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The ‘Anglo-American’ model, privatization and the transformation of private capitalism in Italy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 January 2016

Dermot McCann
Dermot McCann*
Affiliation:
London Guildhall University, Calcutta House, Old Castle Street, London E1 7NT. Telephone: 020 7320 1000; Fax: 020 7320 1157. E-mail: mccann@lgu.ac.uk
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Summary

Italian capitalism has long been distinguished by the large size of the public enterprise sector and the power of large family firms, underpinned by powerful networks of inter-firm alliance orchestrated by the merchant bank, Mediobanca. This article seeks to analyse the extent to which the current programme of privatization is serving not only to shrink the size of, but to transform the structure of, power in the private sector. While some reformers have seen in privatization an instrument to encourage the adoption of Anglo-Saxon forms of corporate governance in Italy, it is argued here that the evidence of recent changes indicates the emergence of a more differentiated pattern of corporate governance rather than the triumph of any single model.

Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Italy , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , May 2000 , pp. 47 - 61
Copyright
Copyright © Association for the study of Modern Italy 

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References

Notes

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