T and J Brocklebank v R (1925) 1 KB 52. See P Birks (1980) 30 CLP 191 at 198.
51. (1999) 2 AC 349.
52. O'Reilly v Mackman (1983) 2 AC 237.
53. (1993) AC 70, 173; see A Burrows The Law of Restitution (London: Butterworths, 1993) pp 346, 348, 361.
54. See P Birks in P D Finn (ed) Essays on Restitution (Sydney: The Law Book Co, 1990) pp 164–265.
55. ‘… that the liberties, franchises, privileges and jurisdictions of Parliament are the ancient and undoubted birthright and inheritance of the subjects of England …‘
56. (1921) 37 TLR 884, cf Gosling v Veley (1850) 12 QB 328 at 404, where the principle was described as a ‘legal axiom and requires no authority to be cited in support of it’.
57. Eg McArthy and Stone v Richmond Borough Council (1991) 4 All ER 897.
58. (1921) 37 TLR 884 at 887, per Atkin LJ; see also Tand J Brocklebank v R (1926) 1 KB52.
59. (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161 at 169.
60. Above n 40, p 223.
61. Above n 40, pp 294,295; cf White, (1999) 115 LQR 380.
62. (1989) 59 DLR (4th), 161, 169–170. However, the defence of passing-on is available in many countries against public authorities: see eg Shannon v Hughes (1937) 109 SW (2d) 1174. See also Law Commission Consultation Paper No 120, paras 3.83.3.85. which tentatively supports the defence; cf Burrows, n 51 above, at 476, arguing that a mitigation defence is the more appropriate. See also Mason v NSW (1959) 102 CLR 146; Rudden and Bishop (1991) 6 European Law Rev 243.
63. (1994) 182 CLR 51. The case did not involve the Woolwich principle as such but concerned a statutory power to repay.
64. At 69.
65. The other main argument against passing-on, namely the practical difficulties of determining questions of economic impact applies equally in public law cases.
66. See East Fifty-Fourth Street v US (1946) 157 F Rep (2d) 68, per Learned Hand J.
67. See R v Tower Hamlets Borough Council, exp Chetnik Developments (1988) 1 AC 858.
68. See IRC, exp National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd (1982) AC 617; R v IRC, exp Rossminster (1980) AC 952; R v Lancashire County Council, exp Huddlestone (1986) 2 All ER 941 at 945.
69. (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161.
70. At 190.
71. Cf the broadening possibilities opened up by Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale (1991) 2 AC 548 which removes the link between specific payments and outgoings.
72. At 758,760.
73. (1993) AC 70 at 170, 173, 174. See also Ralph Gibson LJ at 122.
74. Above n 73, at 170, 171.
75. Maritime Electric Company v General Dairies Ltd (1937) AC 610; Essex Incorporated Congregational Church Union v Essex County Council (1963) AC 808.
76. (1993) AC 70 at 199; see also A-G v Wilts United Dairies Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 884 at 887.
77. No 120, paras 3.65–3.69, 3.90, as apparently did Lord Goff in the different context of a discretionary power to repay: R v Tower Hamlets Borough Council, exp Chetnik Developments (1988) AC 858 at 882.
78. Supreme Court Act 1981, s3 1(4)Google ScholarPubMed; CPR 54.3(2). The position is different in Scotland.
79. R v IRC, exp Woolwich Building Society (1990) 1 WLR 1400.
80. CPR 54.2.
81. See R v Special Commissioners of Income Tax (1888) 21 QBD 303; R v Lords Commissioners of the Treasury (1872) LR 7 QB 387.
82. (1993) AC 70 at 101; see R v IRC, exp Woolwich Building Society (1990) 1 WLR 1400. Or it might suffice that some person had succeeded in Administrative Court proceedings.
83. (1997) 2 All ER 336.
84. (1998) 2 All ER 333.
85. IRC v National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses (1982) AC 617.
86. See in relation to restitution Birks, n 40 above, pp 189–190; Burrows n 53 above, ch 7; Friedmann (1983) 99 LQR 534; A S Burrows Essays on the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) ch 7.
87. (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161, 190.
88. Cf Kleinwort Bensen v Lincoln City Council (1999) 2 AC 349.
89. (1993) 109 LQR 401 at 439.
90. (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161.
91. (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161, 169–70.
92. (1993) AC 70 at 174.
93. (1993) AC 70 at 176, 178.
94. See Berkeley v Secretary of State (2000) 3 All ER 875.
95. R v Lincolnshire County Council and Wealdon District Council, exp Atkinson, Wales and Stratford (1996) 8 Admin Law Rev 529 at 550; R v Paddington Valuation Officer, ex p Peachey Property Corpn Ltd (1966) 1 QB 380.
96. See Roy v Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee (1992) 1 All ER 705 at 730; Mercury Communications Ltd v Director General of Telecommunications (1996) 1 WLR 48; Trustees of the Dennis Nye Pension Fund v Sheffield City Council (1997) 4 All ER 747.
97. (1999) 2 AC 349.
98. (1999) 2 AC 367.
99. (1993) AC 70, 173.
100. (1993) AC 70, 177.
101. See Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association v Donoughue (2001) 4 All ER 604.
102. See R v Cobham Hall School, exp S (1998) ELR 389; R v Governors of Haberdashers Aske's Hatcham College Trust, exp T (1995) ELR 350.
103. R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, exp Datafin plc (1987) QB 815.
104. Mercury Communications Ltd v Director General Telecommunications (1996) 1 WLR 48; R v Lord Chancellor's Dept, ex p Hibbit and Saunders (1993) COD 326.
105. R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, exp Datafin plc (1987) QB 81 5; R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, exp the Aga Khan (1983) 2 All ER 853; R v Smite Houses, exp Goldsmith (2001) LGR 55.
106. See Heather v The Leonard Cheshire Foundation (2001) EWHC Admin 449, para 53; R v Legal Aid Board, exp Donn (1996) 3 All ER I; McLaren v Home Office (1990) ICR 824.
107. Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association v Donoughue (2001) 4 All ER 604.
108. At 177; cf Glasgow Corpn v Lord Advocate (1959) SC 203.
109. (1993) AC 70 at 205.
110. (1969) 2 AC 147; Page v Hull Prison Visitors (1993) AC 682; O'Reilly v Mackman (1983) 2 AC 237.
111. See Craig, P P Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 4th edn, 1999) p 462 ffGoogle Scholar; Wade, H W R and Forsythe, C F Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 8th edn, 2000) pp 256–273 Google Scholar.
