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INDEPENDENT OF CONTENT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2003

P. Markwick
P. Markwick
Affiliation:
University College London, Crown Prosecution Service London
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Extract

Reasons appear to fall into well-recognized types: pro tanto or decisive, moral or nonmoral, and so on. Nowadays, it is widely held that reasons can also be “content-independent.” This paper is directed against this belief.

Type
ARTICLES
Information
Legal Theory , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 2003 , pp. 43 - 61
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

I have benefited greatly from comments on earlier drafts of this paper from John Broome, Roger Crisp, R.A. Duff, John Gardner, Lars Lindahl, David Lyons, Aleksander Peczenik, Joseph Raz, John Skorupski, Dale Smith, Robert S. Summers and anonymous referees. I am grateful for support from Lunds Universitet and Cornell Law School. The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the Crown Prosecution Service.