The European Convention on Human Rights allows its Contracting Parties to submit third-party interventions. This paper analyses the reasons for engagement of the states with the European Court of Human Rights beyond what they are strictly expected to do: respond in contentious cases and execute judgments. It is argued here that the states mainly engage with the Court for the purposes of self-interest. This paper fills the gap in the literature by substantiating this claim using empirical methods of content analysis of the case law and research interviews with the governmental representatives. Finally, this paper looks at the impact of third-party interventions on the Court's reasoning and concludes that the Court is aware of the aims of the national governments and bears those aims in mind.

This paper discusses the extent to which conscientious objections to vaccination qualify for protection under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Drawing on an examination of the nature of conscience and the ethics of vaccine refusal, it argues that a narrow category of reasons for refusal to be vaccinated can be differentiated from more general ‘vaccine hesitancy’. In relation to conscience objections of this kind, it engages in a systematic analysis of the applicability of the ECHR, both in relation to compulsory vaccination, and so-called ‘vaccine passports’. It concludes that states can – and in some situations must – recognise conscientious objections under the ECHR.

This paper is a revised version of a plenary lecture delivered at the SLS Annual Conference held at Oxford Brookes University in June 2023. It adopts an auto-ethnographic approach, drawing on the author's long experience of participating in the UK Research Excellence Framework (REF), to assess the current state of legal research in the UK and consider the implications of the increasing importance in the research landscape of engaging in research that serves the public good. The paper explores what falls within the scope of ‘legal research’, particularly for REF purposes, and reflects on how REF-focused research sits within the broader scope of legal scholarly activities. Ideas of the public good are examined and their relation to measures of research impact probed. The paper concludes by painting a broad-brush picture of the current research landscape, identifying key elements and engines of change, and speculating on the direction in which things are going and what should most concern legal scholars going forward. Although primarily focused on legal research in the UK, the paper should be of interest to legal scholars beyond the UK, particularly those in jurisdictions where research assessment exercises are a feature of academic life.

Discrimination law primarily relies on individual enforcement for addressing discrimination at work; yet those who are most impacted by discrimination are likely the least able to enforce their rights. The question then becomes: what role should individual enforcement play in discrimination law? Can we effectively abandon individual enforcement as part of the legislative model? Drawing on a mixed method, multi-year comparative study of the enforcement of age discrimination law in the UK, Australia and Sweden, this paper considers the gaps, limits and risks of the individual enforcement model in discrimination law. Integrating doctrinal analysis; statistical analysis of claims and cases, and data from the EU and OECD; qualitative expert interviews; and a survey of legal practitioners, this paper argues that while individual enforcement is inherently limited as a tool for achieving systemic change, it must remain part of any legislative model. Reflecting on the experience in Sweden, where individual enforcement of discrimination law is significantly curtailed, the paper posits that individual rights and individual enforcement remain important complements to other regulatory tools, particularly in jurisdictions with strong enduring age norms. Abandoning or severely restricting individual enforcement is unlikely to support either the macro or micro effectiveness of age discrimination law.

This paper investigates the knowledge of the general public on the legislative framework relating to wildlife conservation in England, with a specific focus on the Bern Convention and the public's awareness of the treaty, as well as the domestic legislation transposing it. By creating a publicly available survey, the study determined the environmental attitudes of the public and their knowledge of the legislative regime relating to wildlife conservation. Whilst the majority of the public displayed pro-environmental attitudes and support for greater efforts towards the conservation of flora and fauna, the overall awareness of the legislation was worryingly low, with only 5.6% of respondents recognising the Bern Convention. Accordingly, the study investigated how awareness of environmental legislation may be increased. Ultimately, the paper concludes that formal environmental education, including legislation, must be optimised, and the domestic legislative framework should be further consolidated.

It is conventionally argued that because an artificially-intelligent (AI) system acts autonomously, its makers cannot easily be held liable should the system's actions harm. Since the system cannot be liable on its own account either, existing laws expose victims to accountability gaps and need to be reformed. Recent legal instruments have nonetheless established obligations against AI developers and providers. Drawing on attribution theory, this paper examines how these seemingly opposing positions are shaped by the ways in which AI systems are conceptualised. Specifically, folk dispositionism underpins conventional legal discourse on AI liability, personality, publications, and inventions and leads us towards problematic legal outcomes. Examining the technology and terminology driving contemporary AI systems, the paper contends that AI systems are better conceptualised instead as situational characters whose actions remain constrained by their programming. Properly viewing AI systems as such illuminates how existing legal doctrines could be sensibly applied to AI and reinforces emerging calls for placing greater scrutiny on the broader AI ecosystem.

This is the first work to explore the possibility of holding sports governing bodies and competition organisers vicariously liable for the tortious behaviour of athletes that compete under their auspices. In contrast to other scholarly contributions on vicarious liability in sport, this paper examines the scope of responsibility for athletes in individual sports (as opposed to team sports). It begins by drawing upon the recent tribunal proceedings between professional cyclist Jess Varnish and British Cycling to analyse the employment status of government-funded individual athletes. In calling for a contextual and policy-sensitive approach to the definition of an ‘employee’, this paper argues that certain normative and theoretical considerations ought to be granted more or less weight depending on the particular legal issue animating the dispute. Thereafter, and with one eye on the overly intrusive regulatory provisions found in sports such as tennis and golf, this paper also demonstrates that the vicarious liability of governing bodies and competition organisers could equally be extended to cover the tortious conduct of non-funded individual athletes. In making these claims, it is demonstrated how a sport-specific application of the doctrine may help to teach us a few broader lessons about vicarious liability more generally.

This paper makes a case for the integration of compulsory climate change topics across the core law curriculum. It argues that the most persuasive rationale for this is based in climate legal obligations and institutions, and a clear-eyed perception of climate risk, rather than the sustainability agenda. To this end, the paper outlines efforts taken to ‘mainstream’ climate change and environmental law education in a core course of the LLB degree – land law. An empirical study sought to evaluate the students’ engagement with these materials, and their broader views concerning climate change and their legal education. The paper critically evaluates the course and the results of the empirical study. It concludes that students want to be, and should be, taught climate law and the climate context of law as part of their prescribed learning throughout the core curriculum, rather than as optional or elective content.

Tasked with enforcing criminal law, public prosecutors worldwide enjoy broad discretion. Existing literature on prosecutorial discretion and accountability tends to discuss the regulation of prosecutorial discretion or analyse the influence of the procedural environment in which public prosecutors operate. This paper focuses on occupational culture as an important factor affecting prosecutorial decisions. It draws particular attention to an understudied aspect of prosecutors’ professional identity: legitimacy and, specifically, self-legitimacy, ie the belief public prosecutors have in their own legitimacy to make decisions in individual cases. The paper presents research findings from direct observations and interviews which reveal a sense of a loss of self-legitimacy amongst Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) staff due to the constant monitoring of their decisions by colleagues and managers. This all-pervasive managerialism, paradoxically, undermines the very legitimacy (and, relatedly, transparency) which the CPS has had to work so hard to develop since its inception.

It is recognised that civil litigation has a place within the police accountability infrastructure. However, the role of actions against the police for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, assault, and malicious prosecution (hereafter police actions) is underexplored. Taking citizenship as its analytical frame, this paper probes the relationship between police actions and the police complaints and discipline system over the last 60 years. Its primary focus is the Court of Appeal decision Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Hsu v Same [1998] QB 498 (Thompson). Here the potential for police actions to expose questionable police responses to officer misconduct, and failings in external oversight mechanisms, came into conflict with the drive towards proportionate civil justice. In prioritising the latter, Thompson increased police autonomy over settlement of police actions, thereby deprioritising the role of the courts in demarcating the limits of state interference with citizens’ rights. It is not suggested that Thompson should be overruled. Instead, it is contended that recognising the impact of the decision on subsequent reforms to police accountability processes and contemporary conceptions of the police-citizen relationship is crucial to understanding the roots of current disquiet concerning police accountability (and therefore to the development of meaningful reforms).

This paper explores the relationship between the concept of the ‘identity of the child’ and legal parenthood. It examines the role of identity in the determination of legal parenthood in three contexts: (a) parental orders after surrogacy arrangements; (b) disputed paternity cases; and (c) the statutory rules in cases involving gamete donation. This paper argues that the concept of ‘identity’ plays an inconsistent role in the attribution of legal parenthood, because the concept lacks substantive content within judicial reasoning and the statutory framework. The understanding of identity, and the role it plays, appears to change in these different contexts to serve the different purposes that the law is trying to achieve. The reason for this inconsistency is that, despite the utilisation of the language of the ‘child's identity’, legal parenthood remains adult-centric and premised upon replicating the binary, two-parent model of the nuclear family. We argue that instead of appealing to this incoherent concept of ‘identity’, the courts should explicitly engage with different types of parenthood and acknowledge the importance of each for both children and parents. Such an approach would result in more truly child-centred reasoning and serve to diminish the predominance of the binary, two-parent model.

It is May 2030 and Stormont heads into its fourth Assembly election in eight years. Voters walk past election posters loudly praising and denouncing the Northern Ireland Protocol. As with the other Assembly elections since Brexit, the Protocol occupies centre-stage. Voters are under no delusion: the new Assembly will be as polarised as ever, no matter its party-political make-up.

The legal backdrop to this (not entirely unfeasible) future is complex: the UK's Withdrawal Agreement has meant the emergence of a regulatory border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The consequences which flow from this have been swift and myriad: trade barriers and social unrest, barely a year after withdrawal.

The focus of this paper, however, is the impact of these changes on the UK constitution. I will examine two landmark judgments of the UK Supreme Court, applying the themes arising in these cases to the legislation which incorporated the Protocol into UK domestic law. In so doing, I will argue that, far from ‘taking back control’, the UK Parliament has instead erected significant new barriers to its ability to ‘make or unmake any law whatever’ for the whole of the UK.

Third parties who receive trust property with knowledge that the transfer to them was a breach of trust will be liable in knowing receipt. Knowing receipt has grown quickly in importance in recent years and many of the finer points of the doctrine are still being worked out. This paper discusses one such issue: whether liability can exist when the third party acquires a security interest in trust property, rather than the underlying trust property itself. This point has not yet been considered by English courts, although it has been examined in cases from Australia, Canada and Hong Kong. The paper analyses the existing authorities in the context of the wider law relating to knowing receipt and explains the conceptual difficulties and practical problems with allowing liability to be grounded on the receipt of a mere security interest in trust property.

The nature of separate legal personality is a perennial debate in corporate law. This paper uses insights from a previous iteration of the debate to argue that separate legal personality is best seen as a two-step process: it is a concession from the state to something real. That real thing is the economic concept of the firm, which has been recently debated within institutional economics. Viewing separate legal personality as a two-step process lets us explore whether the concession of separate legal personality is operating as it should. Law imposes no prerequisite requirement that a firm exists before establishing a company, nor limits firms to only one company. Law thus facilitates misalignments between the firm and the company. Such misalignments will only occur if two constituencies within the company structure – the ultimate shareholders and directors – consider it in their interests to create such misalignment. As a result, these misalignments harm third parties by allowing risk to be exported to them through opportunistic misalignment. This paper then explores the methods of misalignment and reviews current legal tools which are available to be deployed to re-align the company to the firm, and argues that they should be deployed.

The relationship between a conveyance's validity and its underlying contract has been a classic but unsettled topic for comparative private lawyers over the past three decades. This paper attempts to add positivist and normative observations drawn from property transfer theories and practices in English and Chinese law. A jurisdiction adopting an ‘intent plus’ model does not necessarily recognise a separate intent to convey distinct from the intent in the underlying contract, as exemplified by Chinese law, while a jurisdiction adopting the ‘intent alone’ model does not necessarily deny the separate intent to convey, as exemplified by English law. One advantage for a jurisdiction that takes the separatist approach is its flexibility, so that it can still choose between pure causality, pure abstraction, or context-based abstraction at a later stage. Recent developments show that English and Chinese law are moving towards this approach. As to whether flaws in the underlying contract infect the validity of the conveyance, the English position depends on vitiating factors, whereas the mainstream Chinese judgments tend to be pro-causal. Justifications favouring causality provided in the English and Chinese academia are different, though neither can stand up to scrutiny. The detecting opportunity argument submitted in this paper helps to justify abstraction.

The role of the state has been underplayed in scholarship on global health. Taking a historical view, this paper argues that state institutions, practices and ideologies have in fact been crucial to the realisation of contemporary global health governance and to its predecessor regimes. Drawing on state theory, work on governmentality, and Third World approaches to international law, it traces the origins of the ‘health state’ in late colonial developmentalism, which held out the prospect of conditional independence for the subjects of European empires. Progress in health was also a key goal for nationalist governments in the Global South, one which they sought to realise autonomously as part of a New International Economic Order. The defeat of that challenge to the dominance of the Global North in the 1980s led to the rise of ‘global governance’ in health. Far from rendering the state redundant, the latter was realised through the co-option and disciplining of institutions at national level. To that extent, the current order has an unmistakably imperial character, one which undercuts its declared cosmopolitan aspirations, as evidenced in the approach to vaccine distribution and travel bans during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Exclusion of improperly obtained evidence is often discussed in relation to criminal proceedings, but not civil proceedings, where concerns about wrongdoing of state actors and deprivation of liberty are not usually present. It is sometimes assumed that judges in civil proceedings in England and Wales had no discretion to exclude relevant and reliable evidence based on how it was obtained (as a distinct concern from exclusion of evidence of little probative value) prior to the enactment of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. This paper seeks to demonstrate that this is wrong, arguing that a number of sources of power to exclude evidence on the basis of how that evidence was obtained have arisen in England and Wales, and that these are not attributable to the Civil Procedure Rules. There is a discretion which enables exclusion of evidence where this is ‘in the interests of justice’, and a discretion to do with the administration of justice. It may be possible to break these down further, to concerns over abuse of the court's own procedures, and executive illegality. Analysing the decisions leading to these developments reveals the importance of human rights concerns to recognition of exclusionary discretion in civil proceedings, and for informing the content of the discretion/s.

Prior to the Insurance Act 2015, an insurer could refuse payment by relying on terms unrelated to the manner in which the loss occurred, or with the assured's default. Section 11 of the Insurance Act 2015 reverses that and requires ‘the punishment to fit the crime’ by introducing a ‘could have increased the risk’ test, which is said to be a requirement for correlation between an assured's non-compliance with a risk clause and the actual occurrence of the loss. The new test effectively raises more profound causation issues from a practical point of view as regards insurance recoveries and also from a theoretical point of view of causation in the law. It is submitted that the test ‘could have increased the risk’ introduced by section 11 of the Insurance Act 2015 should be interpreted by an approach to recognising a nexus – a general causal relevance (general causation) – and adopting interpretation as a restricting tool, to achieve alignment with the legislative intent. In presenting this argument, this paper explores the difference between correlation and causation in the law, expounding a wider understanding of legal causation than causa proxima in the insurance context.

Whereas legal comparisons tend to be concerned with legal systems, structures or rules, this paper focuses on a more fundamental element of law: a legal concept. From the semiotic point of view, a concept is an element of the tripartite construct of meaning, which – in the legal context – is derived from a particular legal system. Since effective communication in legal practice is predicated on the unity of meaning, issues are likely to arise when an act of communication spans disparate legal cultures. When the epistemic embedding of legal concepts fundamentally differs between the respective legal systems with which the participants to a communicative event are familiar, conceptual incommensurability will arise, impeding the communication process and, potentially, also having an impact on associated court proceedings.

Against this theoretical backdrop, the paper shifts its focus to globalised legal practice, which requires a broader legal skillset and comparative perspectives. As an illustration, the equivalence of selected substantive law concepts is explored across the common law/civil law divide, accurate comprehension of which is essential to intercultural provision of legal services. Drawing parallels between the functional method in comparative law and the functional approach recommended in legal translation, an overview is provided of techniques for remedying terminological incongruence and conveying intended meaning across legal cultures. The paper concludes by querying whether the law curriculum would be enhanced by inclusion of comparative and linguistic perspectives, with a view to equipping graduates with interdisciplinary tools for effective legal communication and global law practice.