1. Confusion may arise from use of the terms “Czech” and “Czechoslovak.” The “Czechoslovakist” idea that the Czech and Slovak nations were “branches of a single tree” underpinned the state's creation, thus “Czechoslovak” corresponds to state-wide political entities. “Czech” refers to individuals, or, in the case of territory, to the historic Czech crown lands (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia). For the importance of “Czechoslovakism” as a state-building ideology see Leff, Carol Skalnik, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: the making and remaking of the state, 1918-1987 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Jozef Lettrich, The History of Modern Slovakia (New York: Praeger, 1955); Victor S. Mamatey, “The establishment of the Republic,” in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomír Luža eds,. A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973); William V. Wallace, Czechoslovakia (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1977).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. See Wiskemann, Elizabeth, Czechs and Germans (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 122–123. Relevant portions of Masaryk's address are quoted in J. W. Brügel, Czechoslovakia before Munich. The German Minority Problem and British Appeasement Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 19–20.Google Scholar

3. See for example T. G. Masaryk, Cesta demokracie; soubor projevů za republiky [The Path of Democracy; a collection of speeches]. 2 vols. (Prague: Čin, 1933-1934), 1: p. 50.Google Scholar

4. See Ferdinand Peroutka, Budování státu. Československá politika v letech popřevratových [The Building of the State. Czechoslovak Politics in the Years Following the War]. 6 vols. (Prague: Borový, 1934-36), 1: pp. 185–188; Strauss, Emil, Die Entstehung der tschechoslowakischen Republik (Prague: Orbis, 1935), p. 303.Google Scholar

5. Klepetar, Harry, Seit 1918 … Eine Geschichte der tschechoslowakischen Republik (Moravian Ostrava: Verlag Julius Kittls, 1937), p. 149.Google Scholar

6. See César, Jaroslav and Černý, Bohumil, Politika německých buržoazních stran v Československu v letech 1918-38 [Politics of the German Bourgeois Parties in Czechoslovakia 1918-38], 2 vols. (Prague: Československé Akademie Véd, 1962), 1: pp. 140–145.Google Scholar

7. Ibid, 216; Rothschild, Joseph, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, 2nd edn (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), pp. 103–104.Google Scholar

8. Jaksch, Wenzel, Europas Weg nach Potsdam (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958), p. 222.Google Scholar

9. Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, vol. 63 (1923), p. 169; F. Gregory Campbell, Confrontation in Central Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 157.Google Scholar

10. The Czechoslovakist vision of the two languages channeled into one linguistic vehicle, to effect in time a homogenous national group from the Czechs and Slovaks, was of course a fata morgana. See Johnson, Owen V., Slovakia 1918-1938: education and the making of a nation (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1985); and Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia. Google Scholar

11. Luža, Radomír, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans. A Study of Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962 (New York: New York University Press, 1964), pp. 8ff.Google Scholar

12. Ibid., p. 42.Google Scholar

13. See Jonathan Zorach, “The nationality problem in the Czechoslovak army between the two World Wars,” East Central Europe 1978, 5(2): pp. 169–185.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. Zajicek, Erwin, “Erfolge und Mißerfolge des sudetendeutschen Aktivismus”, in Beiträge zum deutsch-tschechischen Verhältnis im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Publication of the Collegium Carolinum, no. 19 (Munich: Verlag Robert Lerche, 1967), p. 132.Google Scholar

15. See Campbell, Confrontation in Central Europe, p. 121.Google Scholar

16. Ibid., p. 116.Google Scholar

17. , Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, p. 122.Google Scholar

18. Ibid., p. 85.Google Scholar

19. César and Černý, Politika německych buržoazních stran 1: p. 300. The Agrarians had been bandying the topic of cooperation about since 1919, with the nationalists always dominant in the debate. See Linz, Norbert, Der Bund der Landwirte in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. Struktur und Politik einer deutschen Partei in der Aufbauphase (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1982), pp. 296-299.Google Scholar

20. , Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, p. 86; Jaksch, Europas Weg, p. 238. See Vladimír Dostal's biography of Czechoslovak Agrarian leader Antonín Švelila, Profil cesko-slovenského státníka [Profile of a Czechoslovak Politician] (New York: Výkonný výbor Republikánské strany v exilu, 1989), p. 129, for an impression of German peasants' geographic bonds.Google Scholar

21. See Šimka, “Česko-německé vztahy na Jihlavsku”, p. 205.Google Scholar

22. See J. W. Brügel, “Jews in Political Life,” in The Jews of Czechoslovakia: historical studies and surveys, 3 vols. (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1968-1984), 2: pp. 243–253 for a survey of Jewish and Jewish-born political functionaries; see also Campbell, Confrontation in Central Europe, p. 158; and Wingfield, Nancy M., “Czech, German or Jew: the Jewish community of Prague during the inter-war period”, in Morison, John, ed., The Czech and Slovak Experience. Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 1990, (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).Google Scholar

23. For information on Rašín's policies see Peroutka, , Budování státu, 2:701–724, 754-771; and Zora P. Pryor, “Czechoslovak economic development in the interwar period,” in Mamatey and Luža, A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp. 194-197.Google Scholar

24. César and Černý, Politika německých buržoazních stran, 1: pp 289-294; Campbell, Confrontation in Central Europe, p. 158.Google Scholar

25. See César and Černý, Politika německých buržoazních stran, 1: p. 290.Google Scholar

26. , Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 111.Google Scholar

27. An administrative reform that took effect in Slovakia in 1923 divided the province into counties, which undermined efforts to create an autonomous government for the province as a whole. However, political leaders blocked this county system from taking effect in the Czech provinces, for it would have resulted in German majorities in their most concentrated areas of settlement. See Josef Anderle, “The Slovak issue in the Munich crisis of 1938” (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1961), pp. 39–43.Google Scholar

28. See Alena Gajanová, “Ke vzniku a úkolům československé zahraniční politiky a k metodam a charakteru československé diplomacie,” [On the development and missions of Czechoslovak foreign policy and the methods and character of diplomacy] Mezinárodní vztahy 1969, 4(1): pp. 43–54; Wandycz, Piotr S., The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1926-1936. French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from Locarno to the Remilitarization of the Rhineland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 3-16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

29. See Campbell, Confrontation in Central Europe, pp. 156–161.Google Scholar

30. Lodgman, von, leader of the German Nationals, lost his seat to an activist.Google Scholar

31. For further analysis of the election see César and Černý, Politika německých buržoazních stran, 1: pp. 304–308; and Wingfield, Minority Politics, pp. 52–53.Google Scholar

32. France and Poland were allies, but Locarno legitimated Germany's anti-Polish territorial revisionism of its eastern frontiers. France came to an understanding with Germany that was independent of Polish considerations.Google Scholar

33. A bona fide opposition party, the Communists drew their strength from disgruntled workers. The Czechoslovak Social Democrats' participation in the government alienated revolutionists in the movement; Prague's inaction toward the collapse of industrial enterprises in Slovakia dismayed workers there. For the gains and losses of the parties in the Chamber see Campbell, Confrontation in Central Europe, p. 315, n. 1.Google Scholar

34. See César and Černý, Politika německých buržoazních stran, 1: p. 375.Google Scholar

35. For the turmoil this crucial measure caused within the camp of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats and the party's deliberation over whether to leave the coalition see Jarmila Menclová, “K některým otázkám vývoje československé sociáln' demokracie v druhé polovině 20. let,” [Several questions regarding the course of Czechoslovak social democracy during the second half of the 1920s] Sborník historický 1967, 15: pp. 78–82; and Erik Polák, “K otázce rozpadu všenárodní koalice a nastolení vlády mezinárodní buržoazie v Československu v letech 1925-26,” [Regarding the breakup of the national coalition and the installation of the multinational bourgeois government 1925-26] Československý časopis historický 1961, 9: p. 30.Google Scholar

36. Central European Observer, 1 January 1927, p. 9.Google Scholar

37. German Christian Socials distanced themselves from negativism because they could not tolerate the anti-Catholic sentiments of pan-German nationalists. They also argued that Germans had to get into the government in order to participate in making and administering laws, and to improve conditions for Germans as much as possible. See Schütz, Hans, “Gedanken eines Aktivisten zur Frage der Chancen und Grenzen des Aktivismus,” in Bosl, Karl ed., Aktuelle Forschungsprobleme um die Erste Tschechoslowakische Republik, (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1969), pp. 151–152. See also Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, pp. 229ff.Google Scholar

38. For details on the often quarrelsome relations between the parties during 1919-1928 see Campbell, Confrontation in Central Europe, pp. 155–161; César and Černý, Politika německých buržoazních stran, 1: pp. 209-214; Victor S. Mamatey, “The development of Czechoslovak democracy, 1920-1938,” and J. W. Brügel, “The Germans in pre-war Czechoslovakia,” in Mamatey and Luža, eds, A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp. 130, 174-175; Menclová, “Vývoje československé sociální demokracie,” pp. 83–84; and Wingfield, Minority Politics, ch. 1-3, passim. Google Scholar

39. With the 1924 Insurance Act, for example, employers had to share in contributions toward sickness and old age benefits, and had to pay the full costs for accident insurance. See Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, p. 189. Germans also participated in efforts to revise taxes. See Helmut Slapnicka, “Die Ära Švehla und des sudetendeutschen Aktivismus,” in Karl Bosl, ed., Handbuch der Geschichte der böhmischen Länder, 4 vols (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1968-70), 4: pp. 61–62.Google Scholar

40. See Brügel, Czechoslovakia before Munich, pp. 80–84. The German Social Democrats became the strongest of the German parties; and President Masaryk also insisted that they should enter the cabinet. For results of the election see Mamatey, “The development of Czechoslovak democracy,” in Mamatey and Luza, A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp. 140-142; see also Menclová, “Vývoje československé sociální demokracie,” p. 104. See Wingfield, Minority Politics, p. 97, for the possible political idée fixe of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats.Google Scholar

41. See Brügel, Czechoslovakia Before Munich, p. 82; Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, p. 195.Google Scholar

42. Ibid., p. 193.Google Scholar

43. See Pryor, “Economic Development,” pp. 205–215, in Mamatey and Luza, eds, A History of the Czechoslovak Republic. For the condition of the Czechoslovak economy in relation to that of neighboring states and of Europe in general see Rothschild, East Central Europe, pp. 122-124.Google Scholar

44. Luža, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans, p. 71.Google Scholar

45. Brügel, Czechoslovakia Before Munich, p. 120; Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 128.Google Scholar

46. For analyses and results of the election see César and Černý, Politika německých buržoazních stran, 2: pp. 289–294; Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 126; and Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, p. 206. The Sudeten German Party was popular in the major German cities of the Republic, particularly in northern and north-western Bohemia. Henleinist rhetoric was less successful in small German villages and in the mixed areas of southern Bohemia and Moravia. See Šimka, “Česko-německé vztahy na Jihlavsku”, p. 201; and Wingfield, Minority Politics, pp. 133-134.Google Scholar

47. These journals, such as Die Tat, founded an Anti-Henlein Front and presented articles by anti-fascist intellectuals. Neue Zeit, founded in 1936 and published with support of Czechoslovak government circles, advocated measures that corresponded more with the opinions of government figures than with those of the activists who sought German autonomy within the Republic. See César and Černý, Politika německých buržoazních stran, 2: pp. 332–334. The DSAP published the trilingual (German/French/English) Sudeten-German Newsletters in order to influence domestic and foreign public opinion.Google Scholar

48. Ibid., p. 337; Wingfield, Minority Politics, p. 146–148.Google Scholar

49. See César and Černý, Politika německých buržoazních stran, 2: pp. 294–296, 350-6351, 497; Wingfield, Minority Politics, p. 141. Several expressions of Social Democratic unity in 1938 are reprinted in Chtěli jsme bojovat [We were ready to fight], comp. ástav dějin Komunistické strany Československa. 2 vols. (Prague: Nakladatelství politické literatury, 1963).Google Scholar

50. For example, in September 1938 the German Social Democrat Robert Wiener and Czechoslovak Social Democrat Jaromír Nečas went to Paris in a joint Social Democratic effort to relieve Western pressure on Czechoslovakia during the Munich crisis. They met with Léon Blum, leader of the French Socialists, and pleaded with him to seek a change in French policy. Blum, of course, was unable to help. See Brügel, Czechoslovakia before Munich, pp. 248–249.Google Scholar

51. See Hajek, Jiří S., “Social Democrats defending Czechoslovak democracy and independence,” Kosmas Winter 1984/Summer 1985, 3&4(2&1): pp. 150–156; Wingfield, Minority Politics, pp. 172-173.Google Scholar