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Institutional Power and the Rise of Milošević

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Nebojsa Vladisavljevic
Nebojsa Vladisavljevic*
Affiliation:
Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, N.Vladisavljevic@lse.ac.uk
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Extract

The consensus among specialists on the politics of socialist Yugoslavia and supporters of Slobodan Milošević is that he rose personally as the leader due to a broad appeal of his political programme. According to one version of the political programme thesis, Milošević overwhelmed his initially more powerful opponents in the leadership of Serbia in 1987 by obtaining majority support in higher ranks of the party for his nationalist programme, namely the reduction of autonomy of Kosovo. The other version of the thesis says that he extended nationalist appeals to the population at large and established control over party and state organs in the largest republic of federal Yugoslavia largely by bringing pressure from society on the political elite. In any case, Milošević emerged from the leadership struggle as a very powerful leader and was thus able to purge his rivals from the regional leadership and embark upon the implementation of a nationalist programme. The supporters of Milošević have largely agreed with the specialists. Borisav Jović, his right-hand man, claimed, “the removal of bureaucratic leadership of Serbia, which had subserviently accepted the division of Serbia in three parts,” to be one of their main achievements.

Type
Articles
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , March 2004 , pp. 183 - 205
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 Association for the Study of Nationalities 

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References

Notes

1. For the most sophisticated exposition of the former view see Lenard J. Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 2001), pp. 43–74; for the most detailed and informed attempt to substantiate the latter view see Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin and BBC, 1995), pp. 37–47.Google Scholar

2. Interview in Duga, 7 June 1991.Google Scholar

3. See Steven L. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making since 1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). The collective character of leadership did not preclude frequent conflicts among regions over the distribution of material resources at the disposal of federal organs.Google Scholar

4. Dragisa Pavlovic, Olako obecana brzina (Zagreb: Globus, 1988); Ivan Stambolic, Put u bespuce: odgovori Ivana Stambolica na pitanja Slobodana Inica (Belgrade: Radio B92, 1995); and Mirko Djekic, Upotreba Srbije: optužbe i priznanja Draže Markovića (Belgrade: Besede, 1990).Google Scholar

5. I conducted interviews with Dragoslav Draza Markovic and Bosko Krunic, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of Yugoslavia and its Presidents in 1983–1984 and 1987–1988, respectively; Spiro Galovic, Vaso Milincevic and Milenko Markovic, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of Serbia; Danilo Markovic, a minister in the government of Serbia; Slobodan Jovanovic, a high official in the Belgrade Committee and editor of a popular Belgrade daily; nine high officials who wanted to remain anonymous, including prominent members of the federal party Presidium, regional party Presidium, state Presidency of Serbia, government of Serbia, Presidium of the Provincial Committee of Vojvodina and the Belgrade Committee; and a senior aide to Draza Markovic and Ivan Stambolic (Belgrade and Novi Sad, July 1999, July and August 2000, July 2001).Google Scholar

6. A number of personal accounts of the politicians who took part in these events have been published in book form—including: Pavlović, Olako obećarna brzina; Djekic, Upotreba Srbije; Stambolic, Put u bespuće; and Dušan Čkrebić, Zapis na pesku: secanja (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1995)—and numerous interviews appeared in the local press. For speeches of the two leading figures of the period in Serbia see Ivan Stambolic, Rasprave o SR Srbiji (Zagreb: Globus, 1988) and Slobodan Milošević, Godine raspleta (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1989).Google Scholar

7. The most important documents that shed light on the September 1987 showdown are: “Trideseta sednica Predsednistva CK SK Srbije,” held in Belgrade, 18–19 September 1987 (unauthorised transcript, CK SKS, Predsednistvo, 0300 No: highly confidential, 290/1), Vols 1 and 2; and “Osma sednica CK SK Srbije,” held in Belgrade, 24–25 September 1987, Dokumenti Saveza komunista Srbije (Belgrade: Komunist, 1987). I am grateful to a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of Serbia, whom I have interviewed for this article, for the permission to read his personal copy of the transcript “Trideseta sednica Predsednistva CK SK Srbije,” a document that is still unavailable to the public.Google Scholar

8. Milošević was born in Pozarevac, a small town in central Serbia. His parents, who were originally from Montenegro, settled in the town on the eve of the Second World War. His father, a catechist and teacher of Russian and Serbo-Croat, later separated from his wife and returned to Montenegro, so Slobodan and his elder brother grew up with their mother, a schoolteacher and devoted communist. Their childhood passed without much disturbance and excitement and Slobodan was remembered as a quiet and diligent pupil. See Slavoljub Djukić, Izmedju slave i anateme: politicka biografija Slobodana Miloševića (Belgrade: Filip Višnjič, 1994), pp. 13–17.Google Scholar

9. For a highly informative and balanced portraits of leading members of the older generation in Serbia see the account of their younger long-term associate in Ckrebic, Zapis na pesku, pp. 271–340.Google Scholar

10. For details about the “liberals” and their removal from power see Slavoljub Djukic, Slom srpskih liberala: tehnologija politickih obracuna Josipa Broza (Belgrade: Filip Visnjic, 1990). For more information about purges in other Yugoslav republics see Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974 (London: C. Hurst, 1977).Google Scholar

11. See Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, pp. 143–144.Google Scholar

12. Djukić, Slom srpskih liberala, pp. 105–262.Google Scholar

13. Draža Marković, interview with the author.Google Scholar

14. The post was subsequently renamed “President of the Presidium of the Central Committee.”Google Scholar

15. Draža Marković, Špiro Galović, Vaso Milinčević and two influential members of the regional party Presidium who wanted to remain anonymous, interviews with the author.Google Scholar

16. Draža Marković, interview with author.Google Scholar

17. Stambolić, Put u bespuće, pp. 66–67. See the full text of the “Blue Book” in Djekic, Upotreba Srbije. Google Scholar

18. “Osamnaesta sednica CK SK Srbije,” held in Belgrade, 23–24 November 1984, Dokumenti Saveza Komunista Srbije (Belgrade: Komunist, 1984).Google Scholar

19. See “Osamnaesta sednica CK SK Srbije.”Google Scholar

20. In April 1984 Stipe Suvar, a chief party ideologue in Croatia and a member of the younger generation, initiated a sweeping attack on the partial liberalisation by singling out tens of “anti-socialist” and “anti-Titoist” authors who thrived under the new policy. See a full text of the “White Book” in Intervju, No. 11, 1989. Others responded quietly by unanimously rejecting the nomination of Ivan Stambolic for President of the Federal Executive Council (government). See Stambolic, Put u bespuce, pp. 114–115.Google Scholar

21. Jerry F. Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985–1991 (Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 80–86; and Robert V. Daniels, “Soviet Politics since Khrushchev,” in John W. Strong, ed., The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin: The Transition Years (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold, 1971), p. 20.Google Scholar

22. Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fansoid, How the Soviet Union Is Governed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 260–61; and Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, pp. 80–86.Google Scholar

23. For more information about constitutional and party reforms and elite conflicts and alliances of the late 1960s and early 1970s see Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia; April Carter, Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: The Changing Role of the Party (London: Frances Pinter, 1982); and Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment. Google Scholar

24. Steven L. Burg, “Elite Conflict in Post-Tito Yugoslavia,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1986.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25. Draža Marković, interview with the author.Google Scholar

26. Čkrebić, Zapis na pesku, pp. 278, 302–303.Google Scholar

27. Draža Marković, interview with the author.Google Scholar

28. A prominent member of the regional Presidium who wanted to remain anonymous, interview with the author.Google Scholar

29. An anonymous high party official who was in charge of the cadre selection process in the regional party Presidium, interview with the author.Google Scholar

30. Draža Marković, Boško Krunić, Špiro Galović and two anonymous high party officials, all present at the meeting, interview with the author.Google Scholar

31. Two influential, anonymous members of the regional party Presidium, at the time a supporter and an opponent of Ivan Stambolic, interviews with the author.Google Scholar

32. High party and state officials, regardless of their age and proximity to either Stambolic or Milošević at the time, repeated this time and again in interviews with the author.Google Scholar

33. An anonymous member of the regional Presidium, interview with the author.Google Scholar

34. Two prominent members of the regional Presidium from the younger generation who wanted to remain anonymous, interviews with the author.Google Scholar

35. Stambolic, Put u bespuce, pp. 141–142.Google Scholar

36. Spiro Galovic, Vaso Milincevic, Milenko Markovic and another, anonymous member of the regional Presidium, interviews with the author.Google Scholar

37. Draža Marković, Špiro Galović and two influential members of the regional Presidium who wanted to remain anonymous, interviews with the author.Google Scholar

38. See full text of the memorandum in Kosta Mihailovic and Vasilije Krestic, Memorandum SANU: odgovori na kritike (Belgrade: SANU, 1995), pp. 99–147.Google Scholar

39. Pavlović, Olako obecana brzina, p. 51; and Stambolic, Put u bespuce, p. 131.Google Scholar

40. Interview with Stipe Suvar, RFE/RL, South Slavic Service, 3 December 1999, <http://www.danas.org/programi/interview/1999/12/19991203100229.asp>..>Google Scholar

41. For details about the meeting, the grassroots protest of the Kosovo Serbs and their relations with Milošević see Nebojsa Vladisavljevic, “Nationalism, Social Movement Theory and the Grass Roots Movement of Kosovo Serbs, 1985–1988,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 5, 2002, pp. 771–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

42. Pavlović, Olako obecana brzina, p. 52; and Stambolic, Put u bespuce, pp. 167–170.Google Scholar

43. Vaso Milinčević, Milenko Marković and another, anynomous member of the regional Presidium, interviews with the author.Google Scholar

44. Pavlović, Olako obecana brzina, pp. 94–99.Google Scholar

45. “Trideseta sednica Predsednistva CK SKS”, Vol. 1; and “Osma sednica CK SKS”, pp. 155–164.Google Scholar

46. Only 11 out of 20 members of the regional Presidium voted to remove Pavlovic from membership of the body. “Trideseta sednica Predsednistva CK SKS”, Vol. 2, p. 128/3. Other participants of the meeting, members of federal party organs and high state officials, did not have voting rights.Google Scholar

47. High party officials from the younger generation, including supporters and opponents of Milošević, interviews with the author.Google Scholar

48. An anonymous member of the Presidium who assisted Stambolic and Milošević in the cadre selection process, and Špiro Galović, interviews with the author.Google Scholar

49. Draža Marković, Špiro Galović and three anonymous high party officials, interviews with the author.Google Scholar

50. Špiro Galović, Vaso Milinčević, Milenko Marković and two anonymous high party officials, interviews with the author.Google Scholar

51. Pavlović, Olako obecana brzina, pp. 48, 59, 188; and Stambolic, Put u bespuce, p. 162.Google Scholar

52. “Trideseta sednica Predsednistva CK SKS,” Vol. 2.Google Scholar

53. Stambolić, Put u bespuce, pp. 111–12, 171–172; and Pavlovic, Olako obecana brzina, pp. 75–76.Google Scholar

54. Stambolić, Put u bespuce, pp. 147–148.Google Scholar

55. “Trideseta sednica Predsednistva CK SKS” and “Osma sednica CK SKS.”Google Scholar

56. “Trideseta sednica Predsednistva CK SKS,” Vol. 2.Google Scholar

57. An anonymous member of the regional Presidium, interview with the author.Google Scholar

58. High party and state officials from the Milošević's group repeatedly stressed the seriousness of the threat in interviews with the author. Another episode fully reveals the extent to which many from the Milošević's group feared Ivan Stambolic, even many years after he had retired from politics. In August 2000, a month before the presidential election that set in motion the demise of Milošević, there were rumours that Ivan Stambolic might enter the presidential race. This should not have been a reason for concern for either Milošević or a democratic opposition candidate, since Stambolic had never enjoyed popular support in Serbia and could not realistically win but a very small fraction of the vote. Nonetheless, some people from the regime apparently believed that he had become a serious threat again. Stambolic was promptly abducted and murdered. His body was found two and a half years later, during the police investigation following the assassination of Zoran Dindic, the Prime Minister of Serbia.Google Scholar