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Can Small Shareholders Protect Their Interests from Expropriation: The Case of a Chinese Bank

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2019

Mahmoud Ezzamel ,
Jason Zezhong Xiao  and
Rongli Yuan
Mahmoud Ezzamel
Affiliation:
Cardiff University, UK IE Business School, Spain
Jason Zezhong Xiao
Affiliation:
Cardiff University, UK
Rongli Yuan*
Affiliation:
Renmin University of China, China
*
Corresponding author: Rongli Yuan (yuanrongli@rmbs.ruc.edu.cn)
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Abstract

This article examines how small shareholders protected their interests from large shareholders’ expropriation by forming an alliance and taking collective action to block a convertible bonds issue by a Chinese bank that they considered harmful. Forming an alliance strengthened small shareholders’ network density, enhanced their salience (power, legitimacy, and urgency), and reduced the bank's centrality. This enabled small shareholders to change their strategy from being a subordinator to a compromiser and forced the controlling shareholders and their representatives to change their strategy from a commander to a compromiser. Apart from interest-based motives, the alliance provided small shareholders with identity-based incentives to persistently oppose expropriation by controlling shareholders. This article enriches the literature on small shareholder activism and principal-principal problem.

摘要

摘要

本文分析了以投资基金为代表的小股东如何通过成立联盟、采取集体行动，阻止他们认为有害于小股东的中国ACB银行的可转债发行方案，从而遏制大股东的利益侵占、保护自身权益。联盟的建立增强了小股东的网络密度，增加了他们的显著性（影响力、合法性和紧迫性），降低了ACB银行的中心性。这使得对抗双方分别改变了对策，小股东从服从者转变为妥协者，进而迫使ACB银行的大股东从主导者转变为妥协者。投资基金联盟不仅为了自身利益，而且为了体现“小股东代表”这一身份，坚持反对大股东的利益侵占。本文丰富了小股东积极主义和委托人—委托人问题的文献。

Аннотация

АННОТАЦИЯ

В этой статье мы изучаем, каким образом мелкие акционеры защитили свои интересы от экспроприации со стороны крупных акционеров с помощью создания альянса и совместных действий для блокировки выпуска конвертируемых облигаций в китайском банке, что они посчитали вредным. Создание альянса укрепило связи между мелкими акционерами, повысило их значимость (влияние, легитимность и необходимость) и ослабило центральную роль банка. Это позволило мелким акционерам изменить свою стратегию подчинения на достижение компромисса и вынудило контролирующих акционеров и их представителей поменять стратегию управления на достижение компромисса. Помимо мотивов, основанных на интересах, создание альянса помогло мелким акционерам обрести свою идентичность, чтобы постоянно противодействовать экспроприации со стороны контролирующих акционеров. Данная статья обогащает научную литературу об активизме мелких акционеров и о проблеме ‘принципал-принципал’.

Resumen

RESUMEN

Este artículo examina cómo los accionistas minoritarios protegen sus intereses de expropiación de grandes accionistas al crear una alianza y tomando acción colectiva para bloquear una emisión de bonos convertibles por parte de un banco chino que consideraban perjudicial. Formar una alianza fortaleció la densidad de la red de los inversionistas minoritarios, mejoró su prominencia (poder, legitimidad y urgencia) y redujo la centralidad del banco. Esto permitió que los accionistas minoritarios cambiaran su estrategia de ser un subordinado a un comprometedor y obligó a los accionistas controladores y sus representantes a cambiar su estrategia de comandante a comprometedor. Aparte de los motivos basados en intereses, la alianza da a los accionistas minoritarios inventivos basados en la identidad para oponerse persistentemente a la expropiación de accionistas controladores. Este artículo enriquece la literatura sobre activismo y el problema principal-principal.

Keywords

expropriationmutual fundsprincipal-principal problemshareholder activismstakeholders利益侵占共同基金委托人—委托人问题股东积极主义利益相关者экспроприацияпаевые инвестиционные фондыпроблема ‘принципал-принципал’активизм акционеровзаинтересованные стороныexpropiaciónfondos mutuosproblema principal-principalactivismo de accionistagrupos de interés
Type
Article
Information
Management and Organization Review , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , February 2020 , pp. 139 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 The International Association for Chinese Management Research

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Footnotes

Accepted by: Editor-in-Chief Arie Y. Lewin on behalf of Klaus Meyer and Xiaohui Liu

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