Introduction
Society thinks, talks, and communicates in ways which are inherently different now from the pre-Internet era. Hashtags in particular have paved the way for online community formation around a particular topic, issue, or goal.Footnote 1 The extraordinary growth and spread of social media have fundamentally transformed feminist activism aiming to change legal landscapes.Footnote 2 Although by now it is futile to discuss whether we should or should not use social media (it is far too embedded in the fabric of modern life), feminist debates continue about whether social media revolutionise activism or whether they are the death knell of strategically sound campaigning for legal change.Footnote 3
A new and relatively under-studied phenomenon which embodies these debates is that of ‘hashtag hijacking’, where individuals or groups ‘hijack’ (or co-opt) a particular hashtag to draw attention to their own arguments and narratives which undermine or oppose the hashtag's original objective.Footnote 4 The ambition is to reframe the hashtag to subversive ends. The majority of hijacking research has taken the perspective of counter-discourses and the subaltern representing minority voices challenging the dominant discourse.Footnote 5 This paper, however, looks at what happens when the original hashtag represents the subaltern counterpublic (feminist work) and those wanting to maintain status quo (anti-feminist groups) react by hijacking the campaign hashtag to assert dominance. This research explores the theoretical debate as to whether campaigning online opens women's rights activists to dangerous aggression and ‘unsafe’ spaces (more so than offline), frustrating or derailing the campaigns, or whether this Habermasian dialogue is actually buoying the campaigns and, in some ways, chipping away at dominant, heteronormative, patriarchal structures and laws. This paper draws insight from empirical evidence from three hashtag campaigns: #notacriminal/ #repealthe8th on abortion legislation in Ireland; #women2drive on the ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia; and #mydressmychoice, arguing for better protections for women against sexual violence in Kenya.
This paper first introduces the larger research project from which this study arose, clarifying the methodological approach and addressing challenges. The paper then spends considerable time exploring the theoretical debate, drawing from the literature on trolling and the Alt_Right and framing the debate with scholarly work on feminist activism. Each of the three case studies is then explored and analysed in detail, weaving the theoretical debate into the analysis. The paper closes with brief discussion, presenting some tentative conclusions.
This paper evolved from its initial presentation at the SLS conference at Queen Mary University, London, in September 2018.
1. Exploring the relationship between international hashtag campaigns and domestic women's rights
This study was part of a research project which looked at broad relationships between women's rights hashtag campaign behaviours and legal outcomes. The project used ten campaigns, nine countries, and over one million Tweets, framed by the spiral model of human rights change. The spiral model was first developed in 1999, using a series of case studies to create a prediction model of how states move from repressing human rights to institutionalising international human rights norms.Footnote 6 The lynchpin of the model is pressure from international actors through transnational advocacy networks.Footnote 7 The research project specifically looked at five areas of critique of the spiral model matched against five areas of risk in using social media to develop testable variables. The research compared social media campaign behaviours to legal outcomes to better understand the role, both positive and negative, of international hashtag campaigns in achieving positive legal change for women.
All of the campaigns in the larger study ‘took off’ with a Tweet and continued to be driven by Twitter. They were referred to by the hashtag, activities were organised on social media, activists shared information and knowledge on Twitter, and key messages were developed and spread via Twitter. This, by no means, is to claim that there were no other campaign activities taking place; they are Twitter-based and Twitter-driven campaigns, not Twitter-only campaigns.Footnote 8 There is something inherently different about campaign behaviours, messaging and framing, and activist organising online rather than offline. These differences are not very well understood yet, particularly when looking at legal change for women. It is important to note that #notacriminal was eventually excluded from the larger project as it was determined well into the research that the campaign was not as purely Twitter-driven as the others were. However, it still a vibrant online campaign with an extremely active Twitter element and therefore is suitable for inclusion in this sub-study. The characteristics as outlined above still hold true.
It is important to underscore at the outset that the issue of correlation versus causation is ripe in any study of this nature.Footnote 9 It is not possible to show direct causation in this kind of research, but it is possible to ensure the study design is rigorous enough to allow for correlations, trends, and patterns to be explored.Footnote 10 It is also critical to note that at no point does this study make claims about causation. It is impossible to attempt to assert that the hashtag campaigns, or the hijackers, directly caused any change or lack thereof. However, given that the online, hashtag driven activities played a central role in all of the campaigns, claims can be made that there was some relationship between the online behaviours and any resulting legal change.
This sub-study was born from what was initially perceived as a massive methodological roadblock. When the larger project was first conceived, historical Twitter data was readily available through free, accessible online tools. However, although recent Tweets are available for research through its application programming interface (API), Twitter data more than two weeks old is now only available via purchase through a small number of select providers. As the larger project was wholly dependent on historical data in order to gauge long-term legal change, the lack of availability of data could have stymied the entire project. However, with a bit of creativity and research, it was determined that historical Tweets were still available for manual collection, using the advanced search function on the live website. This is fully in line with Twitter's terms and conditions.Footnote 11 Hence began a six-month long journey of manually collecting Tweets. In the end, 1,051,525 unique Tweets were collected. To attempt to counter the algorithms and filter bubbles which create echo chambers, a Twitter account was created with no followers, very few follows, and limited search histories (barring the campaigns themselves) in order to minimise the information which would influence which Tweets were seen and which were not.Footnote 12
While at first this seemed a Sisyphean task, once manual collection began, it became clear that this was actually a useful opportunity to develop intimate knowledge and familiarity with each campaign on a scale which would not have been possible had the Tweets been delivered in bulk. Having the opportunity to ‘see’ the campaigns unfold over time, scrolling through each and every individual Tweet, provided rich micro-level insight and understanding of these campaigns which, ultimately, became the backbone of the research. Seeing the images which trended and then disappeared, users who were prevalent throughout the campaign, and messaging and framing which organically evolved and changed, without a doubt positively influenced the macro-level analyses of these campaigns. Specific to this sub-study, it was this process of manually collecting Tweets and scrolling through each and every day of the campaigns which uncovered the extraordinary prevalence of the phenomena of misogynist (ie ‘dark’) hashtag hijacking.
2. Trolling, the rise of the Alt_Right, and the new phenomena of hashtag hijacking
While hashtag hijacking is relatively under-studied, particularly from a ‘dark’ perspective (meaning that the hijackers are not part of a subaltern), a substantial body of related research explores the rise of trolls and the Alt_Right in online spaces.Footnote 13 This body of research provides important insight into the ‘dark side’ of social media which sets the stage for exploring anti-feminist hashtag hijacking. The hijackers in this study may fall just short of being called trolls or Alt_Right, but the mechanics and the subversion of their work is comparable.
‘Trolls’ are individuals who exploit the functionality of social media to start arguments, offend typical users, or cause significant psychological harm to individuals.Footnote 14 While the word ‘troll’ itself often conjures an image of a fairy-tale monster living under a bridge, the original intention in using this word comes from fishing, where the line is ‘trolled’ behind the boat or vessel to attempt to catch fish.Footnote 15 The fairy-tale image is, however, quite apt. It can be argued that the very existence of trolls, underscored by their overwhelming prevalence, by definition mars social media as an ‘unsafe’ space. Using similar tactics, the ‘Alt_Right’ is an emergent white nationalist sect which finds a perfect outlet in social media.Footnote 16 Views which previously would have been seen as ‘extremist’ are suddenly visible and accessible through the new media.Footnote 17 Hannan writes that ‘because social media feed a hyperemotional environment of visceral reactions and paranoid instincts, they feed the psychology of reactionary right-wing movements’.Footnote 18
The mechanics of social media which allow both trolling and the Alt_Right to flourish online provide an important framework for understanding the misogynist dark side of hashtag hijacking. Studies exploring trolling and the rise of the Alt_Right find that there are specific aspects of social media which encourage hate-driven behaviour, the kind seen in the hashtag hijacking in this study. Strong voices of women calling for changes to the laws that bind them are almost guaranteed to arouse a reaction from those who see women's liberation as a threat. The Twitter environment not only allows extremism and misogyny to happen, but arguably cultivates, nurtures, and encourages it.
First, it is anonymous.Footnote 19 Research has found that social media allow a level of confidence in abusing others because the online perpetrators do not know their victims personally.Footnote 20 This anonymity frees individuals from consequences or repercussions which would come from tying their identity to their actions.Footnote 21 Things can be said online that, if said offline, would have significant personal consequences. But behind the screen of anonymity, these consequences are removed.
Secondly, community building online is not reserved for groups with what most would define as ‘noble’ goals. While online spaces allow protest movements to come together, so too can all groups of like-minded individuals.Footnote 22 ‘Tribal’ affinity and identity politics tend to dictate individuals’ online behaviours.Footnote 23 The connectivity provided by social media allows dissonant voices to join together and create a movement fuelled by hatred and anger as much as anything else.Footnote 24 Whereas these individuals may have been previously silenced through perceived isolation, with an entire global population with which to connect these voices may now more easily find a community which sustains, and strengthens, their viewpoints.Footnote 25
Thirdly, commitment to freedom of speech renders regulation of social media disagreeable to most.Footnote 26 The Internet culture is built on a belief in free speech and freedom of expression.Footnote 27 This upholding of ideals of freedom of speech allows trolls and the Alt_Right to continue to spread their messages of hate and extremism unfettered. Viewed through a feminist lens, boyd finds that ‘technology companies uphold an idealized vision of the First Amendment, rooted in Louis Brandeis’ notion that “sunlight is the best disinfectant,” which suggests that hate speech can be neutralized with nonhateful speech’.Footnote 28 Further, ‘free’ speech does not translate into ‘equal’ speech and some certainly have greater access than others.Footnote 29 Again, this value can perversely operate online in a way which reinforces discrimination, rather than challenging it.
Finally, there is something important about the ‘disembodiment’ of speech on social media.Footnote 30 Strands of feminist theory which draw down from Foucault place particular importance on the physical body in protest and resistance to dominant forces of power.Footnote 31 In studying hashtag feminism, Lang has found that campaigns focusing on rape and sexual assault in particular tend to have a decontextualising effect where the lived experiences of victim survivors are decoupled from the dialogue and discussion around the wider epidemic. Stories become statistics rather than personal encounters.Footnote 32 The ‘disembodiment’ also has been shown to pave the way for the Alt-Right narrative.Footnote 33 What is important is not that these elements operate independently, but rather intertwine together creating a complexity of opportunities.
‘Hashtag hijacking’ occurs when individuals or groups appropriate or take over a hashtag and use it to serve their own ends or goals, usually the antithesis of the original purpose of the hashtag.Footnote 34 For example, digital activists may use a particular hashtag at a particular time to specifically and strategically ‘inject’ their counter-discourse into the mainstream conversation.Footnote 35 Activists ‘position’, quite literally, their counter-discourse next to the dominant discourse.Footnote 36 It is important to note that most of the literature looks at hashtag hijacking as a positive outlet for counter-discourse/counter-narrative to challenge dominant groups.Footnote 37 This study looks at the ‘dark side’ of hashtag hijacking, where the dominant discourse use trolling tactics similar to the Alt_Right to reinforce misogynistic views through hijacking.Footnote 38
In their study of #MyNYPD, Jackson and Foucault Welles found that hashtag hijacking is an important strategy for counter-narratives to successfully challenge dominant discourse, illustrating the ‘democratizing potential of Twitter and the evolving strategies of citizen activists in the age of new media’.Footnote 39 Another study looked at the hijacking of #StopIslam, finding that, while the counter-narrative challenging the discriminatory hashtag was visible, it was only fleeting. The dominant discourse of the anti-Muslim movement, in this case, maintained ultimate control over the hashtag. The authors concluded that: ‘these contrasting dynamics of the “echo-chambers” we identified may, through density or dispersion, block out or shut down the further circulation of counter-narratives, as evident in the longevity of conservative voices’.Footnote 40
Of particular relevance to this study is the work of Kosenko, Winderman, and Pugh on the hijacking of #ShoutYourAbortion.Footnote 41 The #ShoutYourAbortion hashtag emerged as a way to optimise online safe spaces for women to share their stories of accessing abortion services, in an attempt to destigmatise. Anti-abortionists, however, hijacked the hashtag to spread messages of the immorality of abortion, rising to the level of threats of violence. Many of the hijacked Tweets conveyed a religious message, a finding which is reiterated across most of the hijacked campaigns in this study.Footnote 42 Unfortunately, the aim of the #ShoutYourAbortion campaign to destigmatise was unrealised due to the stigmatising effect of the anti-abortion message conveyed through the widespread hashtag hijacking.
3. Feminist subaltern counterpublics in online spaces
Feminists for decades have debated whether the visibility and anonymity inherent in occupying online spaces foster destructive misogynyFootnote 43 or whether social media create new spaces for collective action and contestation where before they were not possible.Footnote 44 Rooted in the work of Nancy Fraser, and, to some extent, Sarah Ahmed and Claire Hemmings, this paper explores whether the counter-attack on the feminist campaigners strengthened their work in a Habermasian way, or whether the anti-feminist structures and functions of social media allowed the hijackers to silence the feminist voices.Footnote 45
Habermas's work sets the stage for our understanding of the role of voice, dialogue, and debate in forming societal structures and norms.Footnote 46 He found that dialogue and debate could open spaces for the voice of the bourgeois to gain power from the elite, having a potential redistributive effect. Habermas's view was that true democracy was achieved through this debate, believing in its purest form where decisions are made based on a rational understanding and interpretation of information and knowledge, presented in arguments.Footnote 47 Many proponents of the Internet and social media find that online spaces epitomise a Habermasian utopia of rational decision making emerging from the opening of dialogue and debate to the voices of the many in a common public sphere.Footnote 48 Voice is perceived to be the backbone of democracy, and social media are the megaphones.
In her critique of Habermas, Nancy Fraser posits that this idealistic ‘public sphere’ does not function in the kind of egalitarian way envisioned by Habermas because society itself is not equal.Footnote 49 Structural, political, economic, and social inequalities pervade the so-called ‘public sphere’, rendering the perfect liberal democratic model a failure. However, she takes the Habermasian perspective further to a place that could ‘work’ for feminist and minority voices. In her conceptualisation, multiple and competing public spheres could allow for debate and discussion in ways that might challenge dominant, destructive discourse and structures.Footnote 50
Other viewpoints, starting from Sunstein's position,Footnote 51 see social media as less of a liberal democratic utopia and more of an ‘echo chamber’ where the powerful elite alone control the puppet strings of the platforms most used, and where like-minded homogenous groups connect with, and only with, each other.Footnote 52 When explored through a feminist lens: ‘social network sites create cavernous echo chambers as people reiterate what their friends posted. Given the typical friend overlap in most networks, many within those networks hear the same thing over and over until they believe it to be true’.Footnote 53 The way social media platforms operate, using data to mould online experiences, simply reflects the biases in offline society, potentially underscoring Fraser's critique of Habermas.Footnote 54 Filtering and personalisation lead to group polarisation.Footnote 55 Although there is a façade of ‘openness’ and breaking down societal barriers, the reality is that social media solidify the homogeneity of people's everyday lives.Footnote 56 Online visibility thus becomes a barrier to movements, not a beacon.Footnote 57 In this strand of thinking, social media are in fact the polar opposites of Habermas's ideal space for dialogue, instead reinforcing the offline structures which silence minority or marginalised voices. The debate is far from decided whether online activism is a utopia of access, speed, and connectivity which opens new safe spaces for counterpublics, or a value-laden tool of the elite resulting in slacktivism, extremism, and the reinforcement of existing, harmful power imbalances.Footnote 58
For this study the question then is – does Twitter function as one common public sphere where inequalities are so deeply embedded that minority voices have no hope of being heard? Or does Twitter function as a meeting place for Fraser's multiple competing public spheres, thus allowing minority, and in this case feminist, voices to be heard?
Under the first conceptualisation, social media are not neutral.Footnote 59 Feminist work often points to Twitter in particular as a tool which not only harbours but actually fosters unhealthy debate, asking the question: ‘Do 140 characters predispose discussion to a slanted, shallow, gossipy social interaction?’Footnote 60 One researcher stated: ‘If Facebook is a high school popularity contest, then Twitter is a schoolyard run by bullies’.Footnote 61 Twitter in particular seems to allow misogyny, bullying, and trolling to thrive, with the character limit acting as a curtailment to proper dialogue. Regardless of whether Twitter is a single public sphere (Habermas) or multiple competing public spheres (Fraser's reimagining), if the dialogue is curtailed by the mechanism both conceptualisations of the production of knowledge fail.
Other feminists expose inherent gender biases in the framework on which social media are built, the algorithms that allow certain information to flow and other information to fade away, and the filter bubbles which create ‘personalised’ online experiences.Footnote 62 Both creators and users operate within ‘hierarchal’ structures which are replicated or even amplified in online spaces.Footnote 63 Many also highlight the exploitative nature of the economics of technologies which are inherently anti-feminist.Footnote 64 Heteronormative patriarchal structures are rife, favouring not just the stereotypical ‘rich white man’ but also elite white women.Footnote 65 The voices of minority women and women facing multiple discriminations are certainly not prominent on social media.Footnote 66 As one blatant example explored by Lang, #MeToo was actually not the first ‘me too’ movement; the first me too movement was started by a black woman named Tarana Burke living in Philadelphia four years earlier. It wasn't until Alyssa Milano took to Twitter that #MeToo became a worldwide ‘movement’.Footnote 67 The work of Salter also illustrates the differential impact of social media exposure:
It would seem that a multitude of ‘publics’ are active online although the boundaries between counter-publics and hegemonic discourse are somewhat permeable, disseminating alternative discourses which in turn can reproduce the structures and norms they are ostensibly critiquing. It may be that the criteria of credibility and rationality applied in counter-public spheres mirror those implicitly gendered constructions that circulate in the public sphere and reflect the viewpoints of established and powerful institutions. This raises questions about the effect that disempowered women can have through an online medium.Footnote 68
Further, social media by definition are, well, social. As Freelon states, ‘movements fortunate enough to attract substantial public attention online quickly find themselves among allies, opponents, journalists, celebrities, curious onlookers, and would-be entertainers seeking to capitalize on the latest trend’.Footnote 69 Similarly, from the feminist perspective, danah boyd points out that ‘the most active egoists on social network sites are musicians, politicians, marketers, and other populations who desperately want the attention of the masses’.Footnote 70 The access, connectivity, and community which fosters feminist work is also used by anti-feminist groups in much the same way. These new online spaces may not offer any safety at all, exposing women to far more abuse, hatred, and danger than offline spaces ever did. Evidence shows that these risks are not contained online, as many women have had this abuse come offline and force them to protect their physical bodies.Footnote 71
Embodying the second conceptualisation of Twitter as a space for contestation, many women feel that social media allow them to voice opinions and experiences in ways that face to face, physical spaces could not.Footnote 72 They can Tweet, blog, video, or express themselves freely to a potentially sympathetic or empathetic audience without borders. They can connect to other women with similar experiences and more easily establish subaltern counterpublics.Footnote 73 Rentschler's work in particular illustrates how social media can be used to find different, alternative forms of justice when the mainstream system fails for women.Footnote 74 Feminists can create movements which cultivate and curate vast amounts of knowledge, information, and evidence to advocate for change. Voices which were previously suppressed and oppressed are suddenly heard via social media outlets, challenging established elite discourse in new, effective, and, most importantly, visible ways.Footnote 75
In this way, the public sphere created by social media could manifest Fraser's re-imagining of multiple public spheres, opening the door to challenge dominant discourse through self-defined, feminist subaltern counterpublics. Similarly, both Hemmings and Ahmed understand feminist work to almost necessitate anti-feminist backlash in order to truly be ‘feminist’.Footnote 76 Hemmings in particular theorises the role of both rage and the clash between dominant and feminist perspectives as necessary for disruption and change.Footnote 77 Ahmed builds this idea of facing challenge into the very fabric of feminism.Footnote 78 Thus combining the perspectives of Fraser, Hemmings, and Ahmed into an understanding of campaigning through social media, perhaps the hashtag hijacking by the dominant anti-feminist voice(s) is actually necessary for the work to be truly feminist, and it is only through this hijacking that campaigners can achieve true success. This paper now turns to the empirical evidence to explore this concept.
4. Hijacked campaigns and legal changes
(a) #notacriminal
When this research began, Ireland had one of the world's most restrictive abortion laws.Footnote 79 Groups had been actively lobbying for change for many years. Article 40.3.3 (the 8th Amendment) of the Irish Constitution states: ‘The state acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right’.Footnote 80 This has been interpreted to give equal legal rights to both the foetus and the woman.Footnote 81 This amendment was passed by referendum in 1983 with a 67% majority and a 53% turnout, after a campaign by the pro-life movement which had been launched in 1981.Footnote 82 Over time, challenges have made their way through the court system with varying success. By referendum, an amendment which would remove suicide as a permissible factor for terminations was rejected, while the 13th Amendment and 14th Amendment were passed which allow women to legally travel to seek terminations and to legally seek information about termination services.Footnote 83 However, legislation passed in 1995 (The Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act) restricts the practical availability of such information.Footnote 84
The story of Savita Halappanavar in 2012 sparked particular outrage across the country. She presented at hospital with a potential miscarriage, but doctors could not terminate the pregnancy until there was a ‘real risk’ to her life or until the foetal heartbeat stopped. Without termination of the pregnancy, she became septic and died.Footnote 85 In combination with a Supreme Court caseFootnote 86 and a European Court of Human Rights case,Footnote 87 the Irish government was pushed to repeal the previous criminal law on abortion and passed the ‘Protection of Life during Pregnancy Act’ in 2013.Footnote 88 The Act legislated that if two medical practitioners both agree that there is a ‘real and substantial risk of loss of the woman's life from a physical illness and… that risk can only be averted by carrying out the medical procedure’ then a termination is allowed. The Act also legalised abortion if there is a ‘real and substantial risk of the loss of the woman's life by way of suicide’, though there were extensive regulations in the Act governing how the decision is to be made and what kind of medial reviews were necessary. The Act also explicitly allowed women to travel outside of Ireland to access abortion services. However, health professionals were entitled to conscientious objection and the Act reiterated that abortion outside of these circumstances remained a criminal offence. Abortions were still not legal in cases of rape, incest, or risk to the physical or mental health of the woman that would not result in death.Footnote 89
In June 2015, Amnesty International, as part of an ongoing campaign, launched a report with an accompanying hashtag #notacriminal, referring to Ireland's legal landscape which criminalises women seeking abortions. The goal of the campaign was to push the government to call for a referendum on the 8th Amendment.Footnote 90 The hope was that the referendum results would allow the decriminalisation of abortion and lead to the repeal of the two additional pieces of legislation creating barriers to accessing services described above.Footnote 91
Pro-life campaigners co-opting, appropriating, and contesting pro-choice movements is certainly nothing new.Footnote 92 It was not necessarily surprising that there was some pro-life content in #notacriminal, however what was surprising was the sheer volume of pro-life rhetoric and imagery in the #notacriminal campaign. The hijacked Tweets most often attacked the campaigners as baby-killers, specifically using language and imagery of children with Down's Syndrome or disability. The language and imagery were extremely evocative, attempting to smear the campaign as advocating for the murder of children:
‘I'm a baby, I'm #notacriminal’Footnote 93
‘#repealthe8th #notacriminal– so that sick kids and kids with disabilities can be weeded out?’
Some hijackers took a softer yet more manipulative approach, preying on potential vulnerabilities. These Tweets would often show an image of an ‘abortion survivor’ or a pregnant belly:
‘#notacriminal #repealthe8th Are you or someone you know hurt by abortion? There is help available’.
Others attempted to paint the campaign as anti-woman or to personally smear the campaigners:
‘It seems #repealthe8th #notacriminal lobby are more #abortion loving than pro-woman’
‘#repealthe8th #notacriminal campaigner admits she does not care that woman was killed in abortion’
‘No response from #repealthe8th re leader (circled in red in an accompanying photo) guilty of having 7000 images of #childporn #notacriminal’.
Hijackers also strategically capitalised on anti-US sentiment, framing the #repealthe8th campaign as a US-driven exportation of American values:
‘Lets say NO to US funded #prodeath #repealthe8th #notacriminal lobbyists’
‘Read how abortion lobby group Amnesty Ireland is rotting with dollars from the US #repealthe8th #notacriminal’.
Finally, in a more expected vein, pro-life campaigners used the pro-choice hashtags to organise their own on-the-ground counter-protests, perhaps using exaggerated language and numbers to ‘big up’ their presence:
‘Thousands are expected at #prolife rally in Dublin on Saturday #rally4life’.
Of particular note in this hijacking was the repetitive nature of these Tweets. One Tweet which was particularly visible and memorable showed an image of a young girl with Down's Syndrome and the text: ‘this young girl is #notacriminal and does not deserve to be tortured and killed’. It was Tweeted at least 91 times over the course of the campaign, at one point being sent out at least once a day. Another Tweet criticising Marie Stopes for ‘killing women’ was sent out at least 28 times. While this may, at times, have been via an automated bot, this does not detract from the visibility and prevalence of this imagery and language.
In the top 100 hashtags in #notacriminal the following hashtags appeared: #prolife, #preciouslife, #prodeath, #childporn, #lifeequality, #celebratethe8th, #protectthe8th, #handsoffour8thamendment. This reflects the discourse used in the Tweet content itself. #preciouslife frames the pro-choice groups as killers or murderers taking away the lives of innocent children, using the evocative word ‘precious’. #prodeath again tries to label the #repealthe8th activists as murderers, using a play on ‘pro-life’. #childporn is one example of an oft-used attack on an individual campaigner who the pro-life groups accused as a paedophile. The final three are more generalised, showing a deep cultural and religious commitment to the law as it was. These counter-hashtags provide more evidence of the tactics used by the hashtag hijackers and the prevalence of their voice in the campaigns. To have this many counter-hashtags present in the most used hashtags in the campaign underscores the prevalence of the hijacking.
For the most part, there was not much engagement, response, or countering of the hijackers by campaigners. The majority seemed to adopt the ‘don't feed the trolls’ approach, putting their efforts and energy into the campaign itself rather than into disproving the hijackers. However, there were instances of some engagement with the hijackers. The most clearly seen response was to the prevalence of the hashtag #prolife. Several Tweets, over a lengthy period of time, included the phrase: ‘#prochoice is #prolife’. This phrase seemed to catch on and was used often by various campaigners. This was an opportunity for the #notacriminal campaigners to send a powerful message, changing a negative hijacking frame to a positive one.
Though fairly isolated, some campaigners did engage in online dialogue with the hijackers (sent to some of the hijacking accounts):
‘It's not ‘pro-#abortion’ honey. It's #prochoice. Learn the difference. #prolife = #misogyny’
‘Funny how all those goading anti-choice accounts hide their names and faces. You'd swear they knew they were bigoted arseholes.’
These responses tend to embody the Fraser/Hemmings/Ahmed perspective that challenge, dialogue between publics, and anger were all necessary ingredients to lead this campaign to such astounding success.
Following on from the online and offline campaigning, the government announced a Citizens Assembly in 2016, which is a group of individuals randomly selected to learn about pressing legal issues and recommend changes through a balloting process. The Assembly considered five different topics, one of which was the 8th Amendment, which was designated the first topic to be discussed.Footnote 94 There were four ballots in total which found that Article 40.3.3 should not be repealed, but should be changed to allow for broader legal access to abortion.Footnote 95 While some campaigners were disappointed with this result as it did not go so far as to call for a complete repeal, this outcome was far ‘more liberal’ than many had expected.Footnote 96
In June 2017, the Irish Prime Minister announced that a referendum would be held in 2018, stating: ‘I think there are circumstances in which we should allow it that does means replacing the Eighth Amendment with something else’.Footnote 97 The results of the referendum were overwhelmingly positive for the campaign. A large majority of Irish citizens voted to repeal the 8th.Footnote 98 This led to the passing of the Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy Bill in December 2018, which sets out how abortion services will be legally allowed in Ireland. This brings Ireland's law far more in line with most countries around the world and has been lauded as an extraordinary success for women.
Prior to the referendum, pro-life campaigners were very vocal about their characterisation about the ‘Irish public’, adopting a Habermasian view of one, singular public sphere. For example, after a pro-life rally organised to counter #notacriminal/#repealthe8th, one pro-lifer stated this ‘sends a very strong signal to the Government that they are going to meet tremendous resistance in their campaign to remove from our Constitution the right to life of the unborn’Footnote 99 and ‘he's [Varadkar] going to lose this referendum. He may think otherwise, because he lives in a media and political bubble, but ordinary people are saying we want to save the Eighth Amendment’.Footnote 100 After a public opinion poll, a similar sentiment was expressed: ‘public opinion in Ireland is not in favour of abortion on request but only in limited circumstances, with strict gestational limits’.Footnote 101 Yet it seems that, perhaps, the contestation of this issue in the online sphere may have had a positive effect for the campaigners. Exploring the hashtag hijacking, the limited but powerful responses from campaigners, and the eventual change in the law, it seems that this campaign provides some indication that the Fraser/Hemmings/Ahmed perspective may have been more evident than the boyd/Sunstein conceptualisation. Perhaps, in this instance, hashtag hijacking was to the benefit of the feminist work. This may be particularly relevant as the legal change was eventually determined through a public referendum, rendering the online dialogue critically important.
(b) #women2drive
Since 1957, women have been banned from driving in Saudi Arabia, unable to obtain a licence and risking arrest for being caught driving. Women relied on male guardians or chauffeurs for transportation.Footnote 102 Although it is technically a royal decree and more recently a fatwa, several administrative laws brought it into force, such as traffic laws which do not allow the issuing of licences to women.Footnote 103 Some commentators were of the view that the ban came less from the royal family and more as a means to appease hard-line clerics over the years.Footnote 104
Beginning in 1990, women activists began to protest the ban by driving, though the protest activities had limited traction in the early days.Footnote 105 But when the filming of activist Manal al-Sharif driving a car led to her arrest and detention, the reborn online campaign went viral. According to one activist, ‘social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook have been key for the women drivers, providing support networks and, crucially, publicity outside the kingdom’.Footnote 106 The social media aspect allowed women activists to tap into foreign pressure, something they had not been able to successfully do before, using what must certainly be Fraser's view of multiple contesting public spheres.
#women2drive elicited an expected strong response from hard-line religious clerics, though unexpectedly many took to social media as a battle ground, hijacking the campaign hashtag.Footnote 107 This came as a surprise, as it seemed ironic that hard-line clerics would use a modern, Western, liberal platform to attempt to derail the modern, Western, liberal campaign. However, it was again a very visible hijacking, both in data collection and in reports from the activists themselves: ‘in the new online battlefield, conservative clerics have been deploying their own Twitter accounts to call on the religious police to be extra vigilant against the prospect of women drivers’.Footnote 108
Much of the hashtag hijacking tried to appeal to a conservative but general ‘public’ (ie Habermas), claiming that women were dangerous drivers and featured images of crashed cars with language focusing on women's lack of ability to drive.Footnote 109 This rhetoric was extended to allege that those advocating for women's rights were dangerous to the kingdom, in an attempt to demonise the activists and paint them as threats to public society:
‘# women2drive If they drive the cars, girls, you will see the time – before Morocco in Ramadan – the most dangerous time for the market, any accident in which there are fractures, death, permanent disability’.
‘Supporters of driving women to the car and those led by Manal Sharif are more dangerous than the perpetrators of explosions in our country’.
Other hijacked Tweets took a more traditional approach, seeing women driving as against Sharia, though still echoing the framing which portrayed the women drivers as risks. These Tweets were anti-woman, anti-women's empowerment, and anti-Western, though again appealing to a conservative, religious public:
‘Women, the media, education … a dangerous triangle that the secularists and liberals in our country seek to possess and possess a great danger’.
To attempt to derail the campaign by claiming that the Saudi public did not want women to drive, the hijackers used their own hashtag ‘the women of my house won't drive’ and ‘the people refuse women driving’ (translated).Footnote 110 This framing adopted a Habermasian view of a singular public sphere, sending a message that proclaimed to reflect the dominant, majority voice. By using this kind of language in their hashtags, the hijackers are clearly attempting to continue to frame the issue as a reflection of society, arguing that society still wants the ban in place. This acts in direct contradiction to the framing from the #women2drive activists, who claimed that that vast majority of the Saudi public wanted women to drive. The campaigners recognised the importance of using social media for dialogue and debate:
the most dramatic development is the extent of public debate conducted through social media… Although it does not remove the need for more formal opportunities for freely expressing views and debating policies, it has proved to be a potent tool in many respects and is a constant reminder to the Government of the importance of public engagement, especially in relation to social and economic policies.Footnote 111
This viewpoint tends to illustrate that social media can be a feminist tool, using Fraser's approach.
Another online debate of note occurred when a religious cleric (Al-Hijri) in response to the campaign publicly stated that women have ‘half the brains of men’ which then drops to a quarter ‘when they go to market’. #women2drive campaigners took to social media to frame their response, using their own hashtag which translates to ‘Al-Hijri-women-quarter-brain’. Footnote 112 This hashtag was used 119,00 times in 24 hours.Footnote 113 The religious conservative hijackers then responded again, deploying yet another hashtag ‘Al-Hijri is with the woman, not against her’ which was used 20,000 times in the same 24-hour period. Footnote 114 The debate in this online sphere between the campaigners and the hijackers was palpable. This response tends to show more of the Hemmings/Ahmed conceptualisation of feminist activism as needing opposition, as opposed to the ‘don't feed the trolls’ approach seen more widely in #notacriminal. Both, however, seemed to have a similar effect.
Shifts began in 2016, when Saudi Arabia released its ‘Vision 2030’ policy and strategy document, which outlined a major shift towards modernisation, and, in particular, towards women.Footnote 115 Then in September 2017, the new Saudi King announced that the driving ban would be lifted and women could apply for driving licences from June 2018.Footnote 116 There is widespread agreement that the lifting of the ban signifies a wider shift in Saudi politics brought on by the new, young, modern King.Footnote 117 Additionally, it was not a complete ‘victory’ as guardianship laws are still in force and some believe the move was to detract attention away from other continued human rights abuses.Footnote 118 It is seen by some as a ‘concession’.Footnote 119 However the government has pledged to take special measures to ensure that women will be free to take driving lessons, take driving tests, and receive their licence.Footnote 120 Saudi women themselves celebrated the move and largely attributed the lifting of the ban to the hashtag campaign.Footnote 121
(c) #mydressmychoice
On 7 November 2014, a woman was publicly stripped and beaten at a bus stop in Nairobi for wearing a mini-skirt and ‘tempting’ men. The attack was caught on film and quickly went viral. In the aftermath, a spate of violent public strippings of women across the country took place.Footnote 122 It became clear that this type of incident was not new in Kenya, but the visibility of the stripping on social media pushed people to take action.Footnote 123 The #mydressmychoice campaign framed the strippings as acts of violence against women and advocated for stronger enforcement of existing laws. As one campaigner stated, ‘we started on Facebook and later on went to Twitter, and it immediately became viral. With the pressure coming from social media, we hope the president would have to react, and that something will be done finally’.Footnote 124
The legal framework in Kenya prior to the strippings was generally agreed to be strong on paper but weak in implementation and enforcement.Footnote 125 The Sexual Offences Act passed in 2006 was to be a major improvement over previous law. It took many iterations and debates to reach a point of majority support, and is based on a model law in the UK.Footnote 126 Many compromises were made in order to get the Bill through; marital rape was removed, chemical castration was removed, and a clause was inserted to deter making false accusations (this was later repealed).Footnote 127
The #mydressmychoice campaign officially called for the following:
• investigating and arresting all perpetrators of the attacks; urgently deploying police squads to public bus stations to prevent gender violence, including harassment;
• aggressively cracking down on those inciting violence and similar attacks on women, whether in public or on social media;
• comprehensively and urgently addressing the Kenyan Government's obligation to combat violence against women, including: community sensitisation and awareness campaigns, regulatory action to ensure accountability of bus operators, and necessary legal reforms;
• urging the media to exercise caution in sharing the graphic videos of the women being attacked and stripped, as the videos re-victimise and stigmatise the survivors and are emboldening copycat criminals.Footnote 128
On the other hand, the counter-campaign hijackers used the incident to call for new ‘decency’ laws to be passed to control what women can and cannot wear in public.Footnote 129 Neighbouring Uganda has reportedly used an anti-pornography law to regulate women's attire.Footnote 130 The Ugandan anti-pornography bill includes provocative dress under its definition of pornography which allows an interpretation of ‘banning the mini-skirt’. After the #mydressmychoice campaign, the law was reviewed and passed muster; it is still in place in Uganda.Footnote 131 A similar law was proposed in Kenya prior to the campaign, but it did not pass.Footnote 132
The #mydressmychoice campaign became marred with individuals and groups advocating for these so-called decency laws, blaming the victims of the strippings for wearing revealing clothing. These laws would have regulated women's dress in public, essentially banning the ‘miniskirt’. Some of the debate thus boiled down to a cultural argument over ‘African/anti-colonial’ values, which would have embraced women's exposed skin in public, miniskirts, even bare breasts, versus ‘European/colonial’ values, which imbued Christianity, the covering of skin, and the adoption of decency laws for women's dress.Footnote 133 What was clear throughout the campaign was that, more so here than in any other campaign studied, Twitter was the locus of contestation between the two groups.
The hijacked Tweets were less repetitive or visual than those in #notacriminal but were prevalent enough to be noted during data collection. The language on the whole tended to shift blame to the women, exonerating the men accused of the violence and taking on an anti-woman rhetoric:
‘if those ladies ain't decent, heard there is a law of public indecency’.
‘Decency has to be maintained in society. This will ensure standards of propriety, molarity and decorum’.
‘Decency is absolute and not relative as most of you campaigners of scunty dressing are trying to make us believe’.
‘Too much women empowerment will be the downfall of our society’.
‘#MyDressMyChoice but Christian Ladies can't dress the way they want! There is a Kingdom dressing code… Decency, modesty n propriety’.
Some hijackers took a less anti-woman approach but still used the #mydressmychoice hashtag to advocate for decency:
‘its not cool to strip women but really decensy shud be a virtue’.
‘If interested in walking half naked then do it to yur bf & NOT to the world, it's embarassin’.
‘ladies should mind thea dressing’.
Again, contra to the African/European debate but similar to #notacriminal, there was also decidedly anti-Western rhetoric in some of the hijacked Tweets:
‘If you want to dress like westerns then kindly get a visa to US or Europe. Kindly leave our decency here’.
‘being civilised doesn't mean walking almost naked..#mydressmychoice is an idea mooted by people drunk wit westernisation’.
For every Tweet read which framed this as a campaign to address violence against women, there was another Tweet defending the perpetrators for stripping the victims and calling for decency laws to be passed. It was unmistakeable, unambiguous, public dialogue which clearly reflected deeply-rooted cultural beliefs on both sides. One decency law supporter described their work:
We will never support a demonstration seeking a leeway to legalize nudity, a demonstration in support to indecency, a demonstration seeking to hoodwink men and boys into social immorality… In light to the stripping incidences at Kayole and Embassava, a clear message has been sent out, a worthy testimony in the public domain, that it is time we did away with indecent, revealing clothes and just like our neighbors’, Uganda, ban wearing of the miniskirts.Footnote 134
The other side of the debate was described as:
Tragically, the conversation centred on the hemline of dresses instead of the sex gangs. Women blamed women for the indecent dressing that provoked the strippings. People of stature in the church said that if stripping was the only way to achieve decency, they would support it.Footnote 135
In #mydressmychoice, the hashtag #strippingshame emerged. While its original intention was of course to ‘shame’ those perpetrators who had ‘stripped’ the women, the hijackers used this hashtag to identify their narrative. They used it subversively to ‘shame’ the women who had been stripped for being indecent. This was another layer of hijacking, introducing a new framing of a campaign hashtag which runs completely counter to the campaign's goals. It also shows one of the more underhanded tactics of the hijackers, representing much more of the boyd approach which sees danger in online spaces. The victim-blaming strategy, using the campaign's own hashtag, showed a deep level of subversion and misogyny.
The legal outcomes in this campaign were far less clear than the previous two. While a law was passed to criminalise public strippings, it was rife with the potential for human rights violations.Footnote 136 A new proposed law, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill 2016 was rejected by MPs in February 2017.Footnote 137 The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2016 included amendments to better define ‘indecent acts’, improve sex education, and improve law enforcement. The amendments were proposed by MP Florence Mutua, based on work undertaken by a task force and were supported by women's rights groups. It was reported that mostly male ministers rejected the amendments, saying they could be easily misinterpreted. The Bill was eventually thrown out in its entirety.Footnote 138
No draft decency laws ever even made it to Parliament. Some independent bodies have attempted to pass ‘dress codes’ but these have been isolated and far from widespread. Although there is still more work to be done, at the very least policing in regard to public acts of violence such as stripping did seem to improve, and the perpetrators in the spark incidents were held to account.Footnote 139
It could be argued that the ferocity of the hashtag hijackers in this campaign was more intense than the others; not in terms of visibility or consistency, but in terms of using more sophisticated online strategies to undermine the campaign. There was much more of a ‘fight’ in this campaign, and campaigners seemed to engage more with the hijackers than in the other campaigns. As one activist stated:
It is increasingly becoming difficult for women to escape violence with the growing use of cyberspace; Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. Despite the absence of face to face interactions, many African women are attacked and repressed in virtual space because they are transgressing the conventional representations still expected by society. While this protest undoubtedly opens room for further investigations about gender and cultural norms regarding the dress code for African women, it also rings a bell as to the crucial role our virtual space occupies in our everyday life.Footnote 140
In #notacriminal, while there was some positive reframing of the hijackers’ message to the campaign itself, for the most part the campaigners seemed to channel their anger and energy into the campaign. This campaign saw fundamental legal changes as a result of their work. In #women2drive, there was some engagement with the hijackers, and the campaigners did use the public space of Twitter to express anger and to counter the hijackers. This campaign saw meaningful success, though again tempered by the continued existence of guardianship laws. Finally, in #mydressmychoice, the debate between the campaigners and the hijackers on Twitter was far more visible and intense than in the other campaigns. The hijackers showed more maliciously strategic choices in their use of social media, and the campaigners seemed to engage more directly in the fight. This campaign saw the least positive legal changes.
5. Silencing for status quo or provocation for change? Silencing in the echo chamber? The Sunstein/ boyd approach
The more prominent side of this debate tends to fall towards trolling and Alt_Right literature, where online spaces are seen as safe havens not for feminists or activists, but for those who wish to express hatred and anger, acting to silence minority voices. Online spaces provide a perfect cocktail of opportunities which favour trolls and extremists over feminists with more ‘noble’ goals.Footnote 141 While the hashtag hijackers in the cases in this study are not as extreme as trolls or the Alt_Right, they are arguably on the same spectrum. If this side of the debate were true, dark side hashtag hijackers would be successful in derailing campaigns. Their co-option and appropriation of hashtags advocating for legal change to improve the lives of women and girls would quash the campaigns, using their power to make their voices louder while simultaneously smothering the voices of women.Footnote 142 This view of social media takes a more traditional approach to power differentials, favouring the powerful elite (the hijackers) over the minority voice for change (the campaigners). Here, Sunstein and boyd's warnings about the harms of social media are brought to the fore.Footnote 143 It may be that #mydressmychoice fell more towards this end of the spectrum, particularly as evidenced by the harmful misogynistic re-framing of the #strippingshame hashtag to shift blame to the victims. This campaign saw little to no change in the long run, although the campaigners did manage to stave off any legislating around women's dress.
That which is challenged grows stronger? The Fraser/Ahmed/Hemmings approach
This approach finds that the expression of counter-opinion actually serves to strengthen original feminist work. In his YouTube study, McCosker found that antagonistic comments which many would have labelled as ‘trolling’ actually served a very important ‘provocation’ purpose: ‘provocation and counter-provocation were continually folded into each other in ways that intensified and sustained collective engagement’.Footnote 144 He found that, although at times ‘uncomfortable’, these acts of provocation were actually critically important for online dialogue and discussion to create a ‘dynamic participatory space’, just as Fraser's critique of Habermas would predict.Footnote 145 The reaction against the opposition is stronger because of the opposition.Footnote 146 Through this lens, hashtag hijacking can be theorised as ‘provocation’ or ‘contestation’, not trolling.Footnote 147 This framing of the opposition activities as provocation allows for a more nuanced understanding and interpretation of the campaigners’ reactions and activities. Rather than obstructing the campaign, the opposition actually strengthens the campaign, making their voice stronger, more active, and more resolute, in line with the theories of Ahmed and Hemmings. This approach would indicate that campaigns which are hijacked would be associated with more positive legal change, closely aligned to the goals of the campaign. The hijackers’ activities would make the campaign stronger and that strength would translate into more positive progress in challenging hetero-patriarchal laws. This seemed to be the case in #notacriminal and #women2drive, where the Fraser/Hemmings/Ahmed conceptualisation of feminist work necessitates angry debate in a public forum.
Further study of this phenomenon would take this case study approach further and speak to individuals on both sides of the hashtag – the activists and the hijackers. This additional primary data would help in understanding the role of the hijackers in the overall movement for women's rights.
