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Two Possible Alternatives to Turf War
The Autonomy Alternative
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
Extract
Mass movements based on reason and morality—the enforcement of freedom, equal human dignity, justice, sovereignty of the people and self-determination—are not mere expressions of pious desire, but are expressions of real, irresistible political necessity that must not be ignored.
István Bibó
The preceding studies in this volume have provided an overview of the history and current situation of Hungarians living as minorities in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, and the regions of the former Yugoslavia. The purpose of this conclusion is not to analyze past experience and current hardships but rather to illuminate the future prospects of Hungarian communities located outside Hungary's current state borders by looking at various autonomy proposals. Since the collapse of state socialist regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, persons belonging to Hungarian national communities in the region have expressed a political will to preserve their identity and to determine and govern their own affairs. It is, therefore, instructive to take a closer look at the various proposals for autonomy advocated by the representatives of these Hungarian communities because they offer a peaceful and democratic solution, not only to the current problems of the countries they inhabit, but also to the growing destabilization of the region due to ethnic strife.
- Type
- III In Lieu of an Afterword
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1996 Association for the Study of Nationalities of Eastern Europe and ex-USSR, Inc.
References
Notes
1. Bibó, István, The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies (Sussex, England: The Harvester Press Limited, 1976), p. 34.Google Scholar
2. Because there is more than one Hungarian-founded political party in each relevant state, I have chosen to discuss the autonomy plans adopted by the most popular Hungarian-founded political party in each state. There are no precise statistics with regard to exactly what percentage of the total Hungarian population voted for which political party; however, the percentage of votes cast for certain political parties in each township or region can be determined. In the majority of Hungarian-inhabited areas of Serbia (the region of Vojvodina), Romania and Slovakia, the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Vojvodina (DAHV), the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) and the Political Movement Coexistence, respectively, received the most votes.Google Scholar
3. Aside from the acute case of Yugoslavia (where constitutional debates have not yet begun), see the recently adopted constitutions of Romania and Slovakia. Moreover, as opposed to Ukraine, Croatia and Slovenia, neither of the formerly mentioned states has been willing to sign unqualified bilateral minority-protecting agreements with Hungary. With regard to the international legal arena, though these states are signatories of various relevant international documents, they continue to fail to implement their provisions domestically.Google Scholar
4. In the case of Yugoslavia, an additional means of discrimination has been practiced by the disproportionately heavy drafting of Hungarians into a war in which they refuse to participate and which they vehemently oppose. The Democratic Association of Hungarians in Vojvodina (DAHV) continues to refuse to comply with the draft.Google Scholar
5. On the other hand, the inhabitants of various disputed regions of Germany and Austria were permitted to have a say regarding the borders. Referenda were held in Carinthia, Silesia, Eastern Prussia and Schleswig. The inhabitants of Sopron, Hungary, also participated in a referendum in 1921, in which they voted to remain in Hungary. See Zoltán Palotás, A Trianon-i határok (The Borders of Trianon) (Budapest: Interedition, 1990), pp. 22–23; English translation forthcoming.Google Scholar
6. Historic settlements were also ceded to Austria, but the problems encountered by those Hungarians are of a different nature and cannot be compared to the Hungarian communities under state socialist systems.Google Scholar
7. Bíró, Gáspár, A Legal Theoretical Approach to Group Autonomy Based on the Ethnic Principle, lecture series given at the Budapest Eötvös Lóránd Tudományegyetem, Department of Political Science seminar, 1992-1993.Google Scholar
8. As mentioned previously, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania has not yet adopted a detailed autonomy plan, (The Cluj/Kolozsvár Declaration to which I have referred does not contain institutional suggestions).Google Scholar
9. Use of the term “personal” in this case is rooted in its contrast to “territorial,” a distinction whereby not the location (land) per se but the ethnicity is the deciding factor.Google Scholar
10. This characteristic stands despite the fact that the proposals and views voiced by the elected representatives of the Hungarian national communities in Romania and Slovakia have been ignored (see the debates regarding the new Slovak constitution in the fall of 1992 and the Romanian constitution in the fall of 1991). Moreover, the existing majority rule causes them to be outvoted by the national majority in every case. This problem reinforces the inadequacy of the majority principle as an adequate method of aggregating individual interests in a democratic but also multinational state.Google Scholar
11. See Halperin, Morton H. and Scheffer, David J. with Small, Patricia L., Self-Determination in a New World Order (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), Ch. 1.Google Scholar
12. Ibid., p. 21.Google Scholar
13. Ibid., p. 47.Google Scholar
14. Bibó, pp. 74–75.Google Scholar
15. Ibid., p. 75.Google Scholar
16. Ibid., p. 75.Google Scholar