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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman's announcement on 12 January 1995 that, as of 31 March, he was withdrawing Croatia's “hospitality” to the 12,000-person U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), stationed in strategic locations on its territory, was a calculated gamble. As subsequent events showed, the risk was not as great as it first appeared. The departure of the UNPROFOR buffer force seemed, on the one hand, to expose Croatia and its army, the HV, to a resumption of hostilities with the rebel Serb forces of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) and their Serbian allies in Bosnia (RS—Republika Srpska) and, possibly, the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). The UNPROFOR presence had largely kept such hostilities in check since early 1992, and the outcome of their resumption was at best uncertain.
1. On the dangers for Croatia of conflict with the combined Serbian forces just over a month before Tudjman's decision to remove UNPROFOR see Emil Vedušić, “Zašto Hrvatska izbjegava rat,” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, No. 1231, 2 December 1994, pp. 2–3.Google Scholar
2. Among them, a report from the number two representative in the Croatian interest office in Belgrade, Dr Dusan Bilandzic, a noted political economist with considerable experience in Belgrade. Bilandzic had reported that the Yugoslav economy had been harder hit by U.N. sanctions than had generally been believed.Google Scholar
3. Misha Glenny presents a vivid account of Croatian and Serbian actions and reactions in these regions in The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, new Edition (London: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 121–126.Google Scholar
4. For another good treatment of these events see Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 232–236.Google Scholar
5. In this connection former U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann's characterisation of Tudjman in his recent Foreign Affairs article is particularly insightful. He portrays Tudjman, with all his evident faults, as, unlike Milosevic, someone who “…really wants to be a Western statesman,” and “…therefore listens to Western expressions of concern and criticism and often does something about them,” Warren Zimmermann, “The Last Ambassador—A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2, cited in BOSNEWS Digest, No. 408, 26 November 1995.Google Scholar
6. Fran Visnar, “Nakon uspostava hrvatsko-bošnjackoga vojnog stozera: savez u pravi trenutak,” Vjesnik, 8 March 1995, from a selection of the Croatian press, on e-mail from the Serbian Information Initiative, 11 March 1995. On the VRS see the chart “Formacija srpske vojske u BiH,” Globus, 11 November 1994, p. 4, which gives the total size of the VRS as 80–82,000 soldiers.Google Scholar
7. The obscure details behind these events are recounted in Vesna Fabris-Perunicic's, “[to donosi najav] jeno ujedinjenje ‘svih srpskih država,”’ Vjesnik, 23 May 1995, reproduced by e-mail Hrvatski tisak, 25 May 1995.Google Scholar
8. For some insights into Croatian thinking on these issues on the eve of Tudjman's first declaration see Tihomir Dujmović, “Mandat za Unproforov odlazak,” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, No. 1237, 13 January 1995, pp. 2–3.Google Scholar
9. Ibid. Google Scholar
10. Ibid. Google Scholar
11. Ibid. Google Scholar
12. Mirko Galic, “Granic s Kinkelom i Juppeom: ‘odledjivanje’ pregovora s Hrvatskom,” Vjesnik, 21 March 1995, as transmitted from “Izbor iz tiska” in the Serbian Information Initiative, 22 March 1995 on e-mail.Google Scholar
13. This list of conditions is derived from a number of different sources, some of which are more credible than others, but all have been mentioned in one place or another. For a useful summary and analysis see Bruno Lopandic, “5,000 ‘plavaca’ na hrvatskim granicama,” Nedjeljna Dalmacija, No. 1246, 17 March 1995, pp. 2–3.Google Scholar
14. Ibid. Google Scholar
15. See, for example, the interview with Anto Djapic, spokesman for the right-wing Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), by Tihomir Dujmovic, “Potrosili smo kredit u narod,” Nedeljnja Dalmacija, No. 1246, 17 March 1995, pp. 5–6.Google Scholar
16. Tanja Torbarina, “Ono tamo: Energično je zauzet stav: Ako strani promatraci ne stanu na hrvatske granice onda nista,” Globus, 17 March 1995, transmitted from Hrvatski-Vjesnik on e-mail.Google Scholar
17. The semi-secret involvement of the U.S. military in re-fashioning the Croatian army, most notably, the quasi-private organisation “Military Professional Resources Inc.,” headed by a former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Carl Vuono, and by the former head of the Defence Intelligence Agency, Ed Soyster, and the implications for U.S.-Croatian relations the role of Croatia in Washington's Balkan plans and relationships within the U.S. alliance system in Europe are discussed in Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “American Bow to Forces of Realpolitik in Bosnia,” The Sunday Telegraph, 26 November 1995, cited in Reuters Textline, 26 November 1995.Google Scholar
18. Torbarina herself was not remiss in expressing her glee over the rapidity of the Croatian operation “storm” in the Krajina. In a column on 11 August she noted that the one fault of the Croatian troops was that they were not fast enough to keep up with the retreating Serbs, whom she designated as “the fastest army in the world,” Globus, 11 August 1995, by e-mail from Hrvatski vjesnik, 11 August 1995.Google Scholar
19. The U.N. pours between US$2.5 and US$3.0 million per day, which is a major contribution to the limping Croatian economy. The patent irrationality of sacrificing this income was interpreted by some as evidence that Tudjman was never really serious about expelling UNPROFOR. Alen Anic, “The Art of Sabre Rattling,” Balkan War Report, No. 32, March 1995, p. 36.Google Scholar
20. Even Germany, formerly Croatia's main patron in the West and now somewhat sidetracked by Washington's military and diplomatic “leadership” in the region, found some of the Croatians’ policies toward the remnant Serb population hard to take. See, for example, Kuno Kruse, “Eine Nation auf Bewahrung,” Die Zeit (Hamburg), 20 October 1995, pp. 13–16. I am grateful to Prof. Peter Hill of Hamburg University for sending me this article. On the other hand, Roy Gutman, who won the Pulitzer Prize for his reportage on Serbian atrocities, has recently predicted that human violations by Croat troops and authorities in formerly Serbian inhabited territories will cause difficulties for relations with the U.S., as well. Interviewed by Ivor Alborghetti in Globus, No. 259, 24 November 1995.Google Scholar
21. Ibid., for example.Google Scholar
22. Nearly complete results reported by Reuters on 31 October had the HDZ receiving about 44.8% of the total vote. Cited in the Open Media Research Institute (OMRI) Daily Report, No. 213, 1 November 1995.Google Scholar
23. Davor Butkovic, “Predsjednik Franjo Tudjman odbio je Drazena Budisu, Gorana Granica i Dr. Zdravko Tomca kao kandidate za gradonacelnika i zaprijetio da ce u Zagrebu raspisati nove izbore!” Globus, No. 257, 10 November 1995.Google Scholar
24. There has been a well orchestragted campaign to sell the Dayton outcome as the only possible one for Croatia under present international conditions. See, for example, the interview on 24 November 1995 with Foreign Minister Mate Granić in Večernji list by Mate Piskor, “The Only Peace Agreement Possible,” transmitted by e-mail <croatian-news/stribor.srce.hr>, 24 November 1995 (in English).,+24+November+1995+(in+English).>Google Scholar
25. Evans-Pritchard, loc. cit. Google Scholar
