Philosophical history became the Enlightenment genre of historical writing par excellence supposedly by “defeating” established humanist erudite history and antiquarianism. This article argues that, contrary to established perceptions, philosophical history developed out of a concern expressed by early eighteenth-century erudite historians about the nature of historical evidence: both David Hume—leading philosophical historian—and the members of the French erudite Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres shared a broadly Lockean approach to historical evidence, choosing verisimilitude to common experience as the key criterion of certainty. Indeed, Hume likely drew directly from the académiciens. Historical certainty is achieved, both sides concluded, by providing a verisimilar chain of causes of historical events, rather than mere lists of historical facts. Philosophical historians like Hume departed from the reformulated eighteenth-century version of erudite history by making causes the main object of history rather than merely a foundation of trustworthy factual accounts.

John Rawls (1921–2002) and his work are now squarely a subject for history. In the more than fifteen years since his death, a rich body of scholarship has emerged which attempts, in different ways, to understand the nature, development, and impact of Rawls's thought from a variety of historical perspectives. With 2021 marking fifty years since A Theory of Justice (1971) was first published, this special forum examines what we here call the “historical Rawls.”

How does a new state, born by way of revolution, produce its social and political institutions? This article explores this question by looking at the case of Greece after independence from the Ottomans (1830). It focuses on the Greek civil jurists and provides a history of a liberal political program that was manifested in Roman-law jurisprudence. As elsewhere in Europe, so too for jurists in Greece, Roman law was both a consistent method for lawmaking and a powerful political ideology, one that linked private property to personal liberty, and to equality of conditions. As in several other colonial and postimperial settings, it developed as a language of statehood and a “territorial” program that associated sovereignty with the reorganization of space within the state. As in a very few other cases, there it became a means of practical statecraft, which the jurists turned against other political programs, including that of the monarchy.

This artricle explores the philosophical roots of Alexander Crummell's abolitionism. It argues that the black abolitionist developed a philosophically sophisticated approach to antislavery politics and to black advancement rooted, in part, in his encounter with Samuel Taylor Coleridge's metaphysics and epistemology. Developing out his encounter with Coleridge and others, Crummell developed a politicized theory of the self. From Coleridge he took an appreciation of anti-instrumental ways of thinking about politics rooted in the alignment of internal qualities of the self with external political organizing. His thought demonstrates the cosmopolitanism and sophistication of antebellum black intellectual and activist life, as well as the ways that theories of selfhood were deployed in radical political movements of the nineteenth century.

The opening, in 2004, of John Rawls's personal archive prompted a new wave of Rawls scholarship. This work has deepened our understanding of the development and impact of Rawls's ideas and of the broader contours of twentieth-century analytical political philosophy. This article places these recent archival histories, for the first time, in the context of the longer history of attempts to historicize Rawls, beginning with the publication of A Theory of Justice fifty years ago. Doing so does three things. First, it shows that early readers were more interested in how to think historically about Rawls than is sometimes assumed. Second, it reveals that partisan accounts of Rawls's place in history, popularized by those close to him, have sometimes made their way into the archival studies. Third and finally, it offers an opportunity to rethink how the twentieth-century history of political philosophy and political theory is often told.

George Orwell and William Empson worked closely together at the BBC during the Second World War and they remained friends thereafter. In The Structure of Complex Words (1951) Empson paid surprisingly serious attention to the view of language expounded in Nineteen Eighty-Four, seeing in Orwell's presentation of the meaningless slogans of totalitarianism, such as “War Is Peace,” a challenge to his own more rationalistic analysis of how language works. This article first explores the development of Orwell's thinking about language, including his engagement with Basic English (which Empson helped to propagate); a particularly close, and critical, analysis is given of his celebrated essay “Politics and the English Language.” Orwell's views are then contrasted with Empson's unpacking of the interplay of multiple senses within individual words, demonstrating that even the most extreme propaganda statements need to draw upon and respect the mechanics of meaning as embodied in such words if they are to be persuasive. Intellectual historians have much to learn from these exchanges, as do contemporary analysts of “fake news” and authoritarian bombast more generally.

This article uses the work of French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot and his contemporaries to explore the central role played by internal or mental images in late nineteenth-century understandings of mental function. It argues that the assumed existence of internal images allowed scientists and clinicians of the time to integrate experimental psychological work on mental pathologies such as memory dysfunction, hysteria, hypnosis, and hallucination into contemporary research on brain physiology. The internal image—a general term that embraced concepts such as “memory images,” “sensory images,” and multi-faceted “language images”—linked older ideas about how memory, perception, and consciousness worked with new research on cerebral localization that dominated studies of the brain throughout Europe and the United States. For practitioners of the new physiological (also called experimental) psychology, internal images offered a physiological mechanism for explaining how sensory perceptions are transformed into memories, how memories create perceptions of the self, how the brain generates ideas, and how all these processes can go awry.

G. K. Chesterton's anti-Semitism has attracted much scholarly attention, but his views on Islam have largely passed without comment. This article situates Chesterton's writings in relation to historical views of Islam in Britain and the political, cultural and religious context of the early twentieth century. Chesterton's complex and contradictory opinions fail to support easy conclusions about the immutability of prejudice across time. His views of Islam are at times orientalist and at other times critical of imperialism and elitism. As well as drawing on medieval Catholic ideas about the “heresy” of Islam, Chesterton also links Islam with Protestant Christianity. From another perspective, his views of Islam draw on liberal traditions of humanitarian interventionism and democratic patriotism. Finally, he also used Islam as a symbol of a corroding modernity. This study suggests the need for a historically sensitive genealogy of the evolution of anti-Muslim prejudice which is not predetermined by the politics of the early twenty-first century.

This article offers an interpretation of a key moment in the long history of democracy. Its hypothesis may be simply stated in the following terms: key political theorists and administrators in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century France defined democracy as a means for solving public problems by the public itself. This conception of democracy focused on inventing effective practices of government, administrative intervention and regulatory police and differed fundamentally from our contemporary understandings that privilege the vote, popular sovereignty and parliamentary representation. Moreover, this conception of modern democracy overlapped and in some cases complemented, but—more importantly for this article—remained in significant ways distinct from, other early modern political traditions, in particular liberalism and classical republicanism. What follows therefore uncovers a largely forgotten, but widespread, conception of democracy in the crucial revolutionary age from the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth by asking the question, was there a modern democratic tradition?

Scholarship historicizing John Rawls has put paid to the view that his work was without precedent. This article sets out to find out why, then, A Theory of Justice stirred such philosophical excitement, even among British philosophers in a position to recognize its antecedents. I advance the view that his work is helpfully understood as fulfilling the promise of the “naturalist” revival in ethics begun at Oxford by Philippa Foot and Elizabeth Anscombe. After briefly surveying the development of analytic philosophy, I argue that Rawls's contribution was to reconceive ethics so that it was an investigation neither of an independent ethical reality nor of the logic of moral language. Rather, it was concerned with a class of facts about ourselves. Rawls's practice of ethics adopts as its central focus the ongoing human practice of justification. I place Rawls's turn from religious faith to justification between persons alongside similar shifts in Plato's Euthyphro and in the biographies of Kant and Sidgwick. I try to show the distinctiveness of Rawls's focus by contrasting his search for human self-understanding with the project of R. M. Hare, his most prominent non-naturalist critic, who charged Rawls with offering an inadequate account of the authority of ethics.

This article reexamines Marx's early conception of history by returning to his 1845–6 manuscripts, long known as The German Ideology. On conventional interpretations of these manuscripts, Marx sought to explain the entire historical process through a theory of the systematic development of productive forces. This article reveals that concern to be an artifact of subsequent editorial practices and argues that a different concern animated the manuscripts for Marx himself—namely to grasp the nature of individual epochs, particularly the present one, which he doubted that a generalized theory of history could help him to do. In “Saint Max,” perhaps the most neglected of these early manuscripts, Marx developed the concept of a “mode of production” into a historical lens, one that could aid the work of social critique by bringing into focus how the present is made and might be made anew.

This paper is the first substantial investigation in English or German of the work and career of the student of Jacob Fries, leader of the Burschenschaften, educational reformer, and professor of philosophy and law Karl Hermann Scheidler. It examines Scheidler's interventions into political and constitutional debates during the German Vormärz and argues that he developed a unique brand of liberal corporatism that has been overlooked or misunderstood by intellectual historians—one that attempts to bridge the gap between eighteenth-century natural law and nineteenth-century political nationalism by defending the corporate autonomy of the churches and universities, and by promoting a combination of public virtue and moral perfection that he dubbed “political Protestantism.” It emphasizes Scheidler's polemical articles against the “Hegel school” and the “New Hegelians” in Rotteck's and Welcker's Staats-Lexikon. It proposes that a detailed examination of Scheidler's work provides a clearer understanding of how liberalism emerged as a distinct political ideology during the Vormärz and how one strand of German liberalism defined itself against Hegelianism.

This article scrutinizes a little-known venture in Turkish republican intellectual history, namely Turkish neo-spiritualism. Combining the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Western trend of modern spiritualism with its local dynamics and sociocultural structures, Turkish neo-spiritualism integrated the spiritual philosophies and practices of Western spiritualism with various doctrines of Islamic mysticism (Sufism). It thus sheds light on the complex ways in which a form of knowledge that was originated and disseminated from the West was not derivative in its “imported” version. The article demonstrates how modern spiritualism attained new meanings and connotations in Turkey by merging with indigenous cultural codes and memory, and how it responded to (or was shaped within) local sociopolitical as well as intellectual contexts, particularly including the top-down secularism of the early Turkish Republic.

This article revisits one of John Rawls's rare forays into activist politics, his proposal presented to the Harvard faculty, calling for a denunciation of the “2-S” system of student deferments from conscription. In little-studied archival papers, Rawls argued that the draft both exposed “background” structural racial injustice and constituted a burdening of black Americans that violated the norms of fair cooperation. Rather than obscuring racial injustice and focusing exclusively on economic inequality, as Charles Mills has claimed, Rawls rejected the ascendant conservative views that naturalized black poverty or else attributed it to cultural pathologies in black families. Thus Rawls found nothing illicit in taking the position of a disadvantaged racial group as a relevant comparison when applying his ideal theory to nonideal circumstances. However, I contend in this article that Rawls's account of political philosophy as an attempt to find a consensus may be similarly ideological, leading him to displace the reality of conflict through begging descriptions, expressivist formulations, and historical romanticism.

The American Workingmen's Parties in the 1828–32 period occupy a distinctive place within the history of socialism: they were the first to embrace a strategy of organizing a working-class political party and seizing the democratic state for their collective self-liberation. With universal suffrage, a working-class majority could take political power electorally and expropriate the rich. Karl Marx read about these workers’ parties through works by Thomas Hamilton and Thomas Cooper in the period of his early political development. Like the American workers, he was stringently in favor of robust political rights and conceived of socialism as a democratic mass movement. Unlike the antipolitical socialists predominant in his day, Marx saw the northern United States as uniquely situated for socialism precisely because it had already solved the basic political problem facing Europe: the workers could vote.

This article examines a particular moment in the twentieth century when a burgeoning internationalist movement in Britain in the wake of the First World War coincided with growing nationalist activities in the non-European world, notably in Asia. It explores the intellectual implications of this juncture through the lens of two prominent British internationalists, G. P. Gooch and H. G. Wells, who were central figures in a series of discussions on “world history” that emerged in Britain around this time. Through a close study of their world-historical visions, the article demonstrates how the sequence of Asian nationalist “awakenings” (first in Japan, then after 1905 in India and China) was interpreted by British liberals as evidence of mankind's universal progress towards a uniform (Western) modernity. The effect of burgeoning Asian nationalism, in other words, was ironically to reinvigorate a highly Eurocentric liberal account of world order. The article builds on this analysis to consider the broader implications for our own present intellectual engagement with the world-historical challenge of Europe's Eurocentric past.

How have modern cultures of dissent learnt to narrate the experience of political imprisonment? From 1851 to 1853, M. A. Bakunin was incarcerated in St Petersburg's Peter and Paul Fortress. Here, the “father of Russian anarchism” wrote what has become known as his Confession: an account of his personal and political development, penned in the most notorious prison of the Russian autocracy at the behest of the tsar. Previous scholarship has focused entirely on the content of this peculiar text. The present article is the first to mobilize extensive archival research—on its carceral conditions of production and intellectual conditions of possibility—in order to understand the form of Bakunin's Confession. Doing so reveals the text as one of the first Russian Bildungsromane: the birth of a genre whereby the imprisoned self became legible through a new epistemology of self and history between Goethe and Hegel. Excavating the nature and afterlives of this novel political aesthetics provides original insights into the “politicization” of state incarceration in European history, the origins of modern Russian autobiographics, and the construction of the radical self.

Rediscovery of John Rawls's early interest in theology has recently prompted readings of his philosophical project as a secularized response to earlier theological questions. Intellectual historians have meanwhile begun to historicize Rawls's use of contemporary philosophical resources and his engagement with economic theory. In this article I argue that what held together Rawls's evolving interest in postwar political economy and his commitment to philosophy as reconciliation was his understanding of the need for secular theodicy. In placing Rawls in the intellectual context of a postwar political economy of growth as well as in relation to the history of political thought, including his reading of that history, I defend two claims. First, I argue that Rawls's philosophical ambition is best understood as providing a secular reconciliatory theodicy. Second, I suggest that Rawls's theodicy was initially rendered plausible by the economic background conditions of economic growth that were fractured and fragmented just as Rawls's book was published in 1971. This divergence between text and context helps to account for Rawls's peculiar reception and his own subsequent attempt to insist on the applicability of his theory under radically altered circumstances.

From the very moment the concept of sexuality emerged in nineteenth-century European medical and psychiatric thought, it became a topic of historicization. This historicization formed a consistent habit of thought in many of the medical and psychiatric texts that first enunciated sexuality as a distinct field of meaning. Dialogue between doctors and the first historians of sexuality informed the emergence of both sexology and of the historiography of sexuality. This dialogue suggests a need to rethink the origins of sexual historiography, situating current historians within a continuous genealogy, rather than as transcendental observers marked by epistemological rupture from earlier biological theories of sexual evolution.