1 Mackie, J. A. C., Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, 1963–1966 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. Google Scholar, emphasis added.

2 Jones, Matthew, Conflict and confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the creation of Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)Google Scholaris the most significant book-length work to return to the topic. A number of scholars, including Jones, have brought to the fore the role of Manila at certain points, particularly in raising the Sabah claim and organizing the Manila Summit, but always as something of an outsider to the conflict and never with an eye to the role of Philippine domestic politics and anticommunism in the dispute.

3 Portuguese-controlled East Timor would remain a last vestige in the region of direct European colonial rule for another decade.

4 Ngoei, Wen-Qing, Arc of containment: Britain, the United States, and anticommunism in Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), pp. Google Scholar.

5 Jones, Conflict and confrontation, p. 246; Sodhy, Pamela, ‘Malaysian-American relations during Indonesia’s confrontation against Malaysia, 1963–66’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 19, no. 1, 1988, p. CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Jones, Conflict and confrontation, p. 80.

7 It was not initially the preferred strategy of Britain. Kahin writes, ‘Until 1961 Britain tended to favor separate political evolution for the Borneo territories’ (Kahin, George McT., ‘Malaysia and Indonesia’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 37, no. 2, 1964, p. CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

8 Curless, Gareth, ‘“The people need civil liberties”: Trade unions and contested decolonization in Singapore’, Labor History, vol. 57, no. 1, 2016, pp. 61–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jones, Conflict and confrontation, p. 69.

9 Ibid., p. 71.

10 Osborne, Milton E., Malaysia and Singapore (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, 1964), pp. 25–28Google Scholar.

11 Jones, Conflict and confrontation, p. 75.

12 Ibid., p. 94.

13 I detail the blowback from the Harry Stonehill scandal and its political impact in Scalice, Joseph, ‘Crisis of revolutionary leadership: Martial law and the Communist parties of the Philippines, 1957–1974’, PhD thesis, UC Berkeley, 2017, pp. Google Scholar.

14 Noble, Lela G., Philippine policy toward Sabah: A claim to independence (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977), p. Google Scholar

15 Ibid., p. 57, sums up the tenuous argument for Philippine sovereignty: ‘The heirs owned the territory; the government—somehow—had sovereignty over it; therefore the government should support the heirs’ efforts.’

16 Poulgrain, Greg, The genesis of Konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia, 1945–1965 (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information; Research Development Centre, 2014), p. Google Scholar.

17 Jones, Conflict and confrontation, p. 104.

18 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Office of Current Intelligence, ‘The Philippines under Macapagal’, 1963, p. Google Scholar. OCI No. 0277/63C. Partially declassified, 24 August 2006.

19 Ibid.

20 Noble, Philippine policy toward Sabah, p. 48; Poulgrain, The genesis of Konfrontasi, p. 245.

21 Details on events in Brunei can be found in ibid. and Chanin, Eileen, Limbang rebellion: 7 days in December 1962 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013)Google Scholar.

22 Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 111.

23 Poulgrain, The genesis of Konfrontasi, p. 242.

24 Ibid.

25 Manila Times (MT), 22 Jun 1963, p. 12-A.

26 Confidential US State Department central files, Philippine Republic, 1955–63 (CUSDPR), 796.00(W)/4-1862, p. 2.

27 Poulgrain, The genesis of Konfrontasi, p. 243.

28 Ibid., p. 292.

29 Jones, Conflict and confrontation, p. 96.

30 Saunders, Graham, A history of Brunei (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 44, 147Google Scholar.

31 Sopiee, Mohamed Noordin, ‘The advocacy of Malaysia—before 1961’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 7, no. 4, 1973, p. CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Ibid., p. 727.

33 Noble, Philippine policy toward Sabah, p. 98.

34 Jones, Howard P., Indonesia: The possible dream (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. Google Scholar; Brackman, Arnold C., Southeast Asia’s second front: The power struggle in the Malay archipelago (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 142, 145Google Scholar.

35 Poulgrain, The genesis of Konfrontasi, pp. 248, 253.

36 MT, 22 Nov 1962, p. 4-A.

37 MT, 9 Dec 1962, p. 16-A.

38 Manila Chronicle (hereafter MC), 9 Dec 1962, p. 10.

39 Ibid.

40 MT, 10 Dec 1962, p. 8-A.

41 MT, 13 Dec 1962, p. 1; 14 Dec, p. 12-A.

42 Like all of the other elite actors involved, the sultan of Brunei was motivated by anti-Chinese concerns. He believed that ‘closer union with Sarawak and North Borneo would increase Chinese influence, while the Malays within such a federation would be outnumbered by the combined Chinese and non-Malay indigenous peoples’ (Saunders, A History of Brunei, p. 135).

43 MT, 10 Dec 1962, pp. 1, 8.

44 MC, 11 Dec 1962, p. 13.

45 MC, 15 Dec 1962, p. 1.

46 MC, 14 Dec 1962, p. 4.

47 Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 118.

48 Poulgrain, The genesis of Konfrontasi, p. 292; MT, 22 Jun 1963, p. 12-A.

49 CUSDPR, 796.00(W)/12-762, p. 2.

50 MT, 30 Jan 1963, p. 10-A.

51 Jones, Conflict and confrontation, pp. 98ff; Jones, Indonesia, p. 274.

52 Bunnell, Frederick, ‘Guided democracy foreign policy: 1960–65, President Sukarno moves from non-alignment to confrontation’, Indonesia, vol. 2, no. 2, 1966, pp. 58–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

53 Jones, Conflict and confrontation, p. 59.

54 The Sino-Soviet split further sharpened tensions, with the Indonesian military developing relations with Moscow, which sold them arms, while the PKI was oriented towards Beijing. On relations between Indonesia and China, as well as the impact on the local Chinese population, see Zhou, Taomo, Migration in a time of revolution: China, Indonesia, and the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019)Google Scholar.

55 Crozier, Brian, ‘Indonesia: Retrospect and prospect’, The World Today, vol. 18, no. 7, 1962, p. Google Scholar.

56 Hilsman, Roger, To move a nation: The politics of foreign policy in the administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. Google Scholar.

57 Lev, Daniel, ‘The political role of the army in Indonesia’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 36, no. 4, 1964, pp. Google Scholar; Webster, David, ‘Self-determination abandoned: The road to the New York Agreement on West New Guinea (Papua), 1960–62’, Indonesia, vol. 95, 2013CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 Kahin, ‘Malaysia and Indonesia’, p. 264.

59 Ibid., pp. 263–64.

60 Scalice, Joseph, ‘A deliberately forgotten battle: The Lapiang Manggagawa and the Manila port strike of 1963’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 53, nos. 1–2, 2022, pp. CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

61 I expand on the programme of Stalinism and its centrality to the Sino-Soviet split in the Philippines in Scalice, Joseph, ‘The geopolitical alignments of diverging social interests: The Sino-Soviet split and the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, 1966–67’, Critical Asian Studies, vol. 53, no. 1, 2021, pp. 45–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62 Scalice, Joseph, ‘“We are siding with Filipino capitalists”: Nationalism and the political maturation of Jose Ma. Sison, 1959–61’, Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, vol. 36, no. 1, 2021, pp. 1–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 Lava, Jesus, Memoirs of a Communist (Pasig: Anvil Publishing, 2002), p. Google Scholar.

64 It is important to recognize the key role that Sison played in the policies of the PKP. As Sison went on to become the founder of the influential breakaway Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which split from the PKP along the lines of the Sino-Soviet dispute, he sought in his later accounts to cover over his earlier role and presented himself as a consistent opponent, rather than chief implementer, of the policies of the PKP (Scalice, ‘The geopolitical alignments’).

65 CUSDPR, 746H.00/12-1862.

66 MT, 18 Dec 1962, p. 14-A; 19 Dec, p. 20-A.

67 The British deployed destroyers to the Sulu Sea, where they accosted Philippine vessels to ensure that they were not sending reinforcements to the Brunei rebels (CUSDPR, 796.022/01-463).

68 Sison, Jose Ma., ‘Commentary’, Progressive Review, vol. 1, 1963, p. Google Scholar.

69 Ibid., p. 13.

70 Ibid., p. 15.

71 Sison repeated verbatim much of his editorial in an article which he published in June in the Hong Kong-based Eastern World, concluding that ‘the trend towards closer and stronger relations between the Philippines and Indonesia is swift, steady and, it appears, irreversible’ (Sison, Jose Ma., ‘The Philippines and Malaysia’, Eastern World, vol. XVII, no. 6, 1963, pp. 11, 12Google Scholar).

72 Scalice, ‘A deliberately forgotten battle’.

73 See, for example, his land reform speech: MC, 9 Aug 1963, p. 17.

74 For example, Lapiang Manggagawa (LM), Handbook on the Land Reform Code (Manila: M. Colcol, 1963)Google Scholar.

75 Poh, S. K., Tan, K. F. and Hong, L. (eds), The 1963 Operation Coldstore in Singapore: Commemorating 50 years (Kuala Lumpur: Pusat Sejarah Rakyat, 2013)Google Scholar.

76 On Lopez, see Claudio, Lisandro, Liberalism and the postcolony: Thinking the state in the 20th century Philippines (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 2017), pp. Google Scholar.

77 Kahin, George McT., Southeast Asia: A testament (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 The racialized anticommunism of Maphilindo was known throughout the region. The US ambassador to Malaysia, James Bell, wrote in 1964, ‘Malaysian Chinese fear Maphilindo as a device to crush them’ (Sodhy, ‘Malaysia-American relations’, p. 117).

81 Simpson, Bradley R., Economists with guns: Authoritarian development and US-Indonesian relations, 1960–68 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

82 Zhou, Migration in a time of revolution, pp. 132 ff.

83 Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 154.

84 Jones, Conflict and confrontation, p. 179. The Manila Summit occurred at a moment when Sukarno was aligning more closely with American interests. Toward the end of July, Sukarno was in Tokyo concluding a deal with Shell, Caltex, and Stanvac, which had been negotiated by the US State Department. The oil companies were delighted with the settlement (Hilsman, To move a nation, p. 390). Washington viewed this development as an indication of Sukarno making a decision to turn from the communist bloc to the West (Jones, Conflict and confrontation, p. 168).

85 Philippine Collegian, 31 Jul 1963, p. 7.

86 [Sison, Jose Ma.], ‘Editorial: The Philippines and Indonesia’, Progressive Review, vol. 2, 1963, p. Google Scholar.

87 Ibid., p. 2, emphasis added.

88 Ibid.

89 Scalice, ‘A deliberately forgotten battle’.

90 Tunku Abdul Rahman and his entourage stayed at the Manila Hotel, as did all of Sukarno’s staff. Sukarno himself, however, stayed in the Villa Pacencia Mansion on Shaw Boulevard, the home of house speaker, Jose B. Laurel, son of Jose P. Laurel, president of the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation (MC, 6 Aug 1963, p. 1). Throughout the Manila Summit, Sison was a regular guest in the Laurel home, and was seated next to Sukarno during brunch (Jose, Ma. Sison and Ninotchka Rosca, Jose Maria Sison: At home in the world—portrait of a revolutionary [Manila: Ibon Books, 2004], p. Google Scholar).

91 Kahin, Southeast Asia, p. 171.

92 MC, 31 Jul 1963, p. 12.

93 Kahin, Southeast Asia, p. 171, emphasis in original. The support of the North Bornean elite for merger was, like all of the other powers involved, based on anti-Chinese sentiment. The United National Kadazan Organization of Donald Stephens wrote in a memorandum to the Cobbold Commission in 1962, ‘If North Borneo gets self-government and independence within the foreseeable future by itself, the heirs when the British leave will be the Chinese … it is only Malaysia which will guarantee that they (the indigenous people) have a chance of catching up with their so much more advanced Chinese brothers.’ Malaysia, it argued, would ‘extend special privileges … to the native peoples’ (Luping, Herman, Sabah’s dilemma: The political history of Sabah 1960–1994 [Selangor: Percetakan Eshin, 1994], p. Google Scholar).

94 Jones, Indonesia, p. 283.

95 Ibid., p. 283.

96 MC, 7 Aug 1963, p. 4.

97 Leon, V. Cesar de, ‘Why Philippine labor is supporting the Liberal administration’, Charles T. R. Bohannan Papers, Hoover Institute, 29/18, [1963]Google Scholar.

98 MC, 23 Aug 1963.

99 Kahin, Southeast Asia, pp. 172–73.

100 Ibid., p. 173.

101 Hilsman, To move a nation, p. 404.

102 Philippines Free Press, 12 Oct 1963, p. 1

103 Lapiang Manggagawa (LM), ‘Rally against foreign pressures! Rally to the defense of our national honor and dignity!’, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Radical Papers Archive, 09/33.01, 1963.

104 Ibid.

105 Philippine Collegian, 18 Sep 1963, p. 2.

106 Sison, Jose Ma. , ‘Peaceful, I say’, Philippine Collegian, 25 Sep 1963, p. Google Scholar.

107 The discussion between Macapagal and the Johnson administration surrounding the deployment of Filipino troops to Vietnam can be traced in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–63. Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1994). The shift in Manila’s alignment corresponded to a shift in Washington, as the Johnson administration adopted a far harder line towards Jakarta than that of Kennedy (Jones, Matthew, ‘U.S. relations with Indonesia, the Kennedy-Johnson transition, and the Vietnam Connection, 1963–1965’, Diplomatic History, vol. 26, no. 2, 2002, pp. CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sodhy ‘Malaysian-American relations’, p. 125).

108 News coverage in the Philippines celebrated the crushing of the PKI. The Manila Bulletin, 17 Nov 1965, for example, ran a front-page photo of Indonesians digging what appears to be a mass grave and captioned the image ‘Indon Reds. Getting a taste of their own medicine’.

109 On the conduct of Konfrontasi, see Mackie, Konfrontasi.