1. (1878) 4 P.D. 1.

2. [1895] A.C. 517, 540. Adopted, American Law Institute, Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, (1934), s. 111Google Scholar, hereafter referred to as Restatement, 1934.Google Scholar See, also, Williams v. North Carolina (1945) 325Google Scholar U.S. 226, 229, “judicial power to grant a divorce … is founded on domicile”.

3. Warrender v. Warrender (1835) 2 CI. & F. 488.Google Scholar

4. In the U.S. it was early decided that an innocent spouse could have a separate jurisdictional domicile: Haddock v. Haddock (1906) 201 U.S. 562.Google Scholar The Supreme Court later disapproved of drawing such a distinction and allowed separate domiciles per se: Williams v. North Carolina (1945) 325 U.S. 226.Google Scholar

5. Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey [1921] 1 A.C. 147.Google Scholar

6. Att.-Gen. for Alberta v. Cook [1926] A.C. 444.Google Scholar

7. Garthwaite v. Garthwaite [1964] P. 356.Google Scholar

8. Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey [1921] 1 A.C. 147, 152 per Lord Haldane.Google Scholar

9. Ibid., p. 168 per Lord Shaw.

10. Re-enacted as s. 18 (1) (a), s. 40 (1) (a), s. 46 (1) (a), Matrimonial Causes Acts 1950, 1965, 1973 respectively; repealed, Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, Schedule 6.

11. Indyka v. Indyka [1967] 2 A.E.R. 689, 728–29Google Scholarper Lord Pearson.

12. Re-enacted as s. 18 (1) (b), s. 40 (1) (b), s. 46 (1) (b) Matrimonial Causes Acts 1950, 1965, 1973 respectively; repealed, Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, Schedule 6.

13. Indyka v. Indyka [1967] 2 A.E.R. 689, 707–8Google Scholarper Lord Morris.

14. See, e.g., Kern v. Kern [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1224Google Scholar, discussed Wade (1973) 36 Mod. L.R. 206.

15. See, supra, n. 4.

16. See, s. 24 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959; s. 6 (1) Divorce Act 1968; s. 3 Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1963, respectively.

17. Article 3 whereby the meaning of habitual residence as employed in Article 2 includes domicile as that term is used in the State of origin but does not include the domicile of dependency of a wife.

18. G.A. Res. 217 (III), adopted Paris, 10 December 1948, GAOR, 3rd. Sess. Part I.

19. Law Commission Published Working Paper No. 28, Family Law: Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Causes (other than Nullity), 1970Google Scholar, para. 40; hereafter referred to as Law Comm. W.P. No. 28.

For previous attempts to reform the law see Private International Law Committee, First Report, 1954, Cmnd. 9068, paras. 7 (1), 18; Report of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, 1956, Cmnd. 9678, para. 837, recommending jurisdiction based on residence. For the fate of Lord Meston's Bills of 1958 and 1959 see, House of Lords, Official Report, Vols. 211, cols. 206–9; 213Google Scholar, col. 709; 214, cols. 327–57, and, Bland (1958) 7 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 753, Mann (1959)Google Scholar 8 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 457.

20. Law Commission Report No. 48, Family Law: Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Causes, 1972Google Scholar, para. 46; hereafter referred to as, Law Comm. Rep. No. 48.

21. See, supra, n. 10 and n. 12.

22. Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax [1956] P. 115Google Scholar; Szechter v. Szechter [1971] 2 W.L.R. 170.Google Scholar

23. Garthwaite v. Garthwaite [1964] P. 356.Google Scholar

24. Simonin v. Mallac (1860) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67Google Scholar; Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith [1963]A.C. 280.Google Scholar

25. Leon v. Leon [1967] p. 275Google Scholar; Cheshire & North, Private International Law, 8th ed., (1970), p. 347.Google Scholar

26. Viz. Administration of Justice Act 1956, s. 4; Wills Act 1963, s. 1; Adoption Act 1968, s. 11; Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, s. 3; Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, ss. 5, 6, 16; Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973, s. 7.

27. See, Dicey, & Morris, , Conflict of Laws, 9th ed., (1973), p. 91.Google Scholar

28. See, generally, Law Comm. W.P. No. 28, paras. 81–84Google Scholar; Law Comm. Rep. No. 48; paras. 103–108.Google Scholar

29. See, now, Radwan v. Radwan (No. 2) [1972] 3 W.L.R. 939Google Scholar, holding that capacity to contract a polygamous marriage is governed by the intended matrimonial residence: discussed, Wade (1973) 22 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 571.

30. The enactments applied where the court had jurisdiction, in the first case to proceedings for presumption of death and dissolution of mariage and in the second to proceedings under s. 40 (1) on the basis of the wife petitioner's residence in England, though neither spouse was domiciled in England.

31. Law Comm. Rep. No. 48, paras. 107–8.

32. See, Morris, , Conflicts of Laws, (1971), pp. 67–8.Google Scholar

33. See, Zanelli v. Zanelli (1949) 64 T.L.R. 556Google Scholar, where the Court of Appeal held that a deserted wife whose husband was domiciled in Italy, which at that time did not permit divorce, was able to obtain a divorce in England – the question whether English law alone should apply was not directly argued.

34. Nussbaum, , Principles of Private International Law, (1943), p. 37.Google Scholar

35. Ibid., pp. 41–42.

36. Law Comm. Rep. No. 48, para. 105.

37. Law Comm. W.P. No. 28, para. 82.

38. Ibid., para. 83.

39. Law Comm. Rep. No. 48, para. 104.

40. Law Comm. W.P. No. 28, para. 83.

41. Law Comm. Rep. No. 48, para. 39.

42. Law Comm. W.P. No. 28, para. 83.

43. Law Comm. Rep. No. 48, para. 104.

44. Ibid. p. 40.

45. Whicker v. Hume (1858) 7 H.L.C. 124, 160Google Scholarper Lord Cranworth. See, Dicey, , Conflict of Laws, 1st ed., (1896), pp. 80–90Google Scholar. Also, p. 106 n. 2 where this eminent writer takes pains to elaborate the distinction between domicile and ‘home’.

46. Cmnd. 9068, (1954), para. 13.

47. Forbes v. Forbes (1854), Kay 341, 367Google Scholar; see, Restatement, Redraft 1954, s. 24: “When a person with capacity to acquire a domicile of choice has more than one home, his domicile is in the earlier home unless the second home is his principal home”; of this approach it was said in Wahl v. Att.-Gen. (1932) 147 L.T. 382Google Scholar, H.L., “In a similar situation, the Restatement raises the presumption that his English home corresponds with his domicile, and the onus of proof being on Wahl to show another home as his principal home. In other words, ordinary residence raises the presumption of domicile”.

48. See, generally, Dicey, & Morris, , op. cit., 9th ed., Rules 5 & 6, pp. 88–90.Google Scholar

49. Wolff, , Private International Law, 2nd ed., (1950), p. 106.Google Scholar

50. Bergner & Engle Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus (1898), 51 N.E. 531, 532Google Scholarper Holmes J. Cf. Restatement, 1934, s. 11 “every person has at all times one domicile, and no person has more than one domicile at a time”, reiterated in 1954 Draft, eventually modified to, “for the same purpose”, Restatement, Second, s. 11 (2).

51. Bell v. Kennedy (1868), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 307, 320Google Scholarper Lord Westbury; Udny v. Udny (1869), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441Google Scholar; Garthwaite v. Garthwaite [1964] P. 356, 379Google Scholar. Earlier indications in favour of multiple domiciles: see, Somerville v. Somerville (1801), 5 Ves. 750, 786Google Scholar; Re Capdevielle (1864), 2 H. & C. 985, 1018Google Scholar, used ‘commercial’ domicile as a synonym for residence: cf. The Harmony (1800), 2 C.Rob. 322Google Scholar; La Virginie (1804), 5. C. Rob. 98Google Scholar. See, Dicey, , op.cit., 1st ed., pp. 95–7.Google Scholar

52. Bell v. Kennedy (1868) L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 320Google Scholarper Lord Westbury. English law knows of three categories of domicile: of origin, of choice, and that possessed by persons under a disability, which last is variously termed a domicile by operation of law (which is confusing for a domicile of origin is also said to attach by operation of law), a derivative domicile, or one of dependency. The latter is employed by the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, ss. 1 (2) and 4. See, Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey [1921] 1 A.C. 146, 165–66Google Scholar; Dicey, & Morris, , op. cit., 9th. ed., pp. 85–126.Google Scholar

53. Morris, , op.cit., p. 13.Google Scholar

54. Drevon v. Drevon (1864) 34 L.J.Ch. 129, 133per Kindersley V.C.Google Scholar

55. Casdagli v. Casdagli [1919] A.C. 145, 178per Lord Atkinson.Google Scholar

56. Indyka v. Indyka [1967] 2 A.E.R. 689, 711Google Scholarper Lord Pearce.

57. Ibid. p. 721 per Lord Wilberforce.

58. Lord v. Colvin (1859), 4 Drew. 366, 376Google Scholarper Kindersley V.C.

59. (1869), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441.

60. (1868), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 307.

61. Ibid., p. 311. Emphasis supplied.

62. See, generally, Dicey, & Morris, , op. cit. pp. 85–6Google Scholar. Dicey, , op. cit., 1st ed., p. 110.Google Scholar

63. The domicile of a dependent child whose mother is dead is that which the mother last had before she died if at her death the child had her domicile by virtue of s. 4 and has not since had a home with the father. The domicile of an illegitimate child (the new provisions do not apply to the latter but do apply to adopted children) probably cannot be changed at all.

64. Cf. Bangs v. Inhabitants of Brewster (1873) 111 Mass. 382Google Scholar, and see, Restatement, Second, s. 16, comments d, f. For interpretations of this phrase in the context of the Divorce Reform Act 1969 see, Fuller v. Fuller [1973] 1 W.L.R. 730Google Scholar; Mouncer v. Mouncer [1972] 1 W.L.R. 321Google Scholar; Santos v. Santos [1972] 2 W.L.R. 889.Google Scholar

65. [1953] 1 W.L.R. 865.

66. See, Dicey, & Morris, , op. cit., 9th ed., p. 86Google Scholaret seq., passim; Graveson, , Conflict of Laws, 6th ed., (1969), p. 204Google Scholaret seq., passim; Cheshire, & North, , op. cit., 8th ed., p. 162Google Scholaret seq., passim. Cf. Restatement, Second, s. 16, comment b. Also, Dicey, , op. cit., 1st ed., p. 80et seq.Google Scholar

67. Udny v. Udny (1869), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441, 458Google Scholar. See, generally, Dicey, & Morris, , op. cit., 9th ed., pp. 106–12.Google Scholar

68. See, Bempde v. Johnstone (1796) 3 Ves. 198, 201–2.Google Scholar

69. Drexel v. Drexel [1916] 1 Ch. 251.Google Scholar

70. Firebrace v. Firebrace (1878), 4 P.D. 63.Google Scholar

71. Cruickshanks v. Cruickshanks [1957] 1 W.L.R. 564, 568.Google Scholar

72. McClean, (1962) 11 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 1153, 1159.Google Scholar

73. Bell v. Kennedy (1868), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 307, 319Google Scholarper Lord Westbury.

74. (1869), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441. Dicey, , op. cit., 1st ed. pp. 118–9.Google Scholar

75. (1820), 5 Madd. 379. Dicey, , op. cit., 1st ed. p. 117.Google Scholar

76. (1869), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441, 449–50, 453–54. Cf. Restatement, Second, s. 19, adopting the view expressed by Sir John Leach.

77. Bell v. Kennedy (1868), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 307, 319per Lord Westbury.Google Scholar

78. (1863), 3 Sw. & Tr. 49. Cf. Tee v. Tee [1974] 1 W.L.R. 213, discussed, infra.

79. Munro v. Munro (1840), 7 Cl. & Fin. 842, 876Google Scholarper Lord Cottenham: “residence alone has no effect per se, though it may be most important as a ground from which to infer intention”.

80. Hodgson v. De Beauchesne (1858) 12 Moo. P.C. 285, 329Google Scholar, per Dr. Lushington. Cf. Re Grove (1888), 40 Ch.D. 216, 243Google Scholarper Lopes L.J., where forty five years' residence produced an “almost irresistible” inference of domicile: Dicey, , op. cit., 1st ed., rules 13, 17.Google Scholar

81. (1790), 2 Bos. & P. 229 n., reported as a footnote to Marsh v. Hutchinson (1800), 2 Bos. & P. 226Google Scholar; see, also, Bempde v. Johnstone (1796), 3 Ves. 198.Google Scholar

82. For the modern law as to attribution of domicile of origin, see, Dicey, & Morris, , op.cit., 9th ed., pp. 93–4Google Scholar; Dicey, , op.cit., 1th ed., pp 100–4.Google Scholar

83. See, 126 E.R. 1252–53. Note that even at this early date domicile in the context of succession and choice of law was accepted as a stricter concept than domicile – residence for matrimonial purposes, see, also, Somerville v. Sommerville (1801) 15 Ves. 750, 786–87, 858Google Scholarper Sir R.P. Arden M.R. Cf. Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal Infirmary [1930] A.C. 588Google Scholar, discussed, infra.

84. For a recent discussion as to this, see, Tee v. Tee [1974] 1 W.L.R. 213Google Scholar, discussed, infra.

85. Stanley v. Bernes (1830), 3 Hag. Ecc. 373, 437–38Google Scholarper Sir John Nicholl.

86. Jopp v. Wood (1865), 34 L.J.Ch. 212, 218Google Scholarper Turner L.J. See, also, Steel v. Steel (1888) 15 R. 896, 909Google Scholar, “Nobody in his senses ever goes to Burmah sine animo revertendi”, and, Doucet v. Geoghegan (1878) 9 Ch.D. 441, 453Google Scholar, “It is well known that everyone who goes to India does so for the express purpose of making money and returning to this country as soon as possible”; both cited, Dicey, & Morris, , op. cit., 9th ed., p. 104Google Scholar n. 85. Cf., Dicey, , op. cit., 1st ed. p. 93 n. 1.Google Scholar

87. Bell v. Kennedy (1868), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 307, 321per Lord Westbury.Google Scholar

88. Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal Infirmary [1930] A.C. 588, 595per Lord Thankerton.Google Scholar

89. Ibid., p. 598 per Lord Macmillan.

90. Udny v. Udny (1869), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441, 458per Lord Westbury.Google Scholar

91. See, Dicey, & Morris, , op. cit., 9th ed., p. 85Google Scholaret seq., passim; Graveson, , op. cit., 6th ed., pp. 206–9Google Scholar; Cheshire, & North, , op. cit., 8th ed., p. 78Google Scholaret seq., passim. Dicey, , op. cit., 1st ed., p. 110.Google Scholar

92. See, Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian [1937] 4 A.E.R. 618, 626–27Google Scholarper Langton J. See, also, Henderson v. Henderson [1965] 2 W.L.R. 218.Google Scholar

93. In the Estate of Fuld (No. 3) [1968] p. 675, 684per Scarman J.Google Scholar

94. Graveson, (1972) 19 Neth. Int. L.R. 31, 39.Google Scholar

95. [1904] A.C. 287.

96. [1930] A.C. 588.

97. The irony of the case was that of the eight judges involved in the determination six concluded in favour of a change of domicile – both judges at first instance, all three judges on appeal to the Court of Appeal, and one in the final appeal to the House of Lords. Of the other two judges sitting in the House one declared himself unable to reach any positive decision on the conflicting evidence and fell back on the rule that the domicile of origin must continue on a failure to discharge the onus of proof of showing a change.

98. Bruce v. Bruce (1790), 2 Bos. & P. 229Google Scholar n. See, supra, n. 83.

99. Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal Infirmary [1930] A.C. 588.Google Scholar

100. Ibid, p. 595 per Lord Thankerton. Cf. May v. May [1943] 2 A.E.R. 146Google Scholar. On the need for unequivocal acts, see, Re Lloyd-Evans [1947] 1 Ch. 695Google Scholar Also, Travers v. Holley [1953] p. 246, 252Google Scholarper Jenkins L.J.

101. Winans v.Att.-Gen. [1904] A.C. 287, 289Google Scholarper Lord MacNaghten; see, Lauderdale Peerage Case (1885) 10 App. Cas. 692, 739Google Scholarper Lord Selborne. Also, Restatement, Second, s. 19, comment c.

102. The exception is Casdagli v. Casdagli [1919] A.C. 145Google Scholar. See, Morris, , op. cit., p. 20.Google Scholar

103. Indyka v. Indyka [1967] 2 A.E.R. 689, 697Google Scholarper Lord Reid.

104. Ibid., pp. 710–11 per Lord Pearce.

105. See, for indications of such an approach, Moorhouse v. Lord (1863) 10 H.L.C. 272Google Scholar, Udny v. Udny (1869) L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441Google Scholar, suggesting that a change of domicile requires a change of nationality; Niboyet v. Niboyet (1878) 4 P.D. 1Google Scholar, arguments of counsel at pp. 2–3; Harvie v. Farnie (1882) 8 App. Cas. 43Google Scholar, headnote to decision reads “native”.

106. See, e.g. Ehrenzweig, & Jayme, , Private International Law, Vol. 2, Special Part (1973), p. 100Google Scholar, “England's domicile of origin which may be seen as the very ancestor of the nationality principle itself”.

107. (1869) L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441. See, Dicey, , op. cit., 1st ed., pp. 118–9.Google Scholar

108. Not until 1927 with the coming into effect of the Legitimacy Act 1926.

109. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 213.

110. Ibid., p. 215. Cf. Lauderdale Peerage Case (1885), 10 App. Cas. 692, 739Google Scholarper Selborne, Lord, “an intention to settle there permanently, sine animo revertendi”.Google Scholar

111. (1887) 36 Ch. D. 400, 407 per Cotton L.J.

112. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 213, 215.

113. See, now, Dicey, & Morris, , op. cit., 9th ed. p. 114Google Scholar, rule 13, “by ceasing to intend to reside there”. Contra, Cheshire, & North, , op. cit., 8th ed., p. 173Google Scholar, advancing the opposite view with some force, viz., “Irresolution effects nothing”.

114. [1968] 1 A.E.R.49.

115. Ibid., p. 58. In most cases it will make no difference which test is applied, as in the present and see, also, Ali v. Ali [1966] 1 A.E.R. 664, 666–67 per Cumming - Bruce J.

116. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 213, 216.

117. See, particularly, Bell v. Kennedy (1868)Google Scholar, L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 307, 319 per Westbury, Lord, supraGoogle Scholar. See, Dicey, , op. cit., 1st. ed., p. 107.Google Scholar

118. Dicey, & Morris, , op. cit., 9th ed., pp. 95–6Google Scholar, citing, Manning v. Manning (1871) L.R. 2 P. & D. 223, 226Google Scholar, and, Re Newcomb (1908) 192 N.Y. 238, respectivelyGoogle Scholar. Note that the former was not a decision on the factum necessary for domicile, but on the meaning of “residence”.

119. Restatement, Second, s. 19, and comment b. Recommended, Private International Law Committee, 1954, Cmnd. 9068, First Report, rule 13.

120. In re Estate of Jones (1921) 182 N.W. 227.Google Scholar

121. See, Sill v. Worswick (1791), 1 H.B1. 665, 690Google Scholarper Loughborough, Lord; Somerville v. Sommerville (1801), 5 Ves. 750, 787Google Scholarper Arden, M.R.;Ryan v. Ryan (1816), 2 Phill.Ecc. 332, 334Google Scholarper SirNicholl, John; Curling v. Thornton (1823), 2 Add. 6, 15–17Google Scholarper SirNicholl, John; Anderson v. Laneuville (1854), 2 Sp. 41, 55per Dr. Lushington.Google Scholar

122. Moorhouse v. Lord (1863), 10 H.L.C. 272, 283Google Scholarper Lord Kingsdown. See, now, Wahl v. Att.-Gen. (1932), 147 L.T. 382, 385 per Lord Atkin.Google Scholar

123. Re Tootal's Trusts (1883), 23 Ch.D. 532; Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra (1888), 13 App. Cas. 431Google Scholar; see, also, supra, n. 154. See, now, Casdagli v. Casdagli [1919] A.C. 145. Dicey, , op. cit., 1st ed., p. 88.Google Scholar

124. (1921) 182 N.W. 227.

125. Graveson, , loc.cit., p. 39.Google Scholar

126. See, e.g., Kahn-Freund, (1964), 27 Mod. L.R. 55, 57Google Scholar, “dethrone the superannuated ‘domicile’ concept of English and Scottish Law”.

127. Indyka v. Indyka [1967] 2 A.E.R. 689, 711Google Scholarper Lord Pearce, “until a question of domicile comes before your Lordships' House, one must accept the strict test… and acknowledge the existence of the wide gap that lies between our concept of domicile and that of other countries”.

128. Law Comm. W.P. No. 28, para. 19, “it seems unlikely that any root-and-branch reform of the general law of domicile would be possible at present”. But, cf. para. 37, infra, n. 131, 133.

129. Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s. 1.

130. Law Comm. W.P. No. 28, para. 5.

131. Ibid., para. 37, viz., to forum shoppers.

132. See, ibid., para. 34 re the disadvantage of nationality as a jurisdiction base in England.

133. Ibid., para. 37; also, Hartley, & Karsten, (1974) 37 Mod. L.R. 179, 183.Google Scholar

134. See, Law Comm. W.P. No. 28, re the objectives of jurisdiction rules, para. 13 (2), “should be such that persons who reasonably regard themselves as belonging to a country should not be excluded by them”.

135. Ibid., para. 48.

136. See, Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, s. 3(1) (b), (2); Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s. 5.

137. See, Council of Europe, Standardisation of the Legal Concepts of ‘Domicile’ and ‘Residence’, 1972Google Scholar, Resolution (72) 1 and Annex with Explanatory Memorandum: for the text see (1973) 20 Neth. Int. L.K. 213.