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Opportunism in Inter-firm Exchanges in Emerging Markets[1]

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2015

Yadong Luo
Translated by
陆亚东
Yadong Luo*
Affiliation:
School of Business Administration, University of Miami, USA
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Abstract

This article develops a theoretical model of opportunism in inter-organizational exchanges in emerging markets. I decompose opportunism into ‘strong form’ (contractual norm violation) and ‘weak form’ (relational norm violation), and suggest that strong form tends to be more observable, measurable and remediable than weak form and its adverse effect on cooperation tends to be stronger but less enduring than weak form. I address how external uncertainty, a multidimensional concept that includes market volatility, legal unprotectability, information unverifiability and regulatory variability, along with internal uncertainty that reflects dyadic tensions such as goal disparity, resource misfit, cultural dissimilarity and bargaining asymmetry, together affect exchange members' opportunism. This is followed by further discussions on conditions under which firms will opt for strong form or weak form opportunism in the face of such external and internal uncertainties. I suggest that suppressing forces against opportunism necessitates not only economic ordering, such as contractual mechanisms and structural mechanisms, but also social ordering, such as relational mechanisms and justice mechanisms. I expect that economic ordering is more effective in resisting strong form opportunism while social ordering is more forceful in curtailing weak form opportunism.

摘要

摘要

本文提出了新兴市场中企业间交换的机会主义理论模型。作者将机会主义分类成重型(违反合同规范）和轻型（违反关系规范）。作者认为重型机会主义比轻型机会主义更易观察， 度量及弥补；其对双方合作的负面影响虽较轻型机会主义更强伹持续时间更短。本文讨论了新兴市场中企业外部和内部不确定因素对交换双方机会主义行为的影响。外部的不确定因素包括市场波动性，法律欠保护性，信息不确定性以及政策易变性。内部的不确定因素反映了交换双方间的紧张关系，包括双方的目标不容性、资源错配、文化差异性以及影响力不对称性。本文进一步讨论了企业在面对这些外部及内部不确定因素时，选择重型或轻型机会主义行为的前提条件。最后，本文提出抑制机会主义行为不仅需要内部经济机制，而且需要内部社会机制。其中，经济手段，如合约机制及结构性机制，对抑制重型机会主义行为会更有效； 而社会手段，如关系机制及公平机制，对抑制轻型机会主义行为更有效。

Type
Articles
Information
Management and Organization Review , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , March 2006 , pp. 121 - 147
Copyright
Copyright © International Association for Chinese Management Research 2006

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Footnotes

1

The author would like to thank Marshall Meyer, Anne Tsui and MOR reviewers for their comments and suggestions.

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