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International Territorial Administration and the Limits of Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2010

Extract

The year 2009 was one of many anniversaries for the state-building project. It marked ten years since the United Nations began its bold experiments of state-building in East Timor and Kosovo, now the independent state of Timor-Leste and the embryonic Republic of Kosovo respectively. It was twenty years since Namibia held elections in the course of becoming independent, heralding a new post-Cold War activism. It was also ninety years since the League of Nations established the mandate system, which – even though it applied only to the colonies of enemy states defeated in the Great War – marked the beginning of the end of colonialism.

Type
REVIEW ESSAYS
Copyright
Copyright © Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2010

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References

1 See generally M. R. Berdal and S. Economides (eds.), United Nations Interventionism, 1991–2004 (2007).

2 Cf. Weiler, J. H. H., ‘The Geology of International Law: Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’, (2004) 64 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 547Google Scholar. On the parallels with the domestic move from status to contract, see H. Maine, Ancient Law (1861), 100.

3 I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963).

4 S. C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (2005), 29–38.

5 See, e.g., C. Raghavan, Recolonization: GATT, the Uruguay Round, and the Third World (1990).

6 Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, UN Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304, 2009, para. 4.

7 E. M. Cousens, ‘Introduction’, in E. M. Cousens and C. Kumar (eds.), Peacebuilding as Politics (2001), 1, at 5–10.

8 See, e.g., M. W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (1995); S. L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (1995); D. Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton (1999); J. Saltford, The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969: The Anatomy of Betrayal (2002); M. Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan (2003); J. Dobbins et al., Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority (2009).

9 See, e.g., J. Dobbins et al., America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (2003); R. Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (2004); V. Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (2004); R. Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (2005); J. Dobbins et al., The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (2005); C. T. Call (ed.), Building States to Build Peace (2008); V. Chetail (ed.), Post-conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon (2009); M. R. Berdal, Building Peace after War (2009).

10 J. Dobbins et al., The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building (2007). The RAND Corporation is a non-profit think tank originally formed to offer research and analysis to the armed forces of the United States.

11 See, e.g., B. Knoll, The Legal Status of Territories Subject to Administration by International Organisations (2008).

12 See, e.g., R. G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (2000); J. Stromseth, D. Wippman, and R. Brooks (eds.), Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions (2006); Naomi Roht-Arriaza (ed.), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (2006).

13 See, e.g., D. Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding (2007).

14 See, e.g., K. M. Zisk, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (2004); D. Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building (2006).

15 See, e.g., Chesterman, S., ‘Law, Subject and Subjectivity in International Relations: International Law and the Postcolony’, (1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 979 and sources there citedGoogle Scholar.

16 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005, available at www.un.org/summit2005. See generally G. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All (2008); A. J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (2009).

17 See, e.g., The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (President of the United States, Washington, DC, September 2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

18 M. Doyle and E. Schrader, ‘Emphasis on Small, Covert Operations’, Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2001, 1.

19 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, available at www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations, paras. 76–83.

20 GA Res. 60/180 (2005).

21 S. Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (2004), 153.

22 On realism, see generally K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979); J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001).

23 B. Woodward, Plan of Attack (2004), 150.

24 H. Huntley, ‘Rule that Isn't Its Rule Upsets Pottery Barn’, St Petersburg Times, 20 April 2004.

25 On idealism and liberal institutionalism, see generally R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984); A. Stein, ‘Neoliberal Institutionalism’, in C. Reus-Smith and D. Snidal (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Relations (2008), 201.

26 On constructivism, see generally A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999); J. Der Derian, Critical Practices in International Relations (2009).

27 See Chesterman, supra note 21, at 244–6.

28 Cf. Hehir, A., ‘The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom’, (2007) 1 Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 307CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 Cf. the incapacity and malevolence scenarios described supra note 21 and accompanying text.

30 C. Stahn and J. K. Kleffner (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace (2008).

31 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 16; F. Deng, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (1996).

32 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), done at Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 1994, available at www.un.org/Depts/los, Art. 136.

33 The Antarctic Treaty, done at Washington, DC, 1 December 1959, in force June 1961, available at www.nsf.gov/od/opp/antarct/anttrty.jsp, Preamble (referring to the ‘interest of all mankind’); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), done at London, Moscow, and Washington, 27 January 1967, in force 10 October 1967, available at www.oosa.unvienna.org, Preamble (referring to the ‘common interest of all mankind’); Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty), done at New York, 18 December 1979, GA Res. 34/68 (1979), in force 1984, available at www.unoosa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/moon.html, Art. 11 (the Moon and its natural resources ‘are the common heritage of mankind’). See generally Guntrip, E., ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: An Adequate Regime for Managing the Deep Seabed?’, (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law 376Google Scholar.

34 See generally Saltford, supra note 8.