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Equivalences between logics and their representing type theories
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 March 2009
Abstract
We propose a new framework for representing logics, called LF+, which is based on the Edinburgh Logical Framework. The new framework allows us to give, apparently for the first time, general definitions that capture how well a logic has been represented. These definitions are possible because we are able to distinguish in a generic way that part of the LF+ entailment corresponding to the underlying logic. This distinction does not seem to be possible with other frameworks. Using our definitions, we show that, for example, natural deduction first-order logic can be well-represented in LF+, whereas linear and relevant logics cannot. We also show that our syntactic definitions of representation have a simple formulation as indexed isomorphisms, which both confirms that our approach is a natural one and provides a link between type-theoretic and categorical approaches to frameworks.
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