1. The Geneva Conventions include four separate treaties: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Convention I of 12 August 1949); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Convention II of 12 August 1949); Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Convention IV of 12 August 1949); and Geneva Convention relative to the TYeatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III of 12 August 1949). Conventions I, II, and III revised earlier conventions on the laws of war. Convention IV was an entirely new development in those laws.

2. Note that only five countries are not parties to the Geneva Conventions, the largest of which is Burma. ICRC, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions and Successions (3 07 1989)Google Scholar; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. US), 1986 ICJ 14 (noting that the Geneva Conventions are a development and expression of fundamental principles of humanitarian law).

3. Protocol I opened for signature December 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 ILM (1977) p. 1391; Protocol II opened for signature December 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 ILM (1977) p. 1442.

4. Discussed in full in section 2.3 infra.

5. ‘Soviets Ratify 1977 Protocols to Geneva Pact’, New York Times, Sec A, p. 15, col. 1 (8 August 1989).

6. This section is intentionally brief. For more in-depth treatment of the genesis of these laws see Schindler, D. and Toman, J., The Laws of Armed Conflicts (1981)Google Scholar; Bothe, M., Partsch, K.J. and Solf, W.A., New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts (1982)Google Scholar.

7. Suter, K., An International Law of Guerrilla Warfare (1984)Google Scholar.

8. Common Art. 3; ICRC, Basic Rules of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols (1983)Google Scholar.

9. GA Res. 217 A(III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948).

10. Described infra n. 77.

11. For a full description of ICRC activities, see 2 The International Committee of the Red Cross: International Organization and the Evolution of World Society (1984).

12. Reprinted in Suter, op. cit. n. 7, pp. 30–31.

13. Suter, , op. cit. n. 7, pp. 53–55Google Scholar.

14. UN Secretary-General, Report on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts (A/7720) (20 11 1969)Google Scholar.

15. Ibid.

16. UN Secretary-General, Report on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts (A/8052) (9 09 1970)Google Scholar.

17. UN Secretary-General, Report on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts: Comments by Governments on the Reports of the Secretary General (A/8370) (15 06 1971)Google Scholar.

18. Suter, , op. cit. n. 7, pp. 68–70Google Scholar.

19. Idem at p. 80.

20. UN Secretary-General, Report on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts (A/8370) (2 09 1971)Google Scholar.

21. Pictet, J., Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (1985)Google Scholar.

22. ICRC, Rules Applicable in Guerrilla Warfare (01 1971)Google Scholar.

23. Idem at pp. 50–55.

24. Suter, , op. cit. n. 7, p. 113Google Scholar.

25. ICRC, Report on the Work of the Conference of Government Experts (08 1971) pp. 66–67Google Scholar.

26. ICRC, Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts – Basic Texts (01 1972)Google Scholar.

27. ICRC, Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (07 1977) p. 3Google Scholar. The national liberation movements which participated included: African National Congress, African National Council of Zimbabwe, Angola National Liberation Front, Mozambique Liberation Front, Palestine Liberation Organization, Pan-Africanist Congress, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, Seychelles Peoples' United Party, South West African People's Organization, Zimbabwe African National Union, and Zimbabwe African People's Union.

28. See, e.g., ‘The Sixth Annual American Red Cross – Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions’, 2 AUJIL & Politics Yearbook (1987) pp. 415, 476Google Scholar (hereinafter ‘Sixth Annual Conference’) (Comments by Commander W.J. Fenrick).

29. Discussed supra.

30. Protocol II, Art. 1 (emphasis added).

31. ICRC, op. cit. n. 2, at p. 9Google Scholar.

32. ‘Soviets Ratify 1977 Protocols to Geneva Pact’, supra n. 5.

33. ICRC, op. cit. n. 2, p. 7Google Scholar.

34. In his seminal work on guerrillas and humanitarian law, Michel Veuthey notes that such declarations have been made by the following movements:

— ANC (African National Congress of South Africa), in a declaration addressed to the ICRC on November 28, 1980;

— SWAPO, in a declaration addressed to the ICRC on August 25, 1981;

— EPLF (Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front), in a declaration addressed to the ICRC on February 2, 1977;

— UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), in a declaration addressed to the ICRC on July 25, 1980;

— In Afghanistan by ANLF, in a declaration addressed to the ICRC on December 24, 1981, by Hesli Islami, in a declaration to the ICRC on September 7, 1980, by ISA, in a declaration to the ICRC on June 1, 1982;

— PLO, in several declarations, [including one on] July 6, 1982 [and in a request to the Swiss Government to become party to the Geneva Conventions in August 1989];

— MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) (Philippines), in a declaration addressed to the ICRC on May 18, 1981.

Veuthey notes that although these declarations do not conform precisely with Protocol I, Art. 96(3), they are nonetheless valuable in the sense that they correspond to the will and the means of these movements. Veuthey, M., Guerrilla et droit humanitaire (1983)Google Scholar.

35. Veuthey, M., ‘Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts: The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross’, 33 AUL Rev. (1983) pp. 83, 87Google Scholar.

36. ICRC, The ICRC Worldwide (1988) p. 2Google Scholar.

37. Veuthey, loc cit. n. 35.

38. Gasser, H., ‘International Non-International Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon’, 31 AUL Rev. (1982) pp. 911, 922–923Google Scholar.

39. Idem at pp. 921–922.

40. Idem at p. 916.

41. ICRC, op. cit. n. 36, p. 13Google Scholar.

42. See Braddock, L., ‘Moral Unequivaience’, The Heritage Foundation: Policy Review (Summer 1988)Google Scholar.

43. Bothe, M., ‘Article 2 and Protocol II: Case Studies of Nigeria and El Salvador’, 31 AUL Rev. (1982) pp. 899, 902–903Google Scholar.

44. Idem at p. 903 (fnn. omitted).

45. Idem at p. 904.

46. See idem at p. 899.

47. Geraldson, R., ‘What is International Humanitarian Law? The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross’, 31 AUL Rev. (1982) pp. 817, 836Google Scholar.

48. Solf, W.A., ‘Non-International Armed Conflicts’, 31 AUL Rev. (1982) pp. 927, 930–931Google Scholar.

49. Nahlik, S., A Brief Outline of International Humanitarian Law (1984) p. 42Google Scholar.

50. Letter of Submitted from Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts, S. Treaty Doc No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at VII (1987), reprinted in 26 ILM (1987) p. 563 (hereinafter Letter of Submittal) (numbering does not reflect actual numbering of articles within Protocol II).

51. Nahlik, op. cit. n. 49.

52. See discussion supra.

53. DeLupis, I.D., The Law of War (1987) p. 172Google Scholar.

54. According to Waldemar Solf, only the State involved can make this determination. Solf, , loc cit. n. 48, p. 932Google Scholar. On the other hand, Antonio Cassesse argues that rebel commanders can also invoke Protocol II: Cassesse, A., ‘;The Status of Rebels Under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts’, 30 ICLQ (1981) p. 416CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

55. ICRC, op. cit. n. 2, p. 7Google Scholar.

56. Bothe, , loc. cit. n. 43, pp. 905–906Google Scholar.

57. Idem at p. 907.

58. Solf, , loc cit. n. 48, p. 932Google Scholar.

59. Ibid.

60. Letter of Submittal, supran. 50, at VIII.

61. Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan, Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims ofNoninternational Armed Conflicts, S. Treaty Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) reprinted in 26 ILM (1987) p. 562 (hereinafter Letter of Transmittal).

62. The pertinent sentence in the Letter of Transmittal reads, ‘I would also invite an expression of the sense of the Senate that it shares the view that the United States should not ratify Protocol I…’ I The American Bar Association and others have taken this to mean that Protocol I is thereby transmitted to the Senate, should be reviewed in full, and could even be ratified. Others argue that it merely requests a non-binding vote of support from the Senate, but that the treaty was not actually transmitted to it. E.g., Miller, J., ‘Reagan Shelving Treaty to Revise Law on Captives, New York Times, Sec 1, Pg. 1, Col. 6 (16 02 1987)Google Scholar.

63. For example, the American Red Cross has adopted a strong pro-ratification position.

64. Letter of Submittal, supra n. 50, at IX.

65. Ibid.; see also Sofaer, A., ‘Terrorism and the Law’, Foreign Affairs (Summer 1986)Google Scholar.

66. See, eg., Dinstein, Y., ‘Interstate Armed Conflict and Wars of National Liberation’, 31 AUL Rev. (1982) pp. 849, 849–851Google Scholar.

67. Letter of Submittal, supra n. 50, at IX.

68. Ibid.

69. See, eg., Remarks of Lt. Col. Carnahan, B., Sixth Annual Conference, supra n. 28, at p. 485 et seq.Google Scholar; Roberts, G., ‘The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol I’, 26 Va. JIL (1985) p. 109Google Scholar.

70. See, eg., Feith, D., ‘Law in the Service of Tferror – the Strange Case of Additional Protocol l’, 1 The National Interest (1985) p. 36Google Scholar.

71. See, eg., Dinstein, Y., ‘The New Geneva Protocols: A Step Forward or Backward?’, YB World Affairs (1979) p. 265Google Scholar.

72. See, e.g., Friedlander, R.A., ‘Terrorism and National Liberation Movements: Can Rights Derive from Wrongs?’, 13 Case Western JIL (1981) p. 281Google Scholar.

73. Geneva Convention III, supra n. 1, Art. 4(A).

74. Hans-Peter Gasser, legal counsel to the ICRC, and Raymond Geraldson, of the American Red Cross, are examples. See Gasser, H., ‘Agora: The U.S. Decision not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims’, 81 AJIL (1987) p. 910Google Scholar; Geraldson, loc. cit. n. 47.

75. Ambassador George H. Aldrich, Chief, US Delegation, and Former Army General George S. Prugh, head Committee I, US Delegation, are examples. See Aldrich, G.H., ‘New Life for the Laws of War’ 75 AJIL (1981) p. 764CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

76. Prof. Howard S. Levie, former Professor of international law, Naval War College, is an example. See Remarks of Levie, H., Sixth Annual Conference, supra n. 28, at pp. 533–535Google Scholar.

77. According to the definition in Protocol I, Art. 2(c), ‘“Protecting Power” means a neutral or other State not a Party to the conflict which has been designated by a Party to the conflict and accepted by the adverse Party and has agreed to carry out the [monitoring] functions assigned a Protecting Power under the Conventions and this Protocol.’

78. The significance of this development may be demonstrated by contrast to the experience in the Vietnam conflict, during which North Vietnam claimed that all captured Americans were automatically war criminals despite the fact that there were no trials or convictions, only executions. See Levie, , supra n. 28, at pp. 534–535Google Scholar; See also Aldrich, G., ‘Guerrilla Combatants and Prisoner of War Status’, 31 AUL Rev. (1982) p. 871Google Scholar.

79. See Gasser, H., ‘A Brief Analysis of the 1977 Geneva Protocols’, 19 Akron LR (1986) pp. 525, 528Google Scholar.

80. See DeLupis, , op. cit. n. 53, p. 161Google Scholar.

81. Aldrich, G.H., ‘Progressive Development of the Laws of War a Reply to Criticism of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I’, 26 Va. JIL (1986) pp. 693, 704Google Scholar.

82. Miller, loc cit. n. 62.

83. See Veuthey, op. cit. n. 34.

84. See Suter, , op. cit. n. 7, at p. 167Google Scholar.

85. See Aldrich, , loc. cit. n. 81, p. 702Google Scholar.

86. US v. Shakur 817 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1987) (representative of African People's Organization denied right to claim POW status); US v. Torres 583 F. Supp. 86, 89 (N.D. 111. 1984) (representative of FALN denied right to claim POW status); US v. Williams 532 F. Supp. 319, 320 (N.J. 1981) (representative of New Republic of Africa denied right to claim POW status); US v. Morales 464F. Supp. 325, 326 (E.D. N.Y. 1979) (Protocol I inapplicable as basis for claiming POW status because US not a party).

87. ‘Black South African Fails to Win Prisoner-of-War Status’, The Renter Library Report (3 November 1987).

88. 517 F. Supp. at 547.

89. The US Senate would have to consider whether the executive branch's objections to the Protocols could be resolved through understandings and reservations in a way which would not be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Protocols. Whether this could be accomplished is hotly debated. Compare Gasser, lot cit. n. 74, with Roberts, lot cit. n. 69.

90. For a general introduction to customary international law see Janis, M.W., An Introduction to International Law (1988)Google Scholar.

91. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra n. 2.

92. An entire conference of the American Red Cross was devoted to this issue. See, Sixth Annual Conference, supra n. 28.

93. See, e.g., The Position of the United States on Current Law of War Agreements: Remarks of Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, January 22, 1987, Sixth Annual Conference, supra n. 28, at p. 460 et seq.

94. See, e.g., Remarks of Sohn, L.B., Sixth Annual Conference, supra n. 28, at p. 440Google Scholar.

95. ICRC, op. cit. n. 2.

96. Apparently, the US Army is coordinating its efforts in this area with its NATO allies.

97. Protocol I, Art. 82; see also Hampson, F.J., ‘Fighting by the Rules: Instructing the Armed Forces in Humanitarian Law’, Int. Rev. of Red Cross (03–04 1989) pp. 111, 121Google Scholar.

98. Non-governmental organizations also have an important role in reporting and documenting violations.

99. ICRC, op. cit. n. 2.

100. ‘Guerrillas Responsible for Massacre to be Punished, Says Spokesman’, Kyodo News Service (13 July 1989).

101. Ibid.

102. ‘Philippines: Bishops' Peace Bid Revives War of Words’, Inter Press Service (26 July 1988).

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. International Alert, Summary Report of International Conference on Internal Conflict in the Philippines 11–16 December 1988: Conference Closing Statement, at p. 11Google Scholar.

106. See Marino, E., ‘Towards a Code of Conduct: Minimum Combatant Duties – Minimum People's Rights’, Conflict Resolution in the Philippines (1989)Google Scholar.

107. According to M. Ennals, Secretary General of International Alert.

108. International Alert, op. cit. n. 105, p. 2Google Scholar.

109. According to M. Ennals, Secretary General of International Alert.

110. ‘Shoot-out in Manila’, Newsweek (11 December 1989) p. 55.

111. Ibid.

112. ‘So Much for People Power’, Newsweek (18 December 1989) pp. 38, 39.

113. Ibid.