Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-68ccn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-10T03:18:57.802Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Income taxation and job creation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 March 2023

Johanna Röhrs*
Affiliation:
University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany

Abstract

This paper augments the DMP model with large firms and intrafirm wage bargaining by an endogenous decision to become an entrepreneur that is based on heterogeneous entrepreneurial abilities. If workers’ wage bargaining power is not too large and the match efficiency is not too low, the decentralized market equilibrium features an inefficiently high number of entrepreneurs, because they appropriate large parts of the surplus from matches. A realistic calibration with empirically plausible parameters shows this case to be the relevant one. Consequently, introducing a tax on the profits of entrepreneurs restores the constrained first-best allocation by affecting occupational choices. It drives rather unproductive entrepreneurs out of the market since the marginal entrepreneur is affected and not the average one. Thus, the negative effects on job creation are small.

Type
Articles
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Akcigit, U. and Stantcheva, S.. (2020) Taxation and innovation: What do we know?, National Bureau of Economic Research., Working Paper 27109.Google Scholar
Akcigit, U., Grigsby, J., Nicholas, T. and Stantcheva, S.. (2022) Taxation and innovation in the twentieth century. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 137(1), 329385.10.1093/qje/qjab022CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Akcigit, U., Baslandze, S. and Stantcheva, S.. (2016) Taxation and the international mobility of inventors. American Economic Review 106(10), 29302981.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bivens, J. and Mishel, L.. (2013) The pay of corporate executives and financial professionals as evidence of rents in top 1 percent incomes. Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(3), 5778.10.1257/jep.27.3.57CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boadway, R. and Tremblay, J.-F.. (2013) Optimal income taxation and the labour market: An overview. CESifo Economic Studies 59(1), 93148.10.1093/cesifo/ifs008CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boone, J. and Bovenberg, L.. (2002) Optimal labour taxation and search. Journal of Public Economics 85(1), 5397.10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00114-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brueggemann, B. (2021) Higher taxes at the top: The role of entrepreneurs. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 13(3), 136.Google Scholar
Cagetti, M. and De Nardi, M.. (2006) Entrepreneurship, frictions, and wealth. Journal of Political Economy 114(5), 835870.10.1086/508032CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cahuc, P., Marque, F. and Wasmer, E.. (2008) A theory of wages and labor demand with intra-firm bargaining and matching frictions. International Economic Review 49(3), 943972.10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00502.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cahuc, P. and Wasmer, E.. (2001) Does intrafirm bargaining matter in the large firm’s matching model? Macroeconomic Dynamics 5(5), 742747.Google Scholar
Card, D., Cardoso, A. R., Heining, J. and Kline, P.. (2018) Firms and labor market inequality: Evidence and some theory. Journal of Labor Economics 36(1), 1370.10.1086/694153CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Diamond, P. A. (1982) Wage determination and efficiency in search equilibrium. The Review of Economic Studies 49(2), 217227.10.2307/2297271CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hosios, A. J. (1990) On the efficiency of matching and related models of search and unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies 57(2), 279298.10.2307/2297382CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hungerbühler, M., Lehmann, E., Parmentier, A. and Van Der Linden, B.. (2006) Optimal redistributive taxation in a search equilibrium model. Review of Economic Studies 73(3), 743767.10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00394.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaplan, S. N. and Rauh, J.. (2013) It’s the market: The broad-based rise in the return to top talent. Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(3), 3556.10.1257/jep.27.3.35CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lehmann, E., Parmentier, A. and van der Linden, B.. (2011) Optimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemployment. Journal of Public Economics 95(11), 15231537.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mortensen, D. T. and Pissarides, C. A.. (1994) Job creation and job destruction in the theory of unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies 61(3), 397415.10.2307/2297896CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mortensen, D. T. and Pissarides, C. A. (2002) Taxes, Subsidies and Equilibrium Labor Market Outcomes, CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. Google Scholar
Petrongolo, B. and Pissarides, C. A.. (2001) Looking into the black box: A survey of the matching function. Journal of Economic Literature 39(2), 390431.10.1257/jel.39.2.390CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pissarides, C. A. (1985) Short-Run equilibrium dynamics of unemployment, vacancies, and real wages. The American Economic Review 75(4), 676690.Google Scholar
Pissarides, C. A. (2000) Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, vol. 1, 2nd edition, The MIT Press.Google Scholar
Quadrini, V. (2000) Entrepreneurship, saving, and social mobility. Review of Economic Dynamics 3(1), 140.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rothschild, C. and Scheuer, F.. (2016) Optimal taxation with rent-seeking. Review of Economic Studies 83(3), 12251262.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shimer, R. (2005) The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies. American Economic Review 95(1), 2549.10.1257/0002828053828572CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stole, L. A. and Zwiebel, J.. (1996) Intra-firm bargaining under non-binding contracts. The Review of Economic Studies 63(3), 375410.10.2307/2297888CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yashiv, E. (2007) Labor search and matching in macroeconomics. European Economic Review 51(8), 18591895.CrossRefGoogle Scholar